
{| border="1" width="325" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" align="right" style="margin-left:1em;margin-bottom:1em" !colspan="2" bgcolor="#ffff99"| The Yom Kippur War |- |Conflict||Arab-Israeli conflict |- |Date||October 6–24, 1973 |- |Place||Sinai, Golan Heights, and surrounding regions |- |Result||Ended by a United Nations cease-fire in Israeli victory. |- !colspan="2" bgcolor="#ffff99"|Major Combatants |- | width="50%" valign="top" style="text-align:center"|Israel | width="50%" valign="top" style="text-align:center"|Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan |- !colspan="2" |Casualties |- |2,656 killed
7,250 wounded
400 tanks destroyed
600 damaged/returned to service
102 planes shot down
(Rabinovich, 496–497) |8,528 killed
19,540 wounded
(Western analysis)
15,000 dead
35,000 wounded
(Israeli analysis)
2,250 tanks destroyed or captured
432 planes destroyed
(Rabinovich, 496–497) |- |} The Yom Kippur War (Hebrew language: ''Milchemet Yom HaKipurim'' (מלחמת יום הכיפורים), also known as the October War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Ramadan War), was fought from October 6 (the day of Yom Kippur) to October 24, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Egypt and Syria. The War began when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise joint attack in the Sinai and Golan Heights, both of which had been captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years earlier. Although some key figures in Israel were aware of it ahead of time, Israeli intelligence, despite warnings to the contrary, predicted that war was not imminent. The Israeli Defense Forces, particularly the front-line troops, were caught almost entirely by surprise when the attack came. The Egyptians and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after which momentum began to swing in Israel's favor. By the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed entirely out of the Golan Heights. In the Sinai to the south, the Israelis had struck at the "hinge" between two invading Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal (where the old cease-fire line had been), and cut off an entire Egyptian army just as a United Nations cease-fire came into effect. The war had far reaching implications for many nations. The Arab world, which had been humiliated by their crushing defeat during the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by their string of victories early in the war. This vindication, in many ways, cleared the way for the peace process which followed the war. Following the war, the Camp David Accords led to normalized relations between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized Israel. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence almost entirely. ==Background== ===Causes=== [[Image:Sadat2.jpg|thumb|Anwar Sadat, leader of Egypt during the Yom Kippur War]] This war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which has included many battles and wars since 1948. During the Six-Day War six years earlier, the Israelis had captured the Sinai, clear to the Suez Canal, which had become the cease-fire line. The Israelis had also captured roughly half of the Golan Heights from Syria. In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971, Israel spent $500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after Israeli General Haim Bar-Lev. After the war that defeated the Egyptian and Syrian armies in 1967, and having emerged undefeated from the three-year long War of Attrition with Egypt in the south and several border incidents with Syria in the north, the Israeli leadership had grown somewhat complacent. Both Arab countries desired a return of the territories lost in the 1967 war. After the success of the Six Day War the Israeli leadership was reluctant to enter into negotiations over returning these territories, feeling that they were militarily secure. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who resolved to fight Israel and win back the territory lost in the Six-Day War. In 1971, Sadat, in response to an initiative by UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring, declared that if Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip" and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as requested by Jarring, Egypt would then "be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Israel responded that it would not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines. Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israeli's the status quo could be altered. Hafiz al-Assad had a different view, he had little interest in negotiation and felt the retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since the Six Day War Assad had launched a massive military build up and hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With the aid of Egypt Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly against the Israeli army and thus secure Syria's role in the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been retaken by force, which would force Israel to give up the Palestinian territories, and make other concessions. Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option." (Rabinovich, 13). Israel argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was in the great shame over the Six Day war, and before any reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war to reclaim the Sinai, and were highly upset of Sadat not having launched one in his first three years in office. The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a new war. Hussein of Jordan of Jordan feared another major loss of territory as had occurred in the Six-day war, during which Jordan was halved in population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the Palestinian territories and in the event of a victory promised Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Moreover during the Black September in Jordan of 1970 a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO leaving Assad and Hussein estranged. Iraq and Syria also had strained relations and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a diplomatic offensive to try and win support for the war. By the fall of the 1973 he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to curry favour in Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and France had for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United Nations Security Council. In the lead up to the war West Germany became one of Egypt's largest sources of materiel. ===Events leading up to the War=== Anwar Sadat in 1972 publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to war with the Israel, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers." From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-23s, SA-6 Gainfuls, RPG-7s and especially the Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones. The role of the great powers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of Egypt's military weakness. While the U.S. and other allied nations supplied Israel with the most up-to-date assault weapons in the world, the Russians supplied Egypt only with defense weaponry, and then only with great reluctance. Indeed, President Nasser was only able to obtain the material for an anti-aircraft missile defense wall after having visited Moscow and threatened the Kremlin leaders that he would have to return to Egypt and tell the Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them and then relinquish power to one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans because the Americans would have the upper hand in the region. One of the undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and war materiel. It was felt that the only way to convince the Soviet leaders of the deficiencies of most of the aircraft and air defense weaponry they had supplied to Egypt following 1967 was to put them to the test against the advanced weaponry which the U.S. had supplied to Israel. Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to push Egypt towards a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At all costs they wanted to avoid a new conflagration between the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with the United States. The reality of the situation became apparent when the superpowers met in Oslo and agreed to maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders and when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, it became imperative to expel the Russians from Egypt. In July 1972 Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisors in the country and reoriented the country's foreign policy to be more favourable to the United States. The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez would incur massive losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing Detente, had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June, 1973 meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, Brezhnev had proposed Israel pull back to 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans of conquest. (Rabinovich, 39) In an interview published in ''Newsweek'' (April 9, 1973), President Sadat again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on the highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the Israeli Air Force would be able to repel it. Almost a full year before the war, in an October 24, 1972, meeting with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel, even without proper Soviet support (Rabinovich, 25). Planning was done in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon commanders were not told of war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack Israel in concert with Syria was code-named Operation Badr (the Arabic language word for "full moon"). ===Lead up to the surprise attack=== The IDF's A'man (Military Intelligence), "the leader of Israel's intelligence community," was responsible for formulating the nation's intelligence estimate (Rabinovich, 22). Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as well. Second, they learned from a high ranking Egyptian information (who to-this-day remains confidential, known only as "The Source") that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late August (it would take 4 months to train the Egyptian ground crews), A'man predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly colored their thinking and led them to dismiss other war warnings. The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely hurt the army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptian's made repeated reports on a non-existent lack of spare parts that also made their way to Israel. Sadat had long engaged in brinkmanship. Sadat had so frequently stated that the war would soon resume that the world ignored such declarations. In May and August 1973 the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border. Both times the Israeli army had mobilized at the cost of some $10 million dollars. For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as more training exercises. Movement of Syrian troops towards the border was puzzling, but not a threat because, A'man believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived. Despite refusing to participate Hussein of Jordan of Jordan ''"had met with Sadat and ''[Syrian President]'' Hafez al-Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in"'' (Rabinovich, 51). On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian attack. ''"Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they'' [Egypt] ''would cooperate'"''. (Rabinovich, 50) Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. A'man concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not already know. ''"Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during September from well placed sources. But''[ Mossad chief] ''Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's warnings succeeded in stirring his doubts"'' (Rabinovich, 56). He would later remark that ''"We simply didn't feel them capable [of War]"'' (Rabinovich, 57).
Finally, Zvi Zamir personally went to Europe to meet the aforementioned source at midnight on October 5/6. At that meeting, the source informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian attack on Israel was imminent. It was this warning in particular, combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded the Israeli high command into action. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli Reserve (military). Ironically, calling up the reserves proved to be easier than usual, as almost all of the troops were at synagogue or at home for the holy day.
===Lack of an Israeli Pre-emptive attack===
[[Image:Goldmeir at whitehouse.jpg|frame|right|Upon learning of the impending attack, Israeli Prime Minister of Israel Golda Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike]]
Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if war was imminent, Israel would launch a Preemptive_war. It was assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst case, about 48 hours notice prior to an Arab attack.
Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Israeli general David Elazar met at 8:05 AM the morning of Yom Kippur, 6 hours before the war was to begin. Dayan began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar then presented his argument, in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 PM, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00 PM. ''"When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it not be blamed for starting the war. "If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody", she said"'' (Rabinovich, 89). European nations, under threat of an Arab Petroleum embargo and trade boycott, had stopped supplying Israel with munitions. As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States to resupply its army, and was particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship.
In retrospect, the decision not to strike first was a sound one. Operation Nickel Grass, the American airlift of supplies during the war which began on October 13, while it did not immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, did allow it to expend what it did have more freely (Rabinovich, 491). Had they struck first, according to Henry Kissinger, they would not have received "so much as a nail".
