
[[Image:Voters at the voting booths in 1945.jpeg|thumb|250px|Voters at the voting booths in the US in 1945]] Voting systems are methods (algorithms) for groups of people to select one or more options from many, taking into account the individual preferences of the group members. Vote is best known for its use in elections and is often seen as the defining feature of democracy, where citizen preferences are used to determine the composition of government. In addition, voting can also be used to award prizes, to select between different plans of action, or as a means for computer programs to evaluate which solution is best for a complex problem. A key property of voting systems is that, because they are algorithms, they must be formally defined. Consensus, for example, which is sometimes put forward as a voting system, is more properly a broad way of working with others, analogous to democracy or anarchy (See consensus decision making for disciplined consensus methods and how they relate to voting). == Aspects of voting systems == === The ballot === Different voting systems have different forms for allowing the individual to express their tolerances versus preferences. In ranked ballot or "preference" voting systems, like Instant-runoff voting, the Borda count, or a Condorcet method, voters order the list of options from most to least preferred. In range voting, voters rate each option separately. In first-past-the-post (also known as plurality voting), voters select only one option, while in approval voting, they can select as many as they want. In voting systems that allow "plumping", like cumulative voting, voters may vote for the same candidate multiple times. === District (constituency) size === A voting system may select only one option (usually a candidate, but also an option that represents a decision), in which case it is called a "single winner system", or it may select multiple options, for example candidates to fill an assembly or alternative possible decisions on the measure the ballot posed. Some countries, like Israel, fill their entire parliament using a single multiple-winner district (constituency), while others, like the Republic of Ireland or Belgium, break up their national elections into smaller, multiple-winner districts, and yet others, like the United States or the United Kingdom, hold only single-winner elections. Some systems, like the Additional member system, embed smaller districts within larger ones. === Party-list systems === In party-list proportional representation systems, candidates can be aligned with, or nominated by, parties, and the party's list of candidates plays a functional role within the system. These parties may in turn be aligned with other parties, to form coalitions, which can play roles beyond those played by the party. These systems are designed to ensure proportional representation, the idea that the candidates selected from a given party (or, in non-party-list systems, informal grouping) should be in proportion to the votes cast for that party. Some of these systems, however, have election thresholds--minimum numbers of votes cast for a party to win any seats. The purpose of an election threshold is generally to keep very small parties from participating in a parliament, in order to maintain stability of governments. === None of the above option=== In some voting systems, voters may choose to select none of the candidates (or poll options), by voting for a "None of the above" option. If this option wins, the election fails; typically it will be re-run with a new set of candidates or poll options, all previous ones (having lost to "none of the above") being excluded. The philosophy behind having a "None of the above" option is that all possible alternatives should be considered in a decision; this option represents all of the alternatives not considered explicitly. === Write-in candidate - poll option === Some elections allow voters to write in the name of a person (or of the poll option) not on the ballot as their candidate (or as a poll option). Write-in candidates (poll options) rarely win and votes are often cast for ineligible people or fictional characters. This happens because write-in poll options or candidates are not visible to other voters. This is not usually an issue in the case of an e-voting system, where new write-in poll options or candidates can be made visible as the election takes place. Alternatively, some locations require write-in candidates or poll options to be registered before the election. == List of systems == ===Single-winner systems=== Single-winner systems can be classified by ballot type: #Binary voting A valid vote can only give a yes or nothing to a given candidate. #Ranked voting A valid vote can rank candidates 1,2,3... (Tied rankings are permitted in some methods but not others) #Rated voting A valid vote allows independent numerical values to be associated with each candidate. (The set of valid values is limited.) They can also be classified on how many times votes can be counted. Methods like Plurality, Borda, and Approval with single counting rounds are simpler since voters can be sure to know how their votes will be applied. ==== Binary voting methods ==== *First-past-the-post election system (also called Plurality or Relative Majority or Winner-Take-All) - vote for at most one candidate. Most votes wins, even if this is less than a majority. *Runoff systems **Two-round runoff voting - if no majority, hold a new election with only the top two candidates. This system is used for most single-winner elections in France. **Elimination runoff - if no majority, hold a new election with the weakest candidate eliminated. Repeat until there is a majority. **Exhaustive runoff - no eliminations, repeat balloting until there is a majority. Common in committees. This system is used by the Papal Conclave (if one considers every cardinal as a candidate). **Motion and amendment (election) - treating the choice like another substantial motion, subject to amendment and possibly debate. *Approval voting (AV) - Voters may vote for as many candidates as they like. Candidate with most votes wins. Sometimes considered a version of range voting (see below) with a point range of [0,1] *Random ballot - May also be used for multiwinner elections, or as a tiebreaker for other methods ==== Ranked voting methods ==== *Tied rankings not permitted **Instant-runoff voting (IRV, also known as alternative vote or "preference voting") ***Supplementary vote: simplified IRV process (two rankings, two rounds) **Borda count: single round count, more points for higher-ranked **Coombs' method: disapproval runoff *Tied rankings sometimes permitted **Condorcet method, actually several families of systems that satisfy Condorcet's criterion: ***Ranked Pairs (RP) and variants such as Maximize Affirmed Majorities and Maximum Majority Voting ***Schulze method (Aka_(initialism) Schwartz sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting, path winner) ***Copeland's method **Bucklin voting: approval runoff; voters vote for more candidates each round until a candidate reaches a majority ==== Rated voting methods ==== *Range voting - voters give points in a specified range (for example 0-100) to each candidate. The candidate with the highest total is the winner. * Rated ballots may also be used for ranked voting methods, in cases where tied rankings are allowed. ===Multiple-winner systems=== * Non-party-list systems ** Plurality/majority ***Block voting - Also called Plurality-at-large ** Semiproportional ***Proportional approval voting ***Cumulative voting ***Single non-transferable vote ***Single transferable vote (STV) ***Quota Borda system *Party-list proportional representation. Allocation methods: **Highest averages methods ***Sainte-Laguë method ***d'Hondt method **Largest remainder methods *Mixed Systems **Additional Member System (also called Mixed Member Proportional) **Parallel voting (also called Supplementary Member system) == Criteria in evaluating voting systems == Various criteria are used in evaluating voting systems. These criteria define potentially desirable properties of voting systems mathematically, so that different systems can be compared using the same criteria. It is impossible for one voting system to pass all criteria in common use. For example, Arrow's impossibility theorem demonstrates that several desirable features of voting systems are mutually contradictory. For this reason, someone implementing a voting system has to decide which criteria are important for the election. These criteria include: * Majority criterion - Does the first choice of a majority win? * Mutual majority criterion - If a majority prefers every choice in a set to all other choices, is a member of the set selected? * Monotonicity criterion - Is it impossible to cause a choice to lose by ranking it higher, or win by ranking it lower? * Consistency criterion - If the electorate is divided in two and a choice wins in both parts, does it win overall? * Participation criterion - Is it always better to vote honestly than to not vote? * Condorcet criterion - If a choice beats every other choice in Condorcet method, does it win? * Smith set - If every choice inside a set beats every choice outside the set in Condorcet method, is a member of the set selected? * Independence of irrelevant alternatives - Does the winner never change from A to B just because an unrelated choice C enters the race? * Strategic nomination - If multiple similar choices are available, is the result of the election unaffected by their presence, or do they help or hurt each other? A more extensive list of criteria is on the voting system criteria page. Voting systems are also judged with less-mathematical criteria: * Simplicity * Speed of vote-counting * Reduction of potential for fraud or disputed results * Resistance to strategic voting * Proportionality (proportional representation), for multiple-winner methods {| |- ! !! Majority criterion !! Monotonicity criterion !! Participation criterion !! Condorcet criterion !! Consistency criterion !! Independence of irrelevant alternatives !! Strategic nomination |- ! Approval voting |bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! Borda count |bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No (Strategic nomination) |- ! Copeland's method |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No || Independence of irrelevant alternatives || bgcolor=#ffdddd| No (Strategic nomination) |- ! IRV |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! First-past-the-post |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No (vote-splitting) |- ! Range voting |bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! Ranked