[[Image:Operation Nickel Grass.gif|thumb|right|150px|Operation Nickel Grass was the American airlift of supplies to Israel. Shown here, an American C-5 Galaxy unloads an M-60 Patton Tank at Ben Gurion International Airport]]
== The War ==
=== In the Sinai ===
The Egyptian units would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of losing protection of their Surface-to-air_missile batteries. In the Six-day war, the Israeli Air Force had pummelled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt (and Syria) had heavily fortified their side of the cease-fire lines with SAM batteries, against which Israeli Air Force had no effective countermeasures. Israel, which had invested much of its defense budget building the region's strongest air force, would see its air force rendered almost useless by the presence of the SAM batteries.
Anticipating a swift Israeli armored counterattack, the Egyptians had armed their first wave with unprecedented numbers of tank-destroying weapons — rocket propelled grenades and the more devastating Sagger missiles. 1 in every 3 Egyptian soldiers had an anti-tank weapon. "Never before had such intensive anti-tank fire been brought to bear on the battlefield" (Rabinovich, 108). In addition, the ramp on the Egyptian side of the canal had been increased to twice the height of the Israeli ramp, giving them an excellent vantage point from which to fire down on the Israelis, as well as any approaching tanks.
The Egyptian army surprised many by breaching the Israeli defenses and quickly crossing the Suez Canal in what became known as The Crossing, reducing all but one of the Bar-Lev forts. In a meticulously rehearsed operation, the Egyptian forces advanced approximately 15 km into the Sinai Desert with the combined forces of two army corps. The Israelis had set up defensive positions behind huge sand berms on the east bank of the canal, which experience taught them would be nearly impervious to bombing or artillery attack. However, Egyptian military engineers came up with an ingenious plan—attacking the berms with water cannon, fed directly from the canal. The berms disintegrated under water pressure, leaving the Israeli defensive positions exposed.
The troops garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts, outnumbered by orders of magnitude, were overwhelmed. Only one, Budapest (the northernmost Bar-Lev fort) would remain in Israeli control through the end of the war.
The Egyptian forces consolidated their initial positions. On October 8, Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front—who had only taken the position 3 months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—ordered a counterattack by Gabi Amir's brigade against entrenched Egyptian forces at Hizayon, where approaching tanks could be easily destroyed by Saggers fired from the Egyptian ramp. Despite Amir's reluctance, the attack proceeded, and result was a disaster. Towards nightfall, a counterattack by the Egyptians was stopped by Ariel Sharon's division—Sharon had been reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. The fighting lulled, with neither side wanting to mount a large attack against the other.
Following the disasterous Israeli attack on the 8th, both sides settled into defensive postures and hoped for the other side to attack (Rabinovich, 353). Elazar replaced Gonen, who had proven out-of-his-league, with Haim Bar-Lev, who had come out of retirement. Because it was considered dangerous to morale to replace the front commander during the middle of a battle, rather than being sacked Gonen was made chief-of-staff to the newly appointed Bar-Lev.
After several days of waiting, Sadat, wanting to ease pressure on the Syrians, ordered his chief generals (Saad El Shazly and Ahmad Ismail Ali chief among them) to attack. The Egyptian forces brought across their reserves and began their counterattack on 14 October. ''"The attack, the most massive since the initial Egyptian assault on Yom Kippur, was a total failure, the first major Egyptian reversal of the war. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the wadi thrust, they had expended them in head-on attack against the waiting Israeli brigades. Egyptian losses for the day were estimated at between 150 and 250 tanks"'' (Rabinovich, 355)
[[Image:Yom Kippur War 2.jpg|right|thumbnail|250px|''"Israeli paratroops breaking through an Egyptian commando ambush on a sandspit leading to Fort Budapest on the Sinai front"'' (Rabinovich, 278)]]
The following day, October 15, the Israelis launched Operation Stouthearted Men—the counterattack against the Egyptians and crossing of the Suez Canal. The attack was a tremendous change of tactics for the Israelis, who had previously relied on air and tank support—support that had been decimated by the well prepared Egyptian forces. Instead, the Israelis used infantry to infiltrate the positions of the Egyptian SAM and anti-tank batteries, which were unable to cope as well with forces on foot. A division led by Major General Ariel Sharon attacked the Egyptian line just north of Great Bitter Lake, in the vicinity of Ismailiya. The Israelis struck at a weak point in the Egyptian line, the "seam" between the Egyptian second Army in the north and the Egyptian third Army in the south. In some of the most brutal fighting of the war in and around the Chinese Farm (an irrigation project east of the canal and north of the crossing point), the Israelis opened a hole in the Egyptian line and reached the Suez Canal. A small force crossed the canal and created a bridgehead on the other side. For over 24 hours, troops were ferried across the canal in light inflatable boats, with no armor support of their own. They were well supplied with American-made M72 LAW missiles, negating the threat of Egyptian armor. Once the anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences of the Egyptians had been neutralized, the infantry once again was able to rely on overwhelming tank and air support.
Prior to the war, fearing an Israeli crossing of the canal, no Western nation would supply the Israelis with bridging equipment. They were able to purchase modular pontoon bridging equipment from a French scrap lot. On the night of October 16/October 17, the Israelis deployed a the pontoon bridge. Avraham Adan's division crossed and raced south, intent on cutting off the Egyptian third Army before it could retreat west back into Egypt. At the same time, it sent out raiding forces, to destroy Egyptian SAM missile batteries east of the canal. (Before the war ended, the Israelis were within 101 kilometers of Cairo, Egypt's capital.)
=== On the Golan Heights ===
In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two brigades and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced off against approximately 1,400 Syrian tanks. Despite the overwhelming odds and the fact that most of the Syrian tanks were equipped with night fighting equipment, every Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Syrian commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli stronghold at ''Jabal al Shaikh'' (Mount Hermon) which had a variety of surveillance equipment.
Fighting in the Golan Heights was given priority by the Israeli High Command. The fighting in the Sinai was far enough that Israel was not immediately threatened; should the Golan Heights fall, the Syrians could easily advance into Israel itself, although they did not plan to. Reservists were directed to the Golan as quickly as possible. They were assigned to tanks and sent to the front as soon as they arrived at army depots, without waiting for the crewman they trained with to arrive; without waiting for machine guns to be installed on their tanks, and without taking the time to calibrate their tank guns (a time-consuming process known as Boring (calibration)).
As in the Sinai, on the Golan Heights, the Syrians took care to stay under cover of their SAM missile batteries. Also as in the Sinai, the Syrians made use of Soviet anti-tank weapons (which, because of the uneven terrain, were not as effective as in the flat Sinai desert).
The Syrians had expected it would take at least 24 hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, Israeli reserve units began reaching the battle lines only fifteen hours after the war began.
By the end of the first day of battle, the Syrians (who at the start outnumbered the Israelis in the Golan 9 to 1) had achieved moderate success. Towards the end of the day, ''"A Syrian tank brigade passing through the Rafid Gap turned northwest up a little-used route known as the Tapline Road, which cut diagonally across the Golan. This roadway would prove one of the main strategic hinges of the battle. It led straight from the main Syrian breakthrough points to Nafekh, which was not only the location of Israeli divisional headquarters but the most important crossroads on the Heights."'' During the night, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold, who had just arrived to the battle unattached to any unit, fought them off with his single tank until help arrived. ''"For the next 20 hours, Zvika Force, as he came to be known on the radio net, fought running battles with Syrian tanks - sometimes alone, sometimes as part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were knocked out. He was wounded and burned but stayed in action and repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected direction to change the course of a skirmish."''.
Over four days of fighting, the 7th Israeli brigade in the north (commanded by Yanush Ben Gal) managed to hold the rocky hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah. To the south, however, the "Barak" brigade, bereft of any natural defenses, began to take on heavy casualties. Commander Colonel Shoham was killed during the first few days of fighting, as the Syrians desperately tried to push inwards towards the Sea of Galilee.
The tide in the Golan turned as the arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain and, starting 8 October, push back the Syrian offensive. The tiny Golan Heights was too small to act as an effective territorial buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but it proved to be a strategic geographical stronghold and was a crucial key in preventing the Syrian army from bombing the cities below. By Wednesday, October 10, the last Syrian unit in the Central sector had been pushed back across the purple line (the pre-war border). (Rabinovich, 302)
A decision now had to be made - whether to ease the fighting down and end the war at the 1967 border, or to continue the war into Syrian territory. Israeli High Command spent the whole of October 10 debating this, well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's ignominious defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had happened two days before). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would give them a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended. Others countered that Syria had strong defenses - antitank ditches, minefields, and strongpoints —and that it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain of Syria) in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Meir realized the most crucial point of the whole debate—''"It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north - an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line... The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, October 11"'' (Rabinovich, 304)
From 11 October to 14 October, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria, conquering a further twenty-square-mile box of territory in the Bashan. From there they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km away, using heavy artillery.