Pairs |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No || Independence of irrelevant alternatives ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! Schulze method |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No || Independence of irrelevant alternatives ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- |+''Compliance of single-winner systems with some established voting system criteria.'' |} Voting systems can be abstracted as mathematical functions that select between choices based on the utility of each option for each voter. This greatly resembles a social welfare function as studied in welfare economics and many of the same considerations can be studied. For aspects such as simplicity, dispute, and fraud, the practical implementation is far more important than the abstract function. However, the choice of abstract function puts some constraints on the implementation. For instance, certain voting systems such as First_Past_the_Post_electoral_system, Schulze method, or Borda count can be tallied in one distributed step, others such as Instant-Runoff require centralization, and others such as multi-round runoff require multiple polling rounds. ===Related terminology=== ; voting strategy : Any way of voting, when it's discussed in terms of its possible or intended affect on the outcome. ; strategic or tactical voting : When a voter self-consciously marks a ballot in a manner different from their actual preferences, in the hope of optimizing the outcome. (While the adjectives 'strategy' and 'tactics' usually have nearly opposite meanings when used to describe other things, in this case, they commonly both have the meaning given here.) == Famous theoreticians of voting systems == *Kenneth Arrow (mathematically demonstrated the limitations of voting systems) *Jean-Charles de Borda (devised the Borda count) *Steven Brams (one of the inventors and chief academic proponents of Approval Voting) *Andrew Inglis Clark (promoted the use of STV in Tasmania) *Peter Fishburn (for his multiple proofs demonstrating the mathematical possibilities of voting systems.) *Marquis de Condorcet (proposed the method of pairwise comparison and the Condorcet Criterion; discovered the Condorcet paradox) *Maurice Duverger (observed effects of proportional vs. majoritarian systems) *Alan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite (for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that demonstrates any deterministic voting system with three or more alternatives is subject to either some form of Arrovian dictatorship or strategic voting) *Thomas Hare (devised STV a.k.a. the Hare Method) *Victor d'Hondt (devised a method of seat allocation under proportional representation) *Ramon Llull (for his independent discovery of a method similar to Condorcet method and possibly the Borda count centuries before Borda or Condorcet) *Edward J. Nanson (devised Nanson's method from the Borda count which selects the Condorcet winner if one exits) *[http://www.math.uci.edu/~dsaari/shortcv.pdf Donald G. Saari] (devised new methods for mathematical analysis of positional voting systems, and demonstrated the advantages of the Borda count over other positional voting methods) *Nicolaus Tideman (proposed ranked pairs and "comparison of pairs of outcomes by single transferable vote") ==See also== *List of democracy and elections-related topics *Center for Voting and Democracy *Disapproval voting *Duverger's law *Electoral reform *Grassroots democracy *Party system *Political scientists *Politics *Representative democracy *Spoiler effect *Table of voting systems by nation *Tactical voting *Vote counting systems ==References== *''Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction'' ISBN 0333801628 == External links == (alphabetical by title) * [http://accuratedemocracy.com/voting_systems.htm Accurate Democracy: Voting Tasks and Voting Systems] by Rob Loring * [http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/es.htm Administration and Costs of Elections Project documents on electoral systems] *[http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/research/perspec.pdf Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance] Article by Roger B. Myerson.(Portable Document Format) * PhD seminar on [http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~rnau/choice/choice09.pdf Choice Theory] (Portable Document Format) Article by Robert Nau. *[http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~conitzer/MLEvotingUAI05.pdf Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators] Article by Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm.(Portable Document Format) * [http://condorcet.org/emr/ Condorcet.org election methods resource] by Blake Cretney * [http://pressurecooker.phil.cmu.edu/Academic/Papers/MS-thesis.htm Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Voting] Article by David Emmanuel Gray. * [http://www.masquilier.org/republic/election/ A different way to vote] by AugustinMa. Of interest is the [http://www.masquilier.org/libre/phpbb/ modified] version of the popular phpBB bulletin board that can be found [http://www.masquilier.org/agora/ here]. The board allows the users to create plurality, approval and condorcet (Schulze method) polls and [http://www.masquilier.org/agora/viewforum.php?f=7 cast their ballots]. * [http://www.newuniversity.org/print.php?id=1032 Efficiency in Polling] Article by Courtney Baird. * [http://electionmethods.org/ electionmethods.org] by Russ Paielli * [http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Main_Page Electowiki] A wiki that focuses on voting theory, which covers some topics not found in wikipedia. Also contains older versions of some wikipedia voting articles. * [http://electorama.com/em Election methods list]: A mailing list containing technical discussions about election methods * [http://theorem.ca/~mvcorks/code/voting_methods.html Evaluating Voting Methods] Article by Matt Corks * [http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/HistTopics/Voting.html The history of voting] * [http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~slinko/Research/IC6.pdf How Large a Coalitional Should Be to Manipulate an Election?] (Portable Document Format) Article by Arkadii Slinko. * [https://www.discover.com/issues/nov-00/features/featbestman/ May the Best Man Lose] article on Approval voting and Borda Count by Dana Mackenzie. *[http://www.hss.caltech.edu/Events/SCW/Papers/erdeo.pdf Minimal Monotonic Extensions of Scoring Rules] Article by Orhan Erdem and M. Remzi Sanver. (Portable Document Format) * [http://www.mcs.vuw.ac.nz/~ncj/comp303/schulze.pdf A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method] (Portable Document Format) by Markus Schulze ([http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/submissions/csharman-10_0409201706-143.pdf mirror1], [http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/demexp-dev/2003-09/pdflQW7IlpAfC.pdf mirror2]) * [http://www.eco.fundp.ac.be/cahiers/filepdf/c223.pdf On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles] (Portable Document Format) Article by V. Merlin, M. Tataru, and F. Valognes. * [http://www.hss.caltech.edu/Events/SCW/Papers/merlv.pdf On the impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes] (Portable Document Format) Article by Vincent Merlin and Fabrice Valognes. * [http://dmoz.org/Society/Politics/Campaigns_and_Elections/Voting_Systems/ ODP category on voting systems] *[http://personal.lse.ac.uk/DOWDING/Files/Manipulaiton_web_04_05.pdf In Praise of Manipulation] (Portable Document Format) Article by Martin van Hees and Keith Dowding. * [http://www.braindoll.net/vote Preferential Voting FAQ] (see glossary at the end) * [http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/Perot.pdf President Perot or fundamentals of voting theory illustrated with the 1992 election] (Portable Document Format) Article by Alexander Tabarrok. * [http://stv.sourceforge.net/ pSTV -- Software for computing a variety of voting systems including IRV, STV, and Condorcet] *[http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~slinko/Research/rules3.pdf A Statistical Investigation of Social Choice Rules] Article by Arkadii Slinko and Wayland Leung. (Portable Document Format) * [http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/sing.html Single winner page] by Mike Ossipoff * [http://www.maa.org/editorial/knot/LiberalArts.html Student's Social Choice] A column by Alex Bogomolny using java applets to illustrate various concepts of choice. * [http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~conitzer/tweakIJCAI03.pdf Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard] (Portable Document Format) An article by Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. * [http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/diss/node4.html Vote Aggregation Methods] An article by Lorrie Cranor evaluating voting methods. *[http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers2005/Moser.pdf Voting by Adaptive Agents in Multi-candidate Elections] Article by Scott Moser.(Portable Document Format) * [http://webspeedreader.com/articles/voting.htm Voting, Elections, Democracy, Republicanism, and the Electoral College] by William C. Spaulding * [http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm Voting methods: tutorial and essays] by James Green-Armytage Voting systems