''"As Arab position on the battlefields deteriorated, pressure mounted on King Hussein to send his Army into action. He found a way to meet these demands without opening his kingdom to Israeli air attack. Instead of attacking Israel from their common border, he sent an expeditionary force into Syria. He let Israel know of his intentions, through U.S. intermediaries, in the hope that it'' [Israel] ''would accept that this was not a casus belli justifying an attack into Jordan... Dayan declined to offer any such assurance, but Israel had no intention of opening another front"'' (Rabinovich, 433). Iraq also sent an expeditionary force to the Golan, consisting of some 30,000 men, 500 tanks, and 700 APCs. (Rabinovich, 314).
Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any further Israeli gains.
On 22 October, the Golani Brigade recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after sustaining very heavy casualites from entrenched Syrian snipers strategically positioned on the mountain. An attack two weeks before had cost 25 dead and 67 wounded, while this second attack cost an additional 55 dead and 79 wounded (Rabinovich, 450). An Israeli D9 bulldozer with Israeli infantry breached a way to the peak, preventing the peak from falling into Syrian hands after the war. A paratrooper brigade took the corresponding Syrian outposts on the mountain.
=== At sea ===
The Battle of Latakia, a revolutionary naval battle between the Syrians and the Israelis, took place on October 7, the second day of the war, resulting in a resounding Israeli victory that proved the potency of small, fast missile boats equipped with advanced Electronic countermeasures. The battle also established the Israeli Navy, long derided as the "black sheep" of the Israeli services, as a formidable and effective force in its own right.
Several other times during the War, the Israeli navy mounted small commando-style raids on Egyptian ports. The purpose of these raids was to destroy boats that were to be used by the Egyptians to ferry their own commandos behind Israeli lines.
=== Participation by other Arab states ===
Besides Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, many other Arab nations were involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. Exact amounts of support are uncertain.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave financial aid and sent some token forces to join in the battle. Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, the palestinians sent troops as well. (Rabinovich, 464). Pakistan sent sixteen pilots.
From 1971 to 1973, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya sent Mirage (aircraft) fighters and gave Egypt around $1 billion to arm for war. Algeria sent squadrons of fighters and bombers, armored brigades, and dozens of tanks. Tunisia sent over 1,000 soldiers, who worked with Egyptian forces in the Nile delta, and Sudan sent 3,500 soldiers.
==The cease-fire and immediate aftermath==
===Egypt's trapped Third Army===
The United Nations passed a cease-fire, largely negotiated between the U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called for an end to the fighting between Israel and Egypt (but technically not between Syria and Israel). It came into effect at 12 hours later at 6:52 PM Israeli time. (Rabinovich, 452). Because it went into effect after darkness, it was impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines were when the fighting was supposed to stop. (Rabinovich, 458)
When the cease-fire began, the Israeli forces were just a few hundred meters short of their goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez. During the night, the Egyptians broke the cease-fire in a number of locations, destroying nine Israeli tanks. In response, David Elazar requested permission to resume the drive south, and Moshe Dayan approved. (Rabinovich, 463) The Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured the road, and trapped the Egyptian Third Army west of the Suez Canal.
The next morning, October 23, a flurry of diplomatic activity occured. Soviet Surveillance aircraft had confirmed that Israeli forces were moving south, and the Soviets accused the Israelis of treachery. In a phone call with Golda Meir, Henry Kissinger asked "how can anyone ever know where a line is or was in the desert?" Meir responded, "they'll know, all right." Kissinger found out shortly later about the trapped Egyptian army. (Rabinovich, 465).
Kissinger realized the situation presented the United States with a tremendous opportunity—Egypt was totally dependent on the United States to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army, which now had no access to food or water. The position could be parlayed later into allowing the United States to Mediation the dispute, and push Egypt out of Soviet influences.
:''"[Kissinger] had pushed Israel during the war to strike hard—harder, in fact, than it had initially been able to—in order to demonstrate its military superiority. But once the Israelis had begun smiting the Egyptians, he worked towards a speedy cease-fire that would leave the Egyptians with their dignity intact. Israel, in short, was to emerge quasi-victorious, not triumphant"'' (Rabinovich, 486)
As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening to support a UN resolution to force the Israelis to pull back to their October 22 positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army "is an option that does not exist" (Rabinovich, 487).
===Nuclear alert===
In the meantime, Brezhnev sent Nixon a letter in the middle of the night of October 23–24. In that letter, Brezhnev proposed that American and Soviet contingents be dispatched to ensure both sides honor the cease fire. He also threatened that "I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps Unilateralism. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel" (Rabinovich, 479). In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene in the war on Egypt's side.
The message arrived after Nixon had gone to bed. Kissinger called immediate meeting of senior officials, including United States Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency William Colby, and White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. The Watergate scandal had reached its apex, and Nixon was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter without him:
:''"When Kissenger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty decisions"'' (Rabinovich, 480).
The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three, the highest peacetime level. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name) asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States. (Rabinovich, 480)
The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition, and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the United States because of Egypt and Syria," said KGB chief Alexei Kosygin, while Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the World War III" (Rabinovich, 484). In the end, the Soviets reconciled themselves to an Arab defeat. The letter from the American cabinet arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply. (Rabinovich, 485) The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets, bringing the crisis to an end.
===Northern front de-escalation===
On the northern front, the Syrians had been preparing for a massive counter-attack, scheduled for October 23. In addition to Syria's five division (military)s, Iraq had supplied two, and there were smaller compliments of troops from other Arab countries, including Jordan. The Soviets had replaced most of the losses Syrian's tank forces had received during the first weeks of the war.
However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations imposed its cease-fire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and Egypt). ''"The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday'' [October 22] ''created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him, but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well... Others, however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking Damascus"'' (Rabinovich, 464-465)
Ultimately, Assad decided to call off the offensive, and on October 23, Syria announced it had accepted the cease-fire, and the Iraqi government ordered its forces home.
===Post-cease-fire negotiations===
Organized fighting on all fronts ended by October 26. The cease-fire did not end the sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines, nor did it dissipate military tensions. With the third Army cut off and without any means of resupply, it was effectively a hostage to the Israelis.
Israel received Kissinger's threat to support a UN withdrawal resolution, but before they could respond, Egyptian national security advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing to enter into direct talks with the Israelis, provided that the Israelis agree to allow nonmilitary supplies to reach their army and agree to a complete cease-fire.
The talks took place on October 28, between Israeli Major General Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Major General Muhammad al-Ghani al-Gamasy. Ultimately, Kissinger brought the proposal to Sadat, who agreed almost without debate. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace Israeli checkpoints, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and prisoner of war were to be exchanged. A summit in Geneva followed, and ultimately, a peace agreement was worked out. On January 18, Israel signed a pullback agreement to the west side of the canal, and the last of their troops withdrew on March 5, 1974 (Rabinovich, 493).
Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war, Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line (border) and the establishment of a UN buffer zone. The UNDOF (UNDOF) was established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.
==Long-term effects of the war==
The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab and Israeli officials met for direct discussions.
For the Arabs (and Egyptians in particular), the psychological trauma of their abysmal defeat in the Six-day war had been healed. In many ways, it allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. However, given that the war started as well as the Arabs could have imagined, and that Israel still won, it helped convince many in the Arab world that Israel could not be militarily defeated, strengthening peace movements therein.
The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel; following their victory in the Six-day war, the Israeli military had become complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had thought they had military supremacy in the region.(Rabinovich, 497–498) However, in time, they began to realize that ''"Reeling from a surprise attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still unmobilized, and confronted by staggering new battlefield realities, Israeli’s situation was one that could readily bring strong nations to their knees. Yet, within days, it had regained its footing and within less than two weeks it was threatening both enemy capitals"'', ''"an achievement having few historical parallels."'' (Rabinovich, 498). However, in Israel, the casualty rate was high. Per capita, Israel suffered as many casualties in 3 weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade of Vietnam War.
In response to Israeli successes and the U.S. support of Israel, in the midst of the war, on October 17 the Arab states declared an oil embargo against Western_countries, leading to the 1973 energy crisis.
===Fallout in Israel===
A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Moti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians (Rabinovich, 499). Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an investigation, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days (Rabinovich, 501).
The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's failings:
* IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal, after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."