A WikiProject is being developed at Wikipedia:WikiProject Voting Systems for further work on this and other voting system related pages. ==coverage== I know I've been scattering pages all over the place here, but here's my idea. :Voting system will be used to discuss the dry, mathematical aspects, :election to discuss specifically human elections, probably their history, geography, etc. Each system page will discuss the mathematical aspects of that particular system, as well as examples of it's use (real-world and hypothetical). I'm not sure how much of a :Proportional representation to recreate on [Voting system]. --DanKeshet :More about methods, I think that ''someone who knows'' should perhaps add notes about the adducted reasons for every system, in order to describe why it is respectively supposed that each system would be a better instrument to represent electors rather than the other ones (thus expanding what is now in the considerations list). At least a concise list of alleged ''pro'' and ''contra'', so that we don't stop at a technical point. :I.e.: I confusely remember Kelsen's notes about proportional system, where he describes why he thinks this should ensure the better popular representation and respect of minorities etc., while others instead criticise this because... Others propose let's say a "majority prize" stressing this should ensure a more effectively productive parliamentar or governmental life, while oppositors believe that... and so on. :I know that this would risk to become and endless tale, and also that (due to single parties' positions on the matter) it would always keep us on the border of a non-NPOV, but a bit of detail (scientifically reported) would render a more complete idea. :Could this eventually belong to a separate page? ==context== ''Voting systems are usually discussed in the context of electoral reform or grassroots democracy, or as an alternative to consensus decision making, but the tradeoffs in choosing a voting system are so complex that there is no easy summary of how these various debates interact with system characteristics.'' Removed because the first sentence is not necessarily true; there are many environments in which voting systems are discussed; the second part is discussed already, and better, in the paragraphs below. pde((?)). ==coalitions== As it stands, we have this text regarding coalitions: ''These parties may in turn be aligned with other parties, to form coalitions, which can play roles beyond those played by the party.'' But I'm wondering, are coalitions ever actually a formal part of the ''voting system'', and not just political or parliamentary entitites which make agreements on candidates and/or lists to submit to a voting system (in which case, they're a bit off-topic)? --User:Pde 04:17 8 Jul 2003 (UTC) : In the Australian(?) system, you can fill in a set of preferences, or you can alternatively just check the "Green" checkbox and have the Green party fill in your preferences for you. In such a system coalitions have a considerable impact. : Also, some voting systems encourage or discourage coalition government (eg proportional representation tends to create coalitions, first past the post tends to create a two party systeam). So there are links that way too. User:MyRedDice :Yes, I meant those words exactly as you understood them. See, for example, http://www.kypros.org/Elections/electoral.html In that system, you can vote for single-party lists or multiple-party coalitions, and there are different election thresholds for single-party lists and for coalitions, and even for coalitions based on their size. Cyprus is not unique in this regard. User:DanKeshet 14:50 8 Jul 2003 (UTC) ---- A grumble about a change that I'm not bold enough to undo myself: disapproval voting is a valid voting topic but is not a "system" in the same sense as the others listed here. -- User:pm67nz == want to add a section for how the absentee ballot is handled in various states == Hi, I'm new to the wiki as an author and I would like to contribute a section on the votes are actually sorted and tabulated in various states. Specificly, I wanted to add a section on how absentee ballots are handled and then tabulate which states allow for absentee ballots. The current Voting System page doesn't allow for this very well without an addition to the table of contents. My thought on this is to add a voting methods section under the aspects of voting systems and have 3 sections: :Voting methods ::Absentee voting: ::Internet Voting: ::DRE voting: ::Paper ballot: Then I will want to expand on the sub headings and get others who are well versed to do the same. Thoughts? --User:Ceremona 19:56, 28 Feb 2004 (UTC) ---- == classification scheme == I do not understand your changes to the classification scheme, Tom: *In what sense is the borda count an "approval" scheme. *All single-winner systems by definition are "majoritarian" (as opposed to proportional). *The bloc vote is not semi-proportional, it is majoritarian. Please explain these changes. User:DanKeshet 18:42, May 7, 2004 (UTC) ---- Dan, Proportional Representation says Electoral systems that do not result in proportional representation are known as majoritarian systems. The term "majoritarian" would seem to me to only apply to multiwinner elections. Maybe this means majoritarian systems pass this test: "If a majority of voters agree-to-agree before the election, they can guarantee to control all the winners." If so, I accept that this would be true for all reasonable single-vote and approval-vote methods. Still I think differentiating multiple vote methods is important. Imagine running an election poll by two methods: Plurality and Method X. If a single candidate gains a sincere majority in Plurality, that candidate should win any reasonable election method. Unfortunately that candidate is not guaranteed to win with an Approval or Borda count because that majority is not necesarily aware of its power and they may "overvote" and cause their favorite to lose. At least Bucklin can pass this test since it only allows each voter one vote in the first round. Borda is an "approval" method because it is not a "One person, one vote" method. Once voters offer more than one vote, there's no definition of majority winner. The only question I have about Borda, is "Can voters truncate their preferences?" The answer doesn't change that it is an approval ballot. It only changes how much Borda looks like simple approval. Looking at simple approval voting: If I approve of candidates in the order of A,B,C, and dislike D and E, I might approval vote [ABC] counted as: (A=1, B=1, C=1, D=0, E=0); Or approval vote [AB] is counted as (A=1, B=1, C=0, D=0, E=0); Or approval vote [A] counted as (A=1, B=0, C=0, D=0, E=0) In comparison in the same Borda election, allowing up to 5 rankings, I might rank vote [ABC], counted as: (A=5, B=4, C=3, D=0, E=0); Or rank vote [AB], counted as (A=5, B=4, C=0, D=0, E=0); Or rank vote as [A] counted as (A=5, B=0, C=0, D=0, E=0). So you can see Borda looks very much like Approval - the number of votes offered increases as more candidates are "approved". As to the multiwinner elections, I apologize. I was in error. The method "Bloc Voting" is apparently identical to the method I call "Plurality-at-large" which I added. I should remove Plurality-at-large and add it as another name for Bloc Voting. User:Tomruen 02:07, 8 May 2004 (UTC) :Regarding bloc voting, thanks for moving that to majoritarian. If anything, it's super-majoritarian because it can produce results even more lopsided than SMDP can. :Regarding single-winner methods: I can understand the distinction you're making, although I think there are better ways to categorize them. More importantly than the quality, though: is this something you have seen in other literature or are these categories idiosyncratic? If it's an accepted system (like majoritarian/semi-proportional/proportional is for multi-winner systems), then let's do it. But if it's just a new system that you made up, I think it's better not to impose our own system of categorizing on these systems. User:DanKeshet 02:40, May 8, 2004 (UTC) ---- Hi Dan, Sorry, I apparently didn't have a watch on this talk page. I'm not sure what super-majoritarian would be. Bloc-voting allows a devoted 51% to win all the seats. Maybe you mean that you don't even need 51% to get all the seats since there's no majority requirement for winners. I don't know what SMDP is. About the single-winner method groupings, admittingly the categories I offered may not be any sort of consensus position. I have read about some methods being considered "Approval methods" as methods that offer more than one vote at a time, although some may argue that Condorcet is an approval method as well, while I keep it separate. Whatever classification is used, I really do believe it is useful to separate methods that can be judged "single vote" versus "multiple vote". Single vote methods (Plurality, runoff, IRV, STV, Cumulative Voting) are all methods used in political elections. I don't know any multivote, single-winner election method used in politics. All proportional represenatation systems are (or should be) single-vote methods - every voter gets equal votes to influence the results. Anyway, I'll do some more research in some books and online and see what I can find. I suppose it might just be useful to point out (elsewhere) which methods are used in various locations, or if they are just theoretical. --User:Tomruen 19:34, 17 May 2004 (UTC) :Hi Tom, :RE: bloc voting: SMDP is Single Member District Plurality (first-past-the-post, but emphasizing the system-wide aspect of it). While first-past-the-post is majoritarian in a single district, often because of the variation in districts, it has some aspect of proportionality (e.g. there are 2 districts where D's are in the majority and 1 where R's are in the majority). In bloc voting, all 3 districts become one large district, where D's are in the majority and win all three seats. That is what I meant by super-majoritarian. :RE: the distinction you make about "approval methods": I have never heard it before. Also, when you say that in "single-vote methods" (another term I've never heard before), every voter gets equal votes to influence the results, this is also true in what you're calling "approval" methods. All voters are equal in all of these methods. User:DanKeshet 21:18, May 17, 2004 (UTC) ::Hi Dan, :: Terminology is always a problem. When I say "single vote method", I mean the same as saying "One person, one vote" - any system that allows every voter one vote for one choice, (or more generally allows a full vote split among a set of candidates). Plurality obviously follows that logic. Runoffs and IRV also follow it since every voter has one vote each round. :: Methods like "Approval", "Borda", and "Bucklin", do not follow the "one person, one vote" ideal. Approval allows multiple full votes. Borda forces multiple votes (unless truncation is allowed). Bucklin applies multiple votes if the first preference votes don't identify a majority candidate. In these methods, if you add the total votes applied, it will exceed the number of voters. :: You might even define an "Approval method" as a method where two or more "majority winners" may exist, although the definition depends on how you normalize the count. You can normalize the count by dividing by the maximum votes one person can offer to a single candidate, then a majority support is fairly defined as half as many votes as voters. :: In "single vote" methods it is possible to identify a majority winner as a singular candidate being supported by more than 50% of the voters. In multivote methods it is possible more than one candidate will exceed more than 50% of the vote (because the total votes exceeds the number of voters). :: In Borda, for example, you might say "Everyone gets equal votes", rank 1,2,3 and apply 3,2,1 points, and so everyone offers 6 points. This can be normalized (by dividing by 3) to 1, 2/3, 1/3 