* Chief of Intelligence Eli Zeira and his deputy, Aryeh Shalev were recommended for dismissal.
* Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the A'man desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
* Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty (Rabinovich, 502). He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that ''"he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."''
Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which ''"had stressed that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its mandate"''—inflamed it. Although it had cleared Meir and Dayan of all responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's) became more vociferous. (Rabinovich, 502)
Finally, on April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity (Rabinovich, 237), became head of the new Government, which was seated in June.
===Camp David Accords===
:''Main article - Camp David Accords (1978)''
Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was forced to step down in 1977. The Right-wing_politics Likud party, under the prime ministership of Menachem Begin won the elections that followed.
Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai, grew frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In November 1977, he took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab leader to do so (and implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist).
The act jump-started the peace process. United States President Jimmy Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and a lasting peace.
Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years later, on October 6, 1981, while attending a parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the war. He was assassinated by Army members who were outraged at his negotiations with Israel.
==Notes==
# "[http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1947-1974/28%20The%20Jarring%20initiative%20and%20the%20response-%208%20Febr The Jarring initiative and the response]," ''Israel's Foreign Relations'', Selected Documents, vols. 1–2, 1947–1974 (accessed June 9, 2005).
# Doron Geller, "[http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973]," Jewish Virtual Library (accessed June 9, 2005).
# Abraham Rabinovich, "[http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.23.html Shattered Heights: Part 1]," ''Jerusalem Post'', September 25, 1998 (accessed June 9, 2005).
# Ibid.
# [http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline6f.html Findings of the Agranat Commission], The Jewish Agency for Israel, see "January 30" on linked page (accessed June 9, 2005).
==References==
*''In Search of Identity: An Autobiography'' by Anwar Sadat.
*''Man of Defiance: A Political Biography of Anwar Sadat'' by Raphael Israeli.
*''Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking'' by Moshe Maòz.
*''The Yom Kippur War : The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East'' by Abraham Rabinovich. ISBN 0805241760
*[http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1947-1974/28%20The%20Jarring%20initiative%20and%20the%20response-%208%20Febr Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The Jarring initiative and the response]
*[http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html Jewish Virtual Library's Israeli Intelligence and the Yom Kippur War of 1973]
*[http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.23.html Jerusalem Post's - Yom Kippur War: Shattered Heights ]
*[http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline6f.html Jewish Agency for Israel's Timeline of Israeli history]
==External links==
*[http://www.jajz-ed.org.il/100/maps/egypt.html Maps : Egypt]
*[http://www.jajz-ed.org.il/100/maps/syria.html Maps : Syria]
*[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/index.htm The October War and U.S. Policy] - Provided by the ''National Security Archive''.
Yom_Kippur_War
Israeli_history
Arab-Israeli_conflict
Syrian_history
History of Egypt
ms:Perang Yom Kippur
''An event mentioned in this article is a Template:May 31 selected anniversaries'' ------ I'm planning to write a major article on the Yom Kippur War (like I did with the Six-Day War), but it may yet take a while to write it (lots of material, viewpoints). --user:Uriyan Suprisingly, this article does not even state why it is called "Yom Kippur War", although it contains a lot of other interesting information. --user:FlorianMarquardt Who the heck is this Esseily guy? Are you trying to re-write history with incorrect facts just to make the Egyptians look better or something? You're obviously not impartial enough to comment on this article. Name the war after the people who won? It's always been called the Yom Kippur War. That's the day the Arab nations attacked Israel again. Emphasis on the word "Attacked" and "Again". There's no rewards for aggressors in war. Egypt lost land from a previous war when they "Attacked" Israel. What do you want Israel to say, "Oh, we're sorry you attacked us and we had to defend ourselves and take some land. Here you go. You can have the land back if you promise not to "Attack" us anymore." Sorry pal, it doesn't work that way. And what's with calling the war an Egyptian victory? I'm pretty sure the Egyptian army was defeated and the Israeli tanks were only about 20Km outside Damascus before the U.S. implored them not to attack and to turn around and go back. If you want to call that a victory, o.k. I guess. Israel gave the land back after Camp David not because of any defeat during this war, but as a peace offering with assurance that Egypt recognizes the state of Israel and will not declare war on them anymore. Pretty nice gesture by Israel. Hey, Eiselly! Keep it real or go post on some Al Jazeera web site where you could commiserate with other haters. On second thought, why don't you stop breeding hate, and become the first great Arab leader and lead your people to peace and to friendly relationships with the great nation of Israel and its people, and then you can stand up and tell the other Arab nations to do the same thing and to stop killing innocent people living in their homes or on buses. Lead by example. Right now the Arab nations seemed to lost and the only thing they can agree on is to hate Israel. If it wasn't for Israel they would all be fighting with themselves. If only you could turn all that negative energy into something good. It only takes one Esseily. Be the leader of your people and start to bring peace to one corner of the world. --[Ted] Mar 3 2005 16:25 '''Actually the site does state why the war is caller "Yom Kippur War" it's because the attack was planned on that day of the Holy Jewish Event, but if it was up to me I'll call it as the people who won the war call it "The 6th. of October War" or "The Canal Crossing Battle'''"--User:Esseily 00:31, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC) This may be an English-to-Hebrew mistake (on my part) but I believe the name is Avraham "Bren" Adan (as opposed to Avraham "Bern" Eden). (from the book "On the Banks of the Suez ..." by the same). Additionally, I think it's important to note that this was considered one of the biggest Arab victories over Israel ever (despite the outcome) to the point that Eqypt currently still celebrates the date the war began. Likewise this war precipitated the resignation of Golda Meir as Prime Minister of Israel (among other notable Israeli politicians and military) and wwas considered one of the worst wars for Israel (by Israelis). Also in your copy, you stated that Egypt didn't plan on developing on their initial successes which is not entirely true. The Egyptian military headed by Abu-Iziz (if I remember the name correctly) plan (Badr) stated that all eastern bank crossings were to be consolidated *before* advancing further east. The actual objective was to capture the whole of the Sinai and Gaza. The actual reason why the Egyptian advance stalled was that they could not overrun the Bar-Lev line as completely as they had planned to. This was due in part to Israeli soldiers who fought extremely bravely, but more due to the fact that there was confusion, hesitation and ultimately failure at evacuating the strongpoints along the canal from the Southern Command (under Gonen at the time). - Baraq Baron Ben-Gideon Bacharach (baraq@dmech.org) '''I didn't get the ''(despite the outcome part)'' coz as far as we're Egyptians concerned we did win that war, and we took back most of our land in battle and the rest through peace talks that started with the Camp David Agreement''' If I'm to say what I think of the ''outcome'', the only thing Egyptians in general didn't like about the Camp David agreement was the restriction on the numbers of the Egyptian troops in Sinai, coz simply this is Egyptian land and only Egypt should have the power to decide how many of our troops should be there .. other than that the outcome was fine .. The October War is till today considered one of the biggest Tank Battles in the modern Military history and it was a well earned victory to retrieve the Egyptian land, of course with the help of all fellow arab countries that participated in the battle in a way the other .. and by the way the Barlev defence line was almost completely destroyed in those 6 hours of the first day of war and I beleive that was the main reason why behind the Israili resignations, coz Israelis before the war were told that the Barlev line in inpenetrable .. which proved wrong of course. A very important fact that Baraq missed as well is that the fight stopped not because of the the bravery of the Israeli soldiers "maybe that is true" but mainly because of the very heavy American reinforcements, hundreds of the Israeli tanks that were destroyed in the battlefield were of course American plus they were brand new, they were brought by by an air bridge to the battle field and they managed to join the fight in very early stages .. My last comment on the Article is that I don't beleive the casualties and dead figures are right at all, If I could get precise information I'll post it ASAP.. thanks all for ur time --User:Esseily 00:34, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC) What about the Bomb? User:BL 22:23, 29 Sep 2003 (UTC) What about it? This war didn't go nuclear at all. User:Berrik There was the possibility of nuclear war during this war but no mention is made about it. From the DEFCON article: :DEFCON 3 refers to an increase in force readiness above normal. United States military commands (minus the Strategic Air Command, at heightened alert on DEFCON 2) went to this level in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. All United States forces went on DEFCON 3 during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Soviet nuclear warheads were discovered moving toward Egypt. James Schlesinger sent U.S. forces to the Middle East without notifying NATO. The third time the United States reached DEFCON 3 was during the September 11, 2001 attacks. I am not familiar with this war but I think that the nuclear aspect should be mentioned since the word 'nuclear' isnt found in the article at all. --User:ShaunMacPherson 06:49, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC) If you want to add blow-by-blow accounts of battles or heaps of statistics, I suggest that you break it out into a seperate article and link to it. I also suggest that you represent both sides equally. Putting in a figure for Israeli casualties for a single battle but not mentioning anything else (including possibly casualties on the other side?) is neither NPOV nor good practice. User:Nvinen 13:07, 9 Feb 2005 (UTC) == Weaponry == I deleted cause it was not really true. Isreal got many weapons from Germany the USA and members in the common wealth. the old mistaken surprise subject listen there was no surprised attack what so ever. we know in Israel that the military and goverment high ministers knew and had all the signs that the war is going to break. to say that there was a surprise it is a bad point of view and a one major error. User:212.179.81.67 :Perhaps so, but either way, it's impertinent — historical claims and observations requiere references. User:El C 10:18, 13 May 2005 (UTC) http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=2424 http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2773155,00.html#n http://my.ynet.co.il/pic/docs/doc_30.1/ user:Oraien :Thanks. I remember reading their (''Yedioth Ahronoth'', that is) print series on it with great interest and found it absolutely fascinating. Incidentally, you can sign your username by typing~~~~ :) User:El C 19:43, 13 May 2005 (UTC)
it is very interesting and also very outrageous to find that the chief of steff generals and the defense minister knew abot that the war is going to break but didn`t do anything.
==Things to do==
I am satisfied that the section about the lead up to the war is complete. The immediate aftermath is *almost* complete (it just needs a talk about the syrian front and UN peacekeeper intervention). The section on the war itself is wholly inadaquate, and the long term effects section is virtually empty. I'd like to address these, and then nominate this article on Wikipedia:featured article candidates. In the mean time, I'd appreciate it if anyone could track down some copyleft pics of the fighting to use in this article. User:Raul654 03:01, Jun 2, 2005 (UTC)
:I've just created the article on Operation Nickel Grass, the U.S. airlift of supplies to Israel (it's since been featured in Did You Know). I'll start looking for pics and see if I can't contribute here and there... -User:Lommer | User talk:Lommer 03:36, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Ok, with the work I did today, I'm happy with the immediate aftermath section. Now it just needs a better description of the long term effects and of the fighting itself. User:Raul654 21:20, Jun 2, 2005 (UTC)
== what is AMAN (spy)? ==
it seems like it is a government agency but it is not explained in the article and its left as a link to an article yet to be written. a footnore, a parenthetical comment, or an article stub would help here. User:UriBudnik 08:05, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:AMAN (the name is the english acronym fo the Hebrew name) is one of Israel's (many) intelligence agencies. As I understand it, their job is to (among other things) digest the intelligence recieved by all the other agencies. Check [http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/israel/aman.htm this] link. User:Raul654 08:12, Jun 3, 2005 (UTC)
::Give me 15 minutes and I will write/translate a very bad article on it! User:El C 05:34, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:::i first posed the question above because it was not clear to me when i first read the article what AMAN was/meant. i saw the link that raul654 provided and i considered maybe even using it as a basis for an article stub but i have not gotten around to it. i did want to change the article to make the AMAN acronym a little bit clearer. i did, and your subsequent modification is an improvement but maybe it still could be better.
:::question for you, would it be correct to say: ''The IDF's AMAN (a Hewbew acronym for Inteligence Branch or Military Intelligence), "the leader of Israel's intelligence community," was responsible...?'' in such a case maybe we can even get rid of "the leader of Israel's intelligence community." especially if there is a link to an article about AMAN. User:UriBudnik
::::It isn't an acronym, it's an abbreviation. Well, it took me much longer than 15 minutes. Naturally, I blame my cat for this. User:El C 06:47, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:::::nice article on AMAN (especially since you wipped it out so fast!) but i still think that opening scentence here is a bit awkard. for example, i did not realize that the phrase "the leader of Israel's intelligence community" was a direct quote from the rabinovich book. that is why i edited it. do you think that ''('intelligence branch')'' still needs single-quote marks inside the parenthesis? to me it was confusing to to see that followed by a direct quotation. i'm not an expert on style but i don't think the single-quote marks serve a purpose inside the parenthesis. User:UriBudnik 07:53, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC)
::::::Thanks! But actually not that fast. Feel free to remove the single quotes, I don't remember what purpose they were supposed to serve, if any – possibly I just copy & pasted it as such). Perhaps that it's just a literal translation(?). User:El C 08:40, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC)
== a reference to the rabinovich report is needed ==
i am assuming that all the attributions marked "Rabinovich" are to a report by an author of that name. it would be usefull to at least create an article stub about this person and/or the report he authored about this war.User:UriBudnik 08:05, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:Rabinovich refers to Abraham Rabinovich. I was using [http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0805241760/102-7025583-3096940?v=glance this book here] to write most of this article. (The book is, from what I have seen, considered one of the best descriptions of the war you can get) User:Raul654 08:12, Jun 3, 2005 (UTC)
::But it does represent one particular current in the historiography. See: [http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040531&c=2&s=beinin Critical book review]. User:El C 08:43, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:::ok, thanks for the clarification. i had incorrectly assumed that the "Rabinovich" references were to a public report by the israeli government or a commission thereof (like the 9/11 report). this certainly needs to be fixed in the article. i am just not sure what the appropriate stylistic form for the reference is. i'll look it up somehow.
:::on the POV issue, i agree with EL_C, however, the article IS written in the spirit of NPOV (IMHO). i suspect it would take an arab speaker who has read on the subject from author(s) writing for "the other side" to make it unequivocally neutral. when i was in college i wrote a paper for a negotiations and conflict resolution class on the falklan island war (or the maldives war depending on whose side you were on.) for research i read books and articles from american, british and argentinian (and some other latin american) authors both in spanish and english. it really struck me then how massively different points of view and perspectives on the same event can be. i think this is a great article as it is, and that it would take someone that can come at it from a completely different perspective to be able to make it truly NPOV. so, perhaps someone who perceives this event from a different perspective will come along and take a stab at it. isn't that what the wikipedia is all about? i hope this happens as i would like to see this great article improved even further. i am curious what someone with a primarily arab perspective would add to this. (please take this in the positive spirit that it is meant) User:UriBudnik 09:52, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)
::::I wasn't commenting on the article, I haven't read it closely yet, my comment was on the book. User:El C 10:02, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Uh, the article isn't POV (please cite any statement that is biased), it's just most of the discussion of command decisions centers on the Israeli side. Why? Because, as the Rabinovich book says pretty clearly, there's was no public report or memoirs available from anyone in the egyptian or syrian high command (most of them being dead by now). The information simply doesn't exist.
User:Raul654 16:28, Jun 3, 2005 (UTC)
:i am not claiming that the article is not NPOV. and, i have not read the rabinovich book, i am not an expert on this subject, and i am too young to remember these events when they transpired. i was just commenting that most of the information comes from the perspective of one side even if it is not biased. i have now learned from you that this is by necessity since as you point out, "the information simply doesn't exist" for the other side. not a challenge to its veracity, just a comment. i think you would agree with me on this. there is just not as much perspective from the other side (and perhaps there is none to be had) i could see how totalitarian governments would not be as open to having their members publish memoirs or personal accounts of a war they started (or of their inner workings). i think saying this only makes the NPOV position of the article stronger.
:by the way, i thought the article was very good. that is why i spent time adding some links and why i posted comments here. heck, i may even get the book...User:UriBudnik
==...Almost there==
Ok, I'm satisfied that this article is complete, except for the description of the fighting on the Syrian front , the participation by other Arab states, and it still needs a references section. After that, I'll nominate it on Wikipedia:Featured article candidates. User:Raul654 16:37, Jun 4, 2005 (UTC)
:By the way, I *know* the Director of WP:FAC, let me know if you wish for me to pull some strings! ;p User:El C 06:50, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
==posible typo inside of quote==
raul654,
i was looking at your latest changes and i think there are a couple of typos, but since you are quoting from a book, i did not want to change it without first checking (with you since i dont have this book to verify the quote).
in this revision http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yom_Kippur_War&curid=34276&diff=0&oldid=0 should it not be "most demoralizing" and "was a desperate option" ? User:UriBudnik 02:38, 9 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:The first one is not a typo (it's perfectly correct english); the second one was and I have corrected it. User:Raul654 03:59, Jun 9, 2005 (UTC)
==Results of my researches==
Sadat's autobiography, which is pretty glaringly self-serving, does have a chapter on the October War. Sadat blames the war mainly on the United States because they refused to force Israel to negotiate. Reporting on the February 1973 meeting between Kissinger and Hafiz Ismail Sadat states that ''the drift of what Kissinger said to Ismail was that the United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority.'' (pg. 238) Sadat thus claims that the war was only a needed enabler of the later peace accords.