point vote for each ranking, so every can be said to be allowed up to 2 total votes, but no more than 1 vote for any one candidate. But the system disallows putting a full allowable vote on one candidate. If I only have one favorite, I must "bullet vote" (offer 1 ranking, 1 vote). Some people get up to 2 votes while I'm limited to 1 vote. :: Similar in Bucklin, if I only have one favorite, and I don't rank deeper than one, and there's no first rank majority winner, other voters can get a second vote to influence the winner, while I am disallowed from putting a second vote on my first favorite. :: "Single vote" methods allow runoffs because candidates that are weak because they are not popular. Approval methods (methods allowing more votes than winners) can't use runoffs fairly because they encourage tactical voting - strong candidate supporters can bluff support for weak competition to force elimination of actually stronger competition, and then back down their support later when the competion is weakened. It's very possible for a single-vote runoff winner to lose in an approval-vote runoff. :: Similarly for PR in multiwinner elections, if you use a multivote method, there's no good definition of a proportional quota in election. Cumulative voting (CV) and STV both are "one vote" methods because all voters can offer a full vote on one candidate. CV is a single-vote method because you can offer your full vote on one choice so 3-votes is actually normalized to 3-(1/3) votes per person. STV is more clearly a one vote method since it is "one vote" that is automatically fractionally split among multiple choices. :: I'm not discounting "approval methods" as unconditionally inferior, but I think the distinction is clear and important to realize as fundamentally different properties. :: Every single-seat voting system used in politics to my knowledge is a one vote system. Basically plurality or runoff or IRV. Bucklin and ranked ballots was tried in Minnesota city of Duluth in the early 20th century and rejected by the courts for not being a "one person, one vote" system. :: See http://www.fairvotemn.org/resources/publications/Municipal%20Voting%20System%20Reform%20article.pdf ::--User:Tomruen 00:05, 18 May 2004 (UTC) ---- == classification scheme - take 2 == :''regroup method list based on category (single vote, multiple vote, and pairiwise votes),'' I think this new classification scheme is nonstandard and adds more confusion and bias. Calling a runoff election a "single vote" method is odd. After all, in case of a tie you need a runoff for many other kinds of election. Saying that approval voting is not ''one person one vote'' is POV, given the common association of that phrase with ''basic fairness in democracy''. In any given election, most people cast lots more than one vote, but for different candidates in different races, but we don't deprecate that practice. I think the root meaning of the phrase is that person A doesn't get to have their votes given more weight than person A (as was the case in the original constitution with respect to slaves). Talking about ''used exclusively in political elections'' would need a lot more evidence to back it up, I think. Suggesting that single vote schemes don't involve ''tactical voting'' but multiple vote ones do is clearly incorrect, given the major tactical connundrum that minor party supporters face in the current US system. :Interesting idea, and sorry I missed this discussion until the article changed. But I suggest going back to the previous revision. User:Nealmcb 21:39, 2004 Jun 4 (UTC) :: I can and will defend my change as aiding in differentiating methods and reduced confusion. These are fundamental differences. Runoffs are "one person, one vote" because a second vote is allowed only after the original vote is invalidated. :: On my claim for "used exclusively in political election", the word exclusive risks being an overstatement, but I know of no exceptions. Of course if you get down to city or other lower elections, anything may be possible in some corners. (Admitting I don't know anywhere that "random ballot" is used.) :: According to the book "The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design", 1/97, under "The World of Electoral systems", the single winner methods used by country are: ***FPTP - USA, Canada, UK, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia ... (30+ other countries) ***Alternative Vote (IRV) - Australia ***Two Round - France, Cuba, (~20 other countries) :: I think it is deceptive to put "Used" and "Theoretical" methods in the same list as if they were all regarded equally in practice. :: If it is judged better for this page to simply list methods, then an alternative location for this information might be a a "Election System History" page that classifies all methods used for practical large scale elections (political or otherwise) in various places and times, and give some background to their local rise (and/or fall). For example, I know Bucklin was used in Minnesota city of Duluth in the past until it was judged as breaking the "one person, one vote" ideal. :: Some people may wish to redefine "one person, one vote" to include Approval voting as "one person, one vote PER CANDIDATE", but the standard meaning is "One person, one vote PER ELECTED SEAT". It is the definition that allows a singular majority winner to be identified. It is also the definition that allows all Proportional Representation systems to function for multiple winners. :: I accept the classification may not be liked by some interested in giving all theoretical election methods equal footing. :: I accept my originally labeling "multiple vote methods" as "approval methods" was nonstandard, but the fundamental difference between allowing an individual voter to support one candidate at a time versus supporting multiple candidates is not debatable. It is irresponsible to not make this clear distinction. :: I said "Multiple vote methods give voters more flexibility where tactical voting is less of a concern." This is standard understanding. The more flexible voting is, the more important tactical voting is. This is well accepted even by the advocates of Borda and Approval. Approval itself is a tactical degeneration of Cardinal Ratings. :: I will be respectful, but I won't retreat and support completely without more discussion. I would hope that others can improve this change if it needs work. :: --User:Tomruen 23:22, Jun 4, 2004 (UTC) :::Hi Tom, I agree this section is very confusing. Part of my motivation for lumping stuff in here was to have one place for all the terminology that gets discussed; I think it might make a lot of sense for *this* page to discuss categorizations, with a few popular examples. For example, I can think of at least three orthogonal ways to categorize systems: **** What the result is (e.g., single-winner, multiple-winner, proportional) ***** How balloting is done (e..g., single vote, cardinal rating, ranking) ***** How it is counted (e.g., pairwise, runoff, etc.) :::I think if we can be clear(er) about how we categorizing things, the other discussions might be easier. Then, we have a whole 'other page which is an exhaustive list of systems (perhaps labeled according to categorizations other than the top-level one) along with a note of where (if ever) they're used. That is, keep this page abstract, and put concrete info in that one. Its not perfect, but hopefully it will help us move forward. User:Drernie 01:49, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) :::: Hi Ernie, Thanks for your thoughts. :::: Certainly "single winner" versus "multiple winner" is the top-level categorical separation and this has already been done (even if there is possible overlap.) :::: I considered separating by "How balloting is done", but that didn't seem as important since each method can have different types of ballots. Runoff and Instant Runoff use different ballots but same results. Condorcet could have rank ballots OR pairwise ballots, but same results. :::: "How it is counted" is clear to me as second most fundamental next to "how many winners". :::: If my regroupings can be improved or wording made with more neutrality, I very much welcome input. I don't want to be unnecessarily controversial, or cause senseless revision/reverting wars, now or over time. I hope there can be some agreement better than an alphabetized listing, even if that's also valuable somewhere. Thanks again! :::: --User:Tomruen 02:15, Jun 5, 2004 (UTC) ::: I'm in favour of classification by ballot type. What matters is not the debatable "fundamentalness" of a clasification scheme but its usefulness, particularly to encyclopedia readers. Ballot types are easily and quickly understood. There is also less room for controversy. Tom's classification is very controversial (see gathering storm on electoral methods mailing list). Personaly I disagree both with his interpretation of what ' the "one person, one vote" ideal' means and that the main advantage of 'multiple vote' methods is to 'give voters more flexibility where tactical voting is less of a concern'. The third category, is, by its own admission a messy one, since particular variants of it can fall into either of the first two categories. None of these problems arise with a ballot type based classification. :::Dealing with the objections above: :::: ''I considered separating by "How balloting is done", but that didn't seem as important since each method can have different types of ballots.'' ::: For every method there is a simplest possible ballot, that is the only one that matters. :::: ''Runoff and Instant Runoff use different ballots but same results.'' ::: Eh? See French presidential election, 2002. :::: ''Condorcet could have rank ballots OR pairwise ballots, but same results.'' ::: I don't belive "pairwise ballot" is a well defined term. Note above point about simplest ballot - Condorcet is a ranked ballot method. ::: User:Pm67nz 06:32, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == classification scheme - take 3 == : I offer a replacement groupings based first on "ballot type" and second on "counting type". Hopefully this is less controverial. These distinction are clear. :The subclass "counting type" is less defendable, especially as listed as "one count" and "multiple counts", but single count methods are worthy to point out since they are simpler and helpful voting strategies will be more transparent in a single round. : --User:Tomruen 08:54, Jun 5, 2004 (UTC) : Someone with only an IP address changed the first catagory to Up/Down so that approval can be moved there. I think approval is a cardinal method, limited values 0,1. : They also added a "ties" subcategory