One other factoids of note from Sadat's work is that Hosni Mubarak was the commander of the initial air attack and Sadat was greatly impressed by him. Sadat states that this was an important reason for later making him vice-president. This should probably be mentioned seeing the emphasis given to Arial Sharon's role on the opposing side.
Also I think that the statement in the introduction that "Egypt and Syria launched a surprise joint attack aimed at retaking territory—the Sinai and Golan Heights—captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years earlier" needs to be changed. The scholarly consensus seems to be that Sadat was only trying to inflict a symbolic defeat on Israel and not to actually trying to retake the Sinai by force of arms. This was the opinion of all the sources I consulted. Assad, however, was trying to retake the Golan and felt betrayed when Sadat turned to the defensive in the Sinai. Maoz in ''Syria and Israel'' states that ''whereas Sadat went into a limited war in order to shatter the status quo and generate American pressure on Israel to give up the entire Sinai, Asad envisaged the capture of the entire Golan (and Sinai) and subsequent pressure on Israel to give up the occupied Palestinian territories.'' pg. 128. Moaz also gives some other reasons Assad was so interested in war besides retaking the Golan. Assad wanted to be the preeminent military power in the region, and was especially interested in competing with Iraq for regional prestige. He also felt that a military victory was the only way to win respect from Syria's Soviet allies.
Raphael Israeli's book on Sadat also states that the Egyptian offensive was to obtain a symbolic rather than a territorial victory. However he states the main motivation was Sadat's deep sense of shame over the 1967 defeat and the belief that until this national shame was reversed other areas of Egyptian life, such as the economy, could not be revived. David Hirst and Irene Beeson focus more on the domestic concerns and the need to build international prestige, but also felt that Sadat's goal was mainly a propaganda victory.
Israeli goes into considerable detail on why the other Arab powers did or did not join the offensive. He seems to disagree with Rabinovich over Jordan as Israeli states that the main reason Jordan stayed out was the Sadat was working closely with the PLO and promised Arafat the West Bank. Hussein had just attacked the PLO in Jordan and still saw the West Bank as their territory.
Both Israeli and Moaz have some good material on the Egyptian and Syrian deception prior to the war. I feel that that section should be rewritten and renamed as the surprise attack was just as much an Egyptian success as a Israeli failure.
Israel has some information on the domestic problems at the time, but not a great deal. He does state the student protests were important in convincing Sadat to launch the war. In a weird opposite to the anti-war protests in the United States at the time the Egyptian students were protesting demanding war with Israel and accusing Sadat of defeatism. The students pushed to have the government close all the universities and conscript the students into the military. - User:SimonP 23:33, Jun 9, 2005 (UTC)
==when was the meeting between nixon and brezhnev?==
the second paragraph in section 1.2 Yom_Kippur_War#Israeli Intelligence failures, starts with "in the summer, in a metting between..." what year did this meeting take place? from the flow of the article it seems it was in 1973 (and i almost changed the article to say that) but its actually not completely clear. i think it a little bit sloppy to say ''in the summer'' and not mention the year when it is not self evident what year it was. if someone knows for sure that the year was 1973 please change accordingly.
:The meeting took place on the night of June 23-24, 1973. I have fixed the article accordingly. User:Raul654 07:03, Jun 10, 2005 (UTC)
==territories vs palestinian territories: a "claim term"==
i noticed that the term ''palestinian territories'' was recently changed to just ''territories'' under the justification that palestinian territories is a 'claim term.' i suspect that there may be some debate as to which is the proper term to use (which i don't feel informed enough on the subject to join), but no matter the consensus result, i suggest that a footnote is added with a sentence or two describing the dispute as to how to refer to these areas AND that the link to the palestinian territories article is preserved. this gives it beter context. User:UriBudnik 01:12, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
I've deleted Palestinian territories because it may be construed (justly) as a claim term. The term is itself ambigious; it could mean territories belonging to Palestinians or territories in geographical Mandate Palestine. Whether or not the term is used by Western media, Western media is not NPOV, wikipedia is theoretically supposed to be. I agree that perhaps plain territories are ambigious, but everyone knows what it means when referring to this conflict. If not, I think reinstating West Bank and Gaza would be fine. Palestinian territories is similiar to Yesha when used in Hebrew. For the sake of NPOV, we must use another term. User:Guy Montag 01:30, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:It is a term used in the scholarship as impartial — unless you bring forth evidence from ''it'' or otherwise notable source that it is disputed in more-or-less the terms you listed above, my original change/merge of GZ and WB as the Palestinian territories stays, not vice versa. User:El C 01:47, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Just to be clear, I am not accussing anyone of POV Pushing. The term, if you clicked Palestinian territories cites this:
This term connotes much more than a definition, but a host of related propositions that amount to a preventive political argument about the disposition and status of the land:
* that these territories are under the military control of a nation that does not have sovereignty over them;
* that the nation in control of these territories, i.e., Israel, is thus obliged (as a matter of right as well as by international law) to return these territories to their rightful owners; and
* that these territories belong by right to the Palestinians, i.e., the stateless indigenous Arabs of Palestine.
As you can see, I am using the definition of that the article has given. Whether it is used as a neutral term is not what is relevent, what is relevent is how it may be construed. User:Guy Montag 02:01, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Negative, this is just wrt the status of (to use military-speak) Palestinian territories themsleves, not so much the term. User:El C 02:14, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Could you please reiterate?
:Reiterate how, Anon? Guy's above passage deals with the controversial ''status'' of Palestinian territories, not so much the term. I don't know if I can explain this any more clearly: there's no mention above wrtt term "Palestinian territories" as itself disputed. User:El C 02:52, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Sorry El C, that was me I just forgot to sign. The article says that the term amounts to a political argument. That is why I am against using it. User:Guy Montag 10:03, 13 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:Oh! My point is: I'm not sure that it does, in that sense. Which is why I'm asking for a reference indicating whether this is/isn't the case. User:El C 23:43, 15 Jun 2005 (UTC)
The only reference I have is from the Palestinian territories article itself. If you read it, you will see that the term is loaded. Also, with a little common sense, I think you already know why it is loaded. Hint: Palestinian acts as a possessive modifying territories. :) User:Guy Montag 01:23, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:Right, maybe it could be read that way, but what I'm getting at is that we need something more definitive, more scholarly-grounded. User:El C 01:29, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
::I think there's no doubt that it is read that way. User:JayjgUser_talk:Jayjg 15:32, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:::Perhaps cf Talk:Palestinian_territories#Cypherx.27s_deletions of necessarily "possessive" construal - actually of "Occupied Palestinian Territories" that's what's actually considered in the Palestinian territories article - in the talk for that article. US State department usage of the term is probably "geographic." A State department usage of it before 1988 or 1974 - see if I can dig up one - ''must'' be "geographic" , as at that point the US position was that some/all of the territory was to be returned to Jordan, not the Palestinians. Of course possessive construal by ordinary readers nowadays is natural enough though.--User:John Z 17:24, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
All these objections against the position of Raul and myself have yet to be substantiated by anything concerete, but I have something. The [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/MFA+Spokesman/2004/Ad-hoc+task+force+for+foreign+observers+to+Palestinian+elections+19-Dec-2004.htm Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Spokesman] writes:
Arab-Israeli conflict Israeli history Syrian wars History of Egypt
#redirect Yom Kippur War
See other meanings of words starting from letter:
Words begining with Yom_Kippur_War:
Yom_Kippur_War
Yom_Kippur_War
Yom_Kippur_War
Yom_Kippur_war
Yom Kippur War
{| border="1" width="325" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" align="right" style="margin-left:1em;margin-bottom:1em" !colspan="2" bgcolor="#ffff99"| The Yom Kippur War |- |Conflict||Arab-Israeli conflict |- |Date||October 6–24, 1973 |- |Place||Sinai, Golan Heights, and surrounding regions |- |Result||Ended by a United Nations cease-fire in Israeli victory. |- !colspan="2" bgcolor="#ffff99"|Major Combatants |- | width="50%" valign="top" style="text-align:center"|Israel | width="50%" valign="top" style="text-align:center"|Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan |- !colspan="2" |Casualties |- |2,656 killed
7,250 wounded
400 tanks destroyed
600 damaged/returned to service
102 planes shot down
(Rabinovich, 496–497) |8,528 killed
19,540 wounded
(Western analysis)
15,000 dead
35,000 wounded
(Israeli analysis)
2,250 tanks destroyed or captured
432 planes destroyed