which I think is not clear. For example, they put Bucklin under "ties allowed" which is not true for any definition I've seen. Bucklin doesn't allow a voter two votes in the first round. That blocks the ability of Bucklin to idenify a singular a majority winner in the first round! : I leave it up to others to consider these changes, but I disagree. --User:Tomruen 00:15, Jun 6, 2004 (UTC) == orphaned article: Simple Majority Voting == There's an orphaned article, Simple Majority Voting. Someone might want to rescue the material there, or delete it. :I'll add it back for now under Plurality, until someone tells me the difference. User:Drernie 22:43, 3 Jun 2004 (UTC) ::I would rather see it deleted User:Pm67nz 06:04, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == Single Winner Variations SECTION == Does anyone understand this section? Where the heck is this stuff used? I don't think this belongs on a "list" page like Voting_Systems unless it has a link. --User:Tomruen 05:44, Jun 5, 2004 (UTC) :Single Winner Variations ::Automatic Equal Ranking Line Option (AERLO) :::A voter may mark a line in his/her ranking, meaning that if no one above that line wins, then that voter wants to promote to 1st place all of him/her above-line candidates and have a recount. (In pairwise-count methods the promotion only takes place if, additionally, there's a circular tie containing above-line and below-line candidates). ::Automatic Truncation Line Option (ATLO) :::A voter may mark a line in him/her ranking, meaning that if no one above the line wins, then that voter wants to drop from him/her ranking all of him/her below-line candidates and have a recount. (In pairwise-count methods the dropping only takes place if, additionally, there's a circular tie containing above-line and below-line candidates). : Agreed, these are AFAIK recent inventions known only to readers of the electoral methods mailing list, and do not (yet!) belong in a general purpose encyclopedia, well certainly not on a core/intro/list page like this one. User:Pm67nz 06:35, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == theory vs. practice/history == In one of the comments above, Tom suggested that we have a separate page to give an overview of voting systems as they have been used in practice and in history. I think this would make a good subsection of this page. For example: "Around the world, the most popular voting systems are .... and ...., which is especially popular in ...." User:DanKeshet 19:41, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == capital letters == Dear User:Michael Hardy, you wrote: "Would the authors of articles on voting methods please stop worshipping capital letters with such incredibly fanatical intensity. It makes it hard to get links right." I consider your recent changes to be vandalism. If you are really so upset about capital letters, then it is sufficient to replace e.g. "Schulze method" by "Schulze method". But the way you replaced capital letters destroyed the links completely. -- User:MarkusSchulze 5 Jan 2005 == "... is not guaranteed..." == Henrygb: why did you feel that was POV? I thought it was tautological, based on the preceding paragraph. --User:Baylink 04:48, 25 Feb 2005 (UTC) == Cleaning up == This article is ''way too long''. You cannot give an uninformed person a complete understanding of all kinds of voting systems in one article, but it seems that lots of people have been trying, and adding their own favorite obscure aspects of voting systems. I've taken out a few things that clearly didn't belong in the article (the line-option stuff that was already discussed here; a duplicate section on criteria signed by Mike Ossipoff; a section on alternate names for Condorcet stuck in the middle of a bulleted list of methods). The section on criteria, and the table, should be merged into Voting method criteria. There should be a paragraph pointing there, noting that criteria are an important way to rationally compare voting methods when everything else devolves into political ideologies. I followed the election-methods list for a while. I appreciate the large volume of contributions those people are making, but some of them should keep in mind that things that are hot topics on that list may nevertheless be too obscure for Wikipedia. User:Rspeer 19:47, Mar 28, 2005 (UTC) == Remove University of Texas tutorial == I followed the link to the University of Texas tutorial, and found it to be misinformative, and generally lower-quality than existing tutorials in the external links section. Specifically, it called IRV and Approval "positional methods", but the generally accepted definition of a positional method is one where positions on a ballot correspond directly to points. IRV is at least ranked, which is a term that is confusable with "positional", but I have no idea what inspired them to put Approval there. Fahrenheit451, I hope you can understand that I'm not reverting your edit out of spite. I would have removed that link if anyone had posted it and I had followed it. That said, it is because your edits to Borda count have made me suspicious that I followed the link. If any other external links on this page are equally misinformative, or if they are biased or have other flaws, I would advocate removing them too. I simply haven't looked at them all. User:Rspeer 17:38, Apr 8, 2005 (UTC) That's fine on removing that tutorial. Your other criteria for link removal is interesting in that it is contrary to what you are advocating for the electowiki link: "if they are biased or have other flaws.." That is quite broad and would include many, perhaps most links on wikipedia. Perhaps you are operating on a double standard. --User:Fahrenheit451 02:10, 31 May 2005 (UTC) == New table == I've made a new table of voting system criteria. Some changes I made are: * Make the table in Wiki-style, instead of HTML * Spell out the method names instead of using incomprehensible abbreviations * To accomodate that, split the criteria into two tables (ones that don't assume strategic manipulation and ones that do, though I acknowledge the line is a bit fuzzy) * Sort the methods in alphabetical order to remove the pro-CSSD bias * Remove Majority Choice Approval altogether (I believe that MCA is original research) * Add Ranked Pairs, which has a Wikipedia article and seems to be on an equal level of notablity with CSSD * Add majority criterion and consistency criterion (which needs an article) * Add Independence of irrelevant alternatives, including local independence * Add independence of clone candidates. Possible values for the column are "Yes", "No (teaming)", "No (vote-splitting)", and "No (crowding)". Teaming trumps crowding. * Collapse "generalized" or "weak" criteria into the main criterion - they rarely make a difference When I had to add cells to the table, I looked up the information on [http://condorcet.org/emr condorcet.org] or Electowiki. I apologize if I made a mistake in any of the cells. Also, if someone can fill in the "unknown" information for Ranked Pairs, it would be quite helpful. User:Rspeer 03:28, Apr 12, 2005 (UTC) Thank you to the anon at 62.246.* - your changes do seem to be correct. I hastily reverted them (having my guard put up by seeing anonymous changes with no edit log), then realized that I had screwed up originally and the anon was right. User:Rspeer 14:08, Apr 12, 2005 (UTC) == Table == I don't want to edit myself but suggest the table and criteria are a little confusing in that the criteria are generally expressed in a negative formulation, but the table appears to be positive about that negative, if you see what I mean. May I humbly and tentatively suggest re-wording the criteria to a positive sense, if only as 'avoids the problem of ...'. --Chuck (2005-05-12) You don't need to be so humble - I was just blatantly inconsistent in writing those criteria. Is it better now? User:Rspeer 23:08, May 10, 2005 (UTC) Yes, a lot clearer. -- Chuck (2005-05-13) ==electowiki link== F451: If you go to this page http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Special:Allpages you will find various articles that exist on electowiki but do not exist on wikipedia. Certainly there is a lot of duplication, but the extra material makes it worth an external link. User:Hermitage It's another secondary resource, but in this case, mostly an older, obsolete version of the wikipedia articles that have since been edited to much higher quality. Let's cultivate a high standard of scholarship, James. Anything that is there and valid should be copied over to wikipedia and edited here. There is a worthwhile project for whoever wishes to do it.--User:Fahrenheit451 00:58, 30 May 2005 (UTC) * I disagree. Electowiki serves a purpose, because ongoing research in election methods can go there, while it can't go on Wikipedia until it's more established. We should link to it. Your complaint seems to be that, on the topics where it overlaps with Wikipedia, it hasn't been obsessively edited to keep in sync with Wikipedia. That doesn't mean it's worthless: that means it has fewer editors, plus merging content from one GFDL resource to another can be confusing and difficult. User:Rspeer 21:33, May 30, 2005 (UTC) You are falsely alleging that I require "obsessive editing to keep in sync with wikipedia" and I think electowiki is worthless. Please present some examples of innovative, ongoing research on electowiki. Otherwise, there is no reason to link to it.--User:Fahrenheit451 02:01, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Why were you unable to check out the site yourself (as I requested) before you deleted the link? User:Hermitage Because I am not a student on summer break like you are and have lots of time on my hands. I have a career and other responsibilities. You are perfectly capable of presenting a case of the inclusion of a dubious link.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) I've said before that if you don't have the time to read a source, you don't have the time to remove that source as an external link. User:Hermitage I wonder if your comment is elitist. Sure comes across that way. I looked over some, but not all, of the articles, and found nothing of any value. Perhaps a voting methods research article should be created and electowiki would be an appropriate link. I will continue to remove the electowiki link for the reasons I have stated.--User:Fahrenheit451 19:32, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) It would have been very simple to go to the link I posted above and notice that there are several articles there that are not in the wikipedia. Wrong. I have no idea what is different between the two. I did ask for examples.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Okay, well, now you know. User:Hermitage However, I have taken some more of my own time to copy the names of some of the articles below. Some of these may be in wikipedia, but I believe that the majority of them are not. Which ones are and which are not?--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) As far as I know, none of the articles below are in wikipedia, but I can't say that for sure. User:Hermitage As for your comments about "high standards of scholarship": 1. It smells of elitism. User:Hermitage Wrong again. That is exercising responsibility for the standards of wikipedia content.Evidently you don't know what the word elitism means.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) If you assume that only people whose articles are published in journals have something useful to say, that's elitism. I'm sure that your actual views aren't this extreme, but they seem to tend in this direction, i.e. your insistence that external links should be published and peer reviewed. User:Hermitage Wrong again. The publication and peer-review process gives a particular professional community the opportunity to comment on a scholar's work. It is an imperfect, but valuable process.--User:Fahrenheit451 19:32, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) Who are you to decide what the standard of scholarship should be, and whether a given site meets those standards? User:Hermitage Because I am a wikipedia editor.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Right, well, we're all wikipedia editors here, so that's not really saying much. My point is that you don't have a right to decide these things unilaterally. If your standards of scholarship are not embraced by a broad consensus of wikipedia editors, then you don't have a right to impose them on any given page. User:Hermitage 21:55, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Wrong again, James. I have a right to edit in accordance with wikipedia policy and I exercise those rights fully.--User:Fahrenheit451 19:32, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) That's it? That's your whole reply? You asked for examples of original research unique to electowiki, and I gave you 24 examples. Yes, electowiki duplicates out of date wikipedia articles, but it also has original work which makes it easily as worthwhile as some of the other pages linked to this page. My guess is that you're deleting the link for some sort of emotional reason, e.g. to avoid losing face. Anyway, your reply seems to contradict the spirit of wikipedia. ("Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution.") I haven't read up on the dispute resolution procedures yet, but for now I'm going to hope that someone else besides me adds the electowiki link, so that F451 sees that I'm not the only one who thinks that it has merit. User:Hermitage 23:07, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) Descending Acquiescing Coalitions Direct Democracy via Proxy Voting Imagine Democratic Fair Choice Later-no-harm criterion Marginal Ranked Approval Voting Neutrality of Spoiled Ballots Pairwise-Elimination SCRIRVE Approval Sorted Margins CDTT Cardinal pairwise DSC Descending Acquiescing Coalitions MMPO Median Ratings Pairwise Sorted Approval Pairwise Sorted Dyadic Ballots Ranked Approval Voting River Sprucing up Uncovered set Definite Majority Choice Descending Solid Coalitions Vote For and Against User:Hermitage 12:15, 31 May 2005 (UTC) == Challenge to validity of Independence of Clones criteria == I challenge the validity of the Independence of Clones criteria: I have not found any mathematical definition of a clone, nor have I found a way to objectively determine what a clone is and isn't. I can say that clones are a special case of a correlated pair, but that still is not a precise definition. I would like to promote a discussion on this topic.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:29, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC) * Independence of clones is a commonly-used way of formalizing the effects strategic nomination. Clones are defined precisely on the strategic nomination page. Deleting a column from a table is a very poor way of "promoting discussion". What was your reason for doing this? User:Rspeer 04:51, Jun 7, 2005 (UTC) There is nothing precise about that definition, furthermore, show me some actual clones.--User:Fahrenheit451 20:00, 7 Jun 2005 (UTC) Independence of clones is mathematically well-defined. See T.N. Tideman (1987): Independence of Clones as a Criterion for Voting Rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 4: 185-206 I am aware of that reference and cited it in a past edit.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) You are correct in saying that perfect clone sets are unlikely to occur in public elections. However, the criterion is still useful for analytical purposes. Also, methods failing clone independence are more likely to respond irregularly to the addition or subtraction of candidates who are close to being clones of other candidates. There is no evidence that any clones have ever existed. When you say useful for analytical purposes, you are giving your opinion, which with I disagree, but you are also implying icc is nothing more than a theoretical construct. I say it is not well-defined because it does not identify observable phenomena, and it does not lead to the prediction of phenomena yet unobserved. I would go so far to assert that the independence of clones criteria is Junk Science.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Independence of clones is a criterion that many students of voting theory find to be significant. Exactly which students are you refering to?--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Thus, I see no reason to delete it. If you find the criterion unimportant, that's fine, but there is no need to impose that judgement on all wikipedia readers new to the topic. I have no interest in deleting the article, just removing the references to it in relations to various voting methods. I can invent a criteria, call it the independence of the tooth fairy criterion, and edit the various voting method articles to state which ones comply or don't comply with itfc. Even if some editors "find it useful" it is absurd to use it if the tooth fairy can never be observed or proven to exist.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Remember, Wikipedia works on the basis of consensus. If there is wide agreement that ICC is at least worth considering as a voting systems criterion (which there is), then it should be defined on wikipedia, and it should be listed among the criteria passed and failed by the various tally methods. If all wikipedia editors made a point of deleting criteria that they didn't find useful, there would be few to zero criteria left in the encyclopedia. Please don't be so contentious in your editing. Wikipedia also requires content to be verifiable, and these "clones" are not. It is irrelevant if 100 wiki editors proclaim the tooth fairy to exist when the existence of even one can never be verified or proven.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) With regard to ICC, you seem to be largely editing before discussing, rather than the other way around. If you are having trouble understanding why people find merit in the ICC, I suggest that you discuss more before editing. In addition to discussing on wikipedia, I invite you to discuss these issues on the electorama mailing list. Go ahead and make an anti-ICC argument there, and see what kind of replies you get. That should be more productive and less antagonistic than the current pattern of "edit wars" here on wikipedia.User:Hermitage 04:54, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) I did browse the postings to that list. To me, most of it is noise rather than signal. The opinions on that list do not interest me, rather I am interested in verifiable facts. Tideman's "clones" are Not verifiable.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Voting method criteria are not facts, they are mathematical definitions. Clone is not a criteria, but is presumed to exist in Tideman's definition. If clone candidates do not exist, then discussing them is tantamount to discussing fiction.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:56, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) If you do not understand what a mathematical definition is, you do not have the necessary background to write about criteria. You are in no position to evaluate my mathematical aptitude. Just to clue you in, I pulled straight A's in calculus in high school and only attended class to take the tests. I also passed the final exam for first year college chemistry with calculus prior to my high school senior year and took organic chemistry and lab while still a high school senior. Have a good day, Rob.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:56, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) "Clones" are a part of this definition, not something whose "existence can be verified or proven". Here are other similar Wikipedia articles, about idealizations that "do not exist" but are still useful definitions: * Ideal gas * Absolute zero * Infinity User:Rspeer 16:27, Jun 8, 2005 (UTC) Yes, and they are totally different bodies of data than clones. Those are not people, for one, and for two, absolutes are unobtainable in the physical universe. The three data you cited are absolutes. Clones are a theoretical construct for some imagined candidates who statistically correlate on ballots. The error in your thinking is that you are equating mathematical absolutes with the much larger superset of theoretical constructs. "Clones" are Not well-defined as they do not identify any observable entity. Hence, are of no practical use.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:56, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Well-defined is a mathematical concept, and clones certainly qualify as a well-defined object - there is no ambiguity in the definition as to whether something is a true clone or not. Whether or not they are likely to be commonly found in elections involving people is entirely secondary - just as no real-world temperature will ever be absolute zero, it is still a useful definition for analytical purposes. As was mentioned earlier, analysis on the effect of clones is frequently useful as analysis on the effect of near-clones as well. Clone analysis, for instance, can be used to study what the effect of putting the same candidate in two different places on the ballot would be. Clones are not a concept invented on Wikipedia either - they appear in the voting literature with some regularity. User:Scott Ritchie 19:46, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Please cite where the ICC appears with regularity. Please substantiate your statement.