(Rabinovich, 496–497) |- |} The Yom Kippur War (Hebrew language: ''Milchemet Yom HaKipurim'' (מלחמת יום הכיפורים), also known as the October War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Ramadan War), was fought from October 6 (the day of Yom Kippur) to October 24, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Egypt and Syria. The War began when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise joint attack in the Sinai and Golan Heights, both of which had been captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years earlier. Although some key figures in Israel were aware of it ahead of time, Israeli intelligence, despite warnings to the contrary, predicted that war was not imminent. The Israeli Defense Forces, particularly the front-line troops, were caught almost entirely by surprise when the attack came. The Egyptians and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after which momentum began to swing in Israel's favor. By the second week of the war, the Syrians had been pushed entirely out of the Golan Heights. In the Sinai to the south, the Israelis had struck at the "hinge" between two invading Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal (where the old cease-fire line had been), and cut off an entire Egyptian army just as a United Nations cease-fire came into effect. The war had far reaching implications for many nations. The Arab world, which had been humiliated by their crushing defeat during the Six-Day War, felt psychologically vindicated by their string of victories early in the war. This vindication, in many ways, cleared the way for the peace process which followed the war. Following the war, the Camp David Accords led to normalized relations between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized Israel. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence almost entirely. ==Background== ===Causes=== [[Image:Sadat2.jpg|thumb|Anwar Sadat, leader of Egypt during the Yom Kippur War]] This war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which has included many battles and wars since 1948. During the Six-Day War six years earlier, the Israelis had captured the Sinai, clear to the Suez Canal, which had become the cease-fire line. The Israelis had also captured roughly half of the Golan Heights from Syria. In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971, Israel spent $500 million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named after Israeli General Haim Bar-Lev. After the war that defeated the Egyptian and Syrian armies in 1967, and having emerged undefeated from the three-year long War of Attrition with Egypt in the south and several border incidents with Syria in the north, the Israeli leadership had grown somewhat complacent. Both Arab countries desired a return of the territories lost in the 1967 war. After the success of the Six Day War the Israeli leadership was reluctant to enter into negotiations over returning these territories, feeling that they were militarily secure. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who resolved to fight Israel and win back the territory lost in the Six-Day War. In 1971, Sadat, in response to an initiative by UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring, declared that if Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip" and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as requested by Jarring, Egypt would then "be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Israel responded that it would not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967, lines. Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israeli's the status quo could be altered. Hafiz al-Assad had a different view, he had little interest in negotiation and felt the retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since the Six Day War Assad had launched a massive military build up and hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With the aid of Egypt Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly against the Israeli army and thus secure Syria's role in the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been retaken by force, which would force Israel to give up the Palestinian territories, and make other concessions. Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option." (Rabinovich, 13). Israel argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was in the great shame over the Six Day war, and before any reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was in shambles but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war to reclaim the Sinai, and were highly upset of Sadat not having launched one in his first three years in office. The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a new war. Hussein of Jordan of Jordan feared another major loss of territory as had occurred in the Six-day war, during which Jordan was halved in population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the Palestinian territories and in the event of a victory promised Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom. Moreover during the Black September in Jordan of 1970 a near civil war had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO leaving Assad and Hussein estranged. Iraq and Syria also had strained relations and the Iraqis refused to join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel, was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage in a diplomatic offensive to try and win support for the war. By the fall of the 1973 he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to curry favour in Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and France had for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United Nations Security Council. In the lead up to the war West Germany became one of Egypt's largest sources of materiel. ===Events leading up to the War=== Anwar Sadat in 1972 publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to war with the Israel, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers." From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-23s, SA-6 Gainfuls, RPG-7s and especially the Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones. The role of the great powers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of Egypt's military weakness. While the U.S. and other allied nations supplied Israel with the most up-to-date assault weapons in the world, the Russians supplied Egypt only with defense weaponry, and then only with great reluctance. Indeed, President Nasser was only able to obtain the material for an anti-aircraft missile defense wall after having visited Moscow and threatened the Kremlin leaders that he would have to return to Egypt and tell the Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them and then relinquish power to one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans because the Americans would have the upper hand in the region. One of the undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and war materiel. It was felt that the only way to convince the Soviet leaders of the deficiencies of most of the aircraft and air defense weaponry they had supplied to Egypt following 1967 was to put them to the test against the advanced weaponry which the U.S. had supplied to Israel. Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to push Egypt towards a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At all costs they wanted to avoid a new conflagration between the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with the United States. The reality of the situation became apparent when the superpowers met in Oslo and agreed to maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders and when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, it became imperative to expel the Russians from Egypt. In July 1972 Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisors in the country and reoriented the country's foreign policy to be more favourable to the United States. The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez would incur massive losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing Detente, had no interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June, 1973 meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, Brezhnev had proposed Israel pull back to 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to restrain Sadat's plans of conquest. (Rabinovich, 39) In an interview published in ''Newsweek'' (April 9, 1973), President Sadat again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on the highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the Israeli Air Force would be able to repel it. Almost a full year before the war, in an October 24, 1972, meeting with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel, even without proper Soviet support (Rabinovich, 25). Planning was done in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon commanders were not told of war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack Israel in concert with Syria was code-named Operation Badr (the Arabic language word for "full moon"). ===Lead up to the surprise attack=== The IDF's A'man (Military Intelligence), "the leader of Israel's intelligence community," was responsible for formulating the nation's intelligence estimate (Rabinovich, 22). Their assessments on the likelihood of war were based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as well. Second, they learned from a high ranking Egyptian information (who to-this-day remains confidential, known only as "The Source") that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late August (it would take 4 months to train the Egyptian ground crews), A'man predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly colored their thinking and led them to dismiss other war warnings. The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely hurt the army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptian's made repeated reports on a non-existent lack of spare parts that also made their way to Israel. Sadat had long engaged in brinkmanship. Sadat had so frequently stated that the war would soon resume that the world ignored such declarations. In May and August 1973 the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border. Both times the Israeli army had mobilized at the cost of some $10 million dollars. For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence, detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as more training exercises. Movement of Syrian troops towards the border was puzzling, but not a threat because, A'man believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived. Despite refusing to participate Hussein of Jordan of Jordan ''"had met with Sadat and ''[Syrian President]'' Hafez al-Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in"'' (Rabinovich, 51). On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian attack. ''"Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they'' [Egypt] ''would cooperate'"''. (Rabinovich, 50) Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. A'man concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not already know. ''"Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during September from well placed sources. But''
Yom Kippur War
''An event mentioned in this article is a Template:May 31 selected anniversaries'' ------ I'm planning to write a major article on the Yom Kippur War (like I did with the Six-Day War), but it may yet take a while to write it (lots of material, viewpoints). --user:Uriyan Suprisingly, this article does not even state why it is called "Yom Kippur War", although it contains a lot of other interesting information. --user:FlorianMarquardt Who the heck is this Esseily guy? Are you trying to re-write history with incorrect facts just to make the Egyptians look better or something? You're obviously not impartial enough to comment on this article. Name the war after the people who won? It's always been called the Yom Kippur War. That's the day the Arab nations attacked Israel again. Emphasis on the word "Attacked" and "Again". There's no rewards for aggressors in war. Egypt lost land from a previous war when they "Attacked" Israel. What do you want Israel to say, "Oh, we're sorry you attacked us and we had to defend ourselves and take some land. Here you go. You can have the land back if you promise not to "Attack" us anymore." Sorry pal, it doesn't work that way. And what's with calling the war an Egyptian victory? I'm pretty sure the Egyptian army was defeated and the Israeli tanks were only about 20Km outside Damascus before the U.S. implored them not to attack and to turn around and go back. If you want to call that a victory, o.k. I guess. Israel gave the land back after Camp David not because of any defeat during this war, but as a peace offering with assurance that Egypt recognizes the state of Israel and will not declare war on them anymore. Pretty nice gesture by Israel. Hey, Eiselly! Keep it real or go post on some Al Jazeera web site where you could commiserate with other haters. On second thought, why don't you stop breeding hate, and become the first great Arab leader and lead your people to peace and to friendly relationships with the great nation of Israel and its