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:40, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC) Am I right in that what you are saying is that clones are an interesting mathematical concept to you and some other folks, even though there is no evidence for their existence? I just do not agree that voting criteria should have no real world application. It is not number theory where such endeavors are legitimate. I have no objection to anyone playing with theories, but please do not mix that data in with data that does have real application with verifiably extant objects.--User:Fahrenheit451 00:30, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC) :There's no evidence of the existence of ideal gases either, however they are a very useful concept for studying real-world chemistry. To claim they have "no real world application" because empirical research shows them to be only very good approximations rather than a perfect model is...strange. True clones may not commonly exist in large public elections (just as true ties don't), however near ties and close elections certainly do, and theoretical analysis of their effects is certainly done - hence, it belongs in Wikipedia. User:Scott Ritchie 01:30, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC) Fine, so show me an article where a real candidate election was analyzed using ICC.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:43, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC) I mentioned this elsewhere (unfortunately this discussion spreads over several pages), but I'll repeat it here: The category we're dealing with is called "voting theory". Thus, it is not limited to observation of real elections. Hence the definition of clones can be useful here even though clones may never exist in large public elections. You ask which students of voting theory find the ICC to be interesting. There are far too many to list. Do a lit review. Do a google search. It's not our responsibility to spoon-feed this information to you. If you do the necessary research, you will find that ICC is a widely-discussed criteria, as far as voting criteria go, and therefore worthy of attention in wikipedia. If you don't have time to do the research, then you don't have time to delete ICC from wikipedia.User:Hermitage 23:15, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) I wonder if Fahrenheit's talk about the Independence of Clones Criterion could have anything to do with his advocacy of a Talk:Borda_count ;)- Written by a anonymous coward with the i.p. address of 84.144.84.53 I wonder if Hermitage's talk about Independence of Clones Criterion has anything to do with his use of it in a derogatory article on the Borda count he has on his college webpage that he is not able to get published and peer-reviewed anywhere.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:36, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC) == NPOV notice == I can't tell when this page had anything POV on it recently, regardless of whether you think independence of clones is a good criterion. This page doesn't express any opinions about criteria, it just lists them. Can we remove the NPOV notice? User:Rspeer 02:44, Jun 10, 2005 (UTC) I think so. Perhaps the npov flag served to foster discussion about ICC, but I think discussion can continue without it. I don't think that the inclusion of a criterion like ICC is a sufficient reason to label a page as non-neutral. User:Hermitage 07:13, 11 Jun 2005 (UTC) == New mechanism for adding and removing methods/criteria == I'd like to propose a page where we discuss adding and removing methods or criteria from this page and its table. This is due to the large amount of editing that is involved in making such a change - it would be best to achieve consensus first. Please add /Included methods and criteria to your watchlist. I've started that page with a (perhaps surprising) proposal to add Majority Choice Approval as a method. User:Rspeer 05:15, Jun 13, 2005 (UTC) == Inconsistent use of voting method criteria == Today I edited several method articles to bring the criteria listed to consistency. One method satisfied the foo criteria, but in another article the foo criteria was not listed, but the boo criteria was. For example, I removed the Smith criterion from the Borda count article because most articles did not use it, and Hermitage reverts my edit. We need a consensus on which criteria is used to evaluate methods and stay consistent with that in editing.--User:Fahrenheit451 23:59, 14 Jun 2005 (UTC) :I agree that consistency in this area could be beneficial. I will follow Rspeer's lead and continue the discussion of which criteria to use on the /Included methods and criteria page. User:Hermitage 01:00, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
See other meanings of words starting from letter:
Words begining with Voting_system:
Voting_system
Voting_system
Voting_system/Included_methods_and_criteria
Voting_systems
Voting_systems
Voting_system_criteria
Voting_system_criteria
Voting_system_criterion
Voting_system_criterion
Voting system
[[Image:Voters at the voting booths in 1945.jpeg|thumb|250px|Voters at the voting booths in the US in 1945]] Voting systems are methods (algorithms) for groups of people to select one or more options from many, taking into account the individual preferences of the group members. Vote is best known for its use in elections and is often seen as the defining feature of democracy, where citizen preferences are used to determine the composition of government. In addition, voting can also be used to award prizes, to select between different plans of action, or as a means for computer programs to evaluate which solution is best for a complex problem. A key property of voting systems is that, because they are algorithms, they must be formally defined. Consensus, for example, which is sometimes put forward as a voting system, is more properly a broad way of working with others, analogous to democracy or anarchy (See consensus decision making for disciplined consensus methods and how they relate to voting). == Aspects of voting systems == === The ballot === Different voting systems have different forms for allowing the individual to express their tolerances versus preferences. In ranked ballot or "preference" voting systems, like Instant-runoff voting, the Borda count, or a Condorcet method, voters order the list of options from most to least preferred. In range voting, voters rate each option separately. In first-past-the-post (also known as plurality voting), voters select only one option, while in approval voting, they can select as many as they want. In voting systems that allow "plumping", like cumulative voting, voters may vote for the same candidate multiple times. === District (constituency) size === A voting system may select only one option (usually a candidate, but also an option that represents a decision), in which case it is called a "single winner system", or it may select multiple options, for example candidates to fill an assembly or alternative possible decisions on the measure the ballot posed. Some countries, like Israel, fill their entire parliament using a single multiple-winner district (constituency), while others, like the Republic of Ireland or Belgium, break up their national elections into smaller, multiple-winner districts, and yet others, like the United States or the United Kingdom, hold only single-winner elections. Some systems, like the Additional member system, embed smaller districts within larger ones. === Party-list systems === In party-list proportional representation systems, candidates can be aligned with, or nominated by, parties, and the party's list of candidates plays a functional role within the system. These parties may in turn be aligned with other parties, to form coalitions, which can play roles beyond those played by the party. These systems are designed to ensure proportional representation, the idea that the candidates selected from a given party (or, in non-party-list systems, informal grouping) should be in proportion to the votes cast for that party. Some of these systems, however, have election thresholds--minimum numbers of votes cast for a party to win any seats. The purpose of an election threshold is generally to keep very small parties from participating in a parliament, in order to maintain stability of governments. === None of the above option=== In some voting systems, voters may choose to select none of the candidates (or poll options), by voting for a "None of the above" option. If this option wins, the election fails; typically it will be re-run with a new set of candidates or poll options, all previous ones (having lost to "none of the above") being excluded. The philosophy behind having a "None of the above" option is that all possible alternatives should be considered in a decision; this option represents all of the alternatives not considered explicitly. === Write-in candidate - poll option === Some elections allow voters to write in the name of a person (or of the poll option) not on the ballot as their candidate (or as a poll option). Write-in candidates (poll options) rarely win and votes are often cast for ineligible people or fictional characters. This happens because write-in poll options or candidates are not visible to other voters. This is not usually an issue in the case of an e-voting system, where new write-in poll options or candidates can be made visible as the election takes place. Alternatively, some locations require write-in candidates or poll options to be registered before the election. == List of systems == ===Single-winner systems=== Single-winner systems can be classified by ballot type: #Binary voting A valid vote can only give a yes or nothing to a given candidate. #Ranked voting A valid vote can rank candidates 1,2,3... (Tied rankings are permitted in some methods but not others) #Rated voting A valid vote allows independent numerical values to be associated with each candidate. (The set of valid values is limited.) They can also be classified on how many times votes can be counted. Methods like Plurality, Borda, and Approval with single counting rounds are simpler since voters can be sure to know how their votes will be applied. ==== Binary voting methods ==== *First-past-the-post election system (also called Plurality or Relative Majority or Winner-Take-All) - vote for at most one candidate. Most votes wins, even if this is less than a majority. *Runoff