people, and then you can stand up and tell the other Arab nations to do the same thing and to stop killing innocent people living in their homes or on buses. Lead by example. Right now the Arab nations seemed to lost and the only thing they can agree on is to hate Israel. If it wasn't for Israel they would all be fighting with themselves. If only you could turn all that negative energy into something good. It only takes one Esseily. Be the leader of your people and start to bring peace to one corner of the world. --[Ted] Mar 3 2005 16:25 '''Actually the site does state why the war is caller "Yom Kippur War" it's because the attack was planned on that day of the Holy Jewish Event, but if it was up to me I'll call it as the people who won the war call it "The 6th. of October War" or "The Canal Crossing Battle'''"--User:Esseily 00:31, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC) This may be an English-to-Hebrew mistake (on my part) but I believe the name is Avraham "Bren" Adan (as opposed to Avraham "Bern" Eden). (from the book "On the Banks of the Suez ..." by the same). Additionally, I think it's important to note that this was considered one of the biggest Arab victories over Israel ever (despite the outcome) to the point that Eqypt currently still celebrates the date the war began. Likewise this war precipitated the resignation of Golda Meir as Prime Minister of Israel (among other notable Israeli politicians and military) and wwas considered one of the worst wars for Israel (by Israelis). Also in your copy, you stated that Egypt didn't plan on developing on their initial successes which is not entirely true. The Egyptian military headed by Abu-Iziz (if I remember the name correctly) plan (Badr) stated that all eastern bank crossings were to be consolidated *before* advancing further east. The actual objective was to capture the whole of the Sinai and Gaza. The actual reason why the Egyptian advance stalled was that they could not overrun the Bar-Lev line as completely as they had planned to. This was due in part to Israeli soldiers who fought extremely bravely, but more due to the fact that there was confusion, hesitation and ultimately failure at evacuating the strongpoints along the canal from the Southern Command (under Gonen at the time). - Baraq Baron Ben-Gideon Bacharach (baraq@dmech.org) '''I didn't get the ''(despite the outcome part)'' coz as far as we're Egyptians concerned we did win that war, and we took back most of our land in battle and the rest through peace talks that started with the Camp David Agreement''' If I'm to say what I think of the ''outcome'', the only thing Egyptians in general didn't like about the Camp David agreement was the restriction on the numbers of the Egyptian troops in Sinai, coz simply this is Egyptian land and only Egypt should have the power to decide how many of our troops should be there .. other than that the outcome was fine .. The October War is till today considered one of the biggest Tank Battles in the modern Military history and it was a well earned victory to retrieve the Egyptian land, of course with the help of all fellow arab countries that participated in the battle in a way the other .. and by the way the Barlev defence line was almost completely destroyed in those 6 hours of the first day of war and I beleive that was the main reason why behind the Israili resignations, coz Israelis before the war were told that the Barlev line in inpenetrable .. which proved wrong of course. A very important fact that Baraq missed as well is that the fight stopped not because of the the bravery of the Israeli soldiers "maybe that is true" but mainly because of the very heavy American reinforcements, hundreds of the Israeli tanks that were destroyed in the battlefield were of course American plus they were brand new, they were brought by by an air bridge to the battle field and they managed to join the fight in very early stages .. My last comment on the Article is that I don't beleive the casualties and dead figures are right at all, If I could get precise information I'll post it ASAP.. thanks all for ur time --User:Esseily 00:34, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC) What about the Bomb? User:BL 22:23, 29 Sep 2003 (UTC) What about it? This war didn't go nuclear at all. User:Berrik There was the possibility of nuclear war during this war but no mention is made about it. From the DEFCON article: :DEFCON 3 refers to an increase in force readiness above normal. United States military commands (minus the Strategic Air Command, at heightened alert on DEFCON 2) went to this level in 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. All United States forces went on DEFCON 3 during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Soviet nuclear warheads were discovered moving toward Egypt. James Schlesinger sent U.S. forces to the Middle East without notifying NATO. The third time the United States reached DEFCON 3 was during the September 11, 2001 attacks. I am not familiar with this war but I think that the nuclear aspect should be mentioned since the word 'nuclear' isnt found in the article at all. --User:ShaunMacPherson 06:49, 4 Aug 2004 (UTC) If you want to add blow-by-blow accounts of battles or heaps of statistics, I suggest that you break it out into a seperate article and link to it. I also suggest that you represent both sides equally. Putting in a figure for Israeli casualties for a single battle but not mentioning anything else (including possibly casualties on the other side?) is neither NPOV nor good practice. User:Nvinen 13:07, 9 Feb 2005 (UTC) == Weaponry == I deleted cause it was not really true. Isreal got many weapons from Germany the USA and members in the common wealth. the old mistaken surprise subject listen there was no surprised attack what so ever. we know in Israel that the military and goverment high ministers knew and had all the signs that the war is going to break. to say that there was a surprise it is a bad point of view and a one major error. User:212.179.81.67 :Perhaps so, but either way, it's impertinent — historical claims and observations requiere references. User:El C 10:18, 13 May 2005 (UTC) http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=2424 http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2773155,00.html#n http://my.ynet.co.il/pic/docs/doc_30.1/ user:Oraien :Thanks. I remember reading their (''Yedioth Ahronoth'', that is) print series on it with great interest and found it absolutely fascinating. Incidentally, you can sign your username by typing
(Communicated by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman) In the framework of Israeli Government policy to assist in carrying out free and democratic elections in the Palestinian territories, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom has instructed the Foreign Ministry to set up an ad-hoc task force. If they do not object... User:El C 22:26, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
I think that the Israeli government is referring to the self governing Area B, where the PA has some authority. But what the Israeli government says, doesn't make a term neutral. For many people in Israel, the government is not truly Zionist. We should focus on how a common reader would interpert the passage, and it will be through the possessive, because the article he will click on will say so. User:Guy Montag 03:13, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:If you have a non-Wikipedia source that demonstartes it's problematic, by all means. I have provided one, now it's the opposition's turn. User:El C 03:20, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)
That appears to be the same Ministry of Foreign Affairs that insists that the territories are "disputed", not "occupied": [http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/11/Israel-%20the%20Conflict%20and%20Peace-%20Answers%20to%20Frequen#territories] User:JayjgUser_talk:Jayjg 15:00, 17 Jun 2005 (UTC)
I don't understand then. The wikipedia article on the Palestinian territories makes it a loaded political argument, and outside sources use it. Is wikipedia wrong and Israel is using the terminology of its adversaries, or is the article wrong? User:Guy Montag 01:18, 18 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:Guy, Jay, I'm going to have to see sources outside of Wikipedia articles regarding the use of Palestinian territories in this article. Thanks. User:El C 01:21, 18 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Why? User:Guy Montag
:Because it's subject to interpertation. I want to see a source which states outright the term is problematic. User:El C 21:42, 19 Jun 2005 (UTC)
We are going around in circles. The palestinian territories article has already established the fact that the term is loaded. Lets use a term that would not be subject to interpertation instead. It's that simple.
User:Guy Montag 00:07, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:Um, no. *YOU* say the article established it as a loaded term. I do not see it that way. I think the first sentence is far more telling -- ''The term "Palestinian territories" is used by mainstream Western journalists as a collective name for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip''. And, as has already been established here, even the Israeli government (or at least one part of it) uses the term. So in essense, we have a term that the Israelis, the palastinian, and the western media all use. It sounds to me like your claim that it's a loaded term is wholly without merit. User:Raul654 01:18, Jun 20, 2005 (UTC)
Guy, either you provide a reputable source, as I did, or there isn't really much left to speak about. Why? Because we'd be going in circles. User:El C 05:37, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)
I suppose my source from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisting that they should be referrred to as "disputed" didn't count for much. Regardless, in Israel they are referred to in a number of different ways; not surpisingly, the terms are all in Hebrew. "Yesha" is one term used by the right, which is an acronym for "Yehuda, Shomron, v'Aza". Here's an interesting article talking about the terms used to describe the territories, which actually argues that "occupied" is the most neutral:[http://www.forward.com/issues/2002/02.08.16/arts4.html] In any event, I think it would be hard to deny that "the West Bank and Gaza Strip" is by far the least ambiguous term. Once you start talking about "Palestinian territories", then you have to parse that; does that mean the territories controlled by the P.A. (and which subset of those), or does it mean the West Bank and Gaza, or (as militants would have it), does it mean all of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip? User:JayjgUser_talk:Jayjg 14:41, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Yes, really, what is wrong with "West Bank and Gaza" here? How could it offend anyone? It's four words, but short ones that add up to less than the two long ones. The problems are in the Palestinian territories article, which should be rewritten to reflect the discussion here.--User:John Z 15:54, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)
:I have no idea; El C evidently objected to my use of them, and converted them:[http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Yom_Kippur_War&diff=next&oldid=15087930], and since then there has been a conflict. User:JayjgUser_talk:Jayjg 16:22, 20 Jun 2005 (UTC)
I did not object to them, I unified them for convinience. I had no idea that there would be objections to that. User:El C 00:34, 21 Jun 2005 (UTC)
No one is blaming you. Those people that want it changed back to West Bank and Gaza are think it will solve a dubious NPOV problem.
User:Guy Montag 15:49, 21 Jun 2005 (UTC)Yom Kippur War
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