systems **Two-round runoff voting - if no majority, hold a new election with only the top two candidates. This system is used for most single-winner elections in France. **Elimination runoff - if no majority, hold a new election with the weakest candidate eliminated. Repeat until there is a majority. **Exhaustive runoff - no eliminations, repeat balloting until there is a majority. Common in committees. This system is used by the Papal Conclave (if one considers every cardinal as a candidate). **Motion and amendment (election) - treating the choice like another substantial motion, subject to amendment and possibly debate. *Approval voting (AV) - Voters may vote for as many candidates as they like. Candidate with most votes wins. Sometimes considered a version of range voting (see below) with a point range of [0,1] *Random ballot - May also be used for multiwinner elections, or as a tiebreaker for other methods ==== Ranked voting methods ==== *Tied rankings not permitted **Instant-runoff voting (IRV, also known as alternative vote or "preference voting") ***Supplementary vote: simplified IRV process (two rankings, two rounds) **Borda count: single round count, more points for higher-ranked **Coombs' method: disapproval runoff *Tied rankings sometimes permitted **Condorcet method, actually several families of systems that satisfy Condorcet's criterion: ***Ranked Pairs (RP) and variants such as Maximize Affirmed Majorities and Maximum Majority Voting ***Schulze method (Aka_(initialism) Schwartz sequential dropping (SSD), cloneproof Schwartz sequential dropping (CSSD), beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting, path winner) ***Copeland's method **Bucklin voting: approval runoff; voters vote for more candidates each round until a candidate reaches a majority ==== Rated voting methods ==== *Range voting - voters give points in a specified range (for example 0-100) to each candidate. The candidate with the highest total is the winner. * Rated ballots may also be used for ranked voting methods, in cases where tied rankings are allowed. ===Multiple-winner systems=== * Non-party-list systems ** Plurality/majority ***Block voting - Also called Plurality-at-large ** Semiproportional ***Proportional approval voting ***Cumulative voting ***Single non-transferable vote ***Single transferable vote (STV) ***Quota Borda system *Party-list proportional representation. Allocation methods: **Highest averages methods ***Sainte-Laguë method ***d'Hondt method **Largest remainder methods *Mixed Systems **Additional Member System (also called Mixed Member Proportional) **Parallel voting (also called Supplementary Member system) == Criteria in evaluating voting systems == Various criteria are used in evaluating voting systems. These criteria define potentially desirable properties of voting systems mathematically, so that different systems can be compared using the same criteria. It is impossible for one voting system to pass all criteria in common use. For example, Arrow's impossibility theorem demonstrates that several desirable features of voting systems are mutually contradictory. For this reason, someone implementing a voting system has to decide which criteria are important for the election. These criteria include: * Majority criterion - Does the first choice of a majority win? * Mutual majority criterion - If a majority prefers every choice in a set to all other choices, is a member of the set selected? * Monotonicity criterion - Is it impossible to cause a choice to lose by ranking it higher, or win by ranking it lower? * Consistency criterion - If the electorate is divided in two and a choice wins in both parts, does it win overall? * Participation criterion - Is it always better to vote honestly than to not vote? * Condorcet criterion - If a choice beats every other choice in Condorcet method, does it win? * Smith set - If every choice inside a set beats every choice outside the set in Condorcet method, is a member of the set selected? * Independence of irrelevant alternatives - Does the winner never change from A to B just because an unrelated choice C enters the race? * Strategic nomination - If multiple similar choices are available, is the result of the election unaffected by their presence, or do they help or hurt each other? A more extensive list of criteria is on the voting system criteria page. Voting systems are also judged with less-mathematical criteria: * Simplicity * Speed of vote-counting * Reduction of potential for fraud or disputed results * Resistance to strategic voting * Proportionality (proportional representation), for multiple-winner methods {| |- ! !! Majority criterion !! Monotonicity criterion !! Participation criterion !! Condorcet criterion !! Consistency criterion !! Independence of irrelevant alternatives !! Strategic nomination |- ! Approval voting |bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! Borda count |bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No (Strategic nomination) |- ! Copeland's method |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No || Independence of irrelevant alternatives || bgcolor=#ffdddd| No (Strategic nomination) |- ! IRV |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! First-past-the-post |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No (vote-splitting) |- ! Range voting |bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! Ranked Pairs |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No || Independence of irrelevant alternatives ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- ! Schulze method |bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes ||bgcolor=#ffdddd| No || Independence of irrelevant alternatives ||bgcolor=#ddffdd| Yes |- |+''Compliance of single-winner systems with some established voting system criteria.'' |} Voting systems can be abstracted as mathematical functions that select between choices based on the utility of each option for each voter. This greatly resembles a social welfare function as studied in welfare economics and many of the same considerations can be studied. For aspects such as simplicity, dispute, and fraud, the practical implementation is far more important than the abstract function. However, the choice of abstract function puts some constraints on the implementation. For instance, certain voting systems such as First_Past_the_Post_electoral_system, Schulze method, or Borda count can be tallied in one distributed step, others such as Instant-Runoff require centralization, and others such as multi-round runoff require multiple polling rounds. ===Related terminology=== ; voting strategy : Any way of voting, when it's discussed in terms of its possible or intended affect on the outcome. ; strategic or tactical voting : When a voter self-consciously marks a ballot in a manner different from their actual preferences, in the hope of optimizing the outcome. (While the adjectives 'strategy' and 'tactics' usually have nearly opposite meanings when used to describe other things, in this case, they commonly both have the meaning given here.) == Famous theoreticians of voting systems == *Kenneth Arrow (mathematically demonstrated the limitations of voting systems) *Jean-Charles de Borda (devised the Borda count) *Steven Brams (one of the inventors and chief academic proponents of Approval Voting) *Andrew Inglis Clark (promoted the use of STV in Tasmania) *Peter Fishburn (for his multiple proofs demonstrating the mathematical possibilities of voting systems.) *Marquis de Condorcet (proposed the method of pairwise comparison and the Condorcet Criterion; discovered the Condorcet paradox) *Maurice Duverger (observed effects of proportional vs. majoritarian systems) *Alan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite (for the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that demonstrates any deterministic voting system with three or more alternatives is subject to either some form of Arrovian dictatorship or strategic voting) *Thomas Hare (devised STV a.k.a. the Hare Method) *Victor d'Hondt (devised a method of seat allocation under proportional representation) *Ramon Llull (for his independent discovery of a method similar to Condorcet method and possibly the Borda count centuries before Borda or Condorcet) *Edward J. Nanson (devised Nanson's method from the Borda count which selects the Condorcet winner if one exits) *[http://www.math.uci.edu/~dsaari/shortcv.pdf Donald G. Saari] (devised new methods for mathematical analysis of positional voting systems, and demonstrated the advantages of the Borda count over other positional voting methods) *Nicolaus Tideman (proposed ranked pairs and "comparison of pairs of outcomes by single transferable vote") ==See also== *List of democracy and elections-related topics *Center for Voting and Democracy *Disapproval voting *Duverger's law *Electoral reform *Grassroots democracy *Party system *Political scientists *Politics *Representative democracy *Spoiler effect *Table of voting systems by nation *Tactical voting *Vote counting systems ==References== *''Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction'' ISBN 0333801628 == External links == (alphabetical by title) * [http://accuratedemocracy.com/voting_systems.htm Accurate Democracy: Voting Tasks and Voting Systems] by Rob Loring * [http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/es/es.htm Administration and Costs of Elections Project documents on electoral systems] *[http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/research/perspec.pdf Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance] Article by Roger B. Myerson.(Portable Document Format) * PhD seminar on [http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~rnau/choice/choice09.pdf Choice Theory] (Portable Document Format) Article by Robert Nau. *[http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~conitzer/MLEvotingUAI05.pdf Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators] Article by Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm.(Portable Document Format) * [http://condorcet.org/emr/ Condorcet.org election methods resource] by Blake Cretney * [http://pressurecooker.phil.cmu.edu/Academic/Papers/MS-thesis.htm Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Voting] Article by David Emmanuel Gray. * [http://www.masquilier.org/republic/election/ A different way to vote] by AugustinMa. Of interest is the [http://www.masquilier.org/libre/phpbb/ modified] version of the popular phpBB bulletin board that can be found [http://www.masquilier.org/agora/ here]. The board allows the users to create plurality, approval and condorcet (Schulze method) polls and [http://www.masquilier.org/agora/viewforum.php?f=7 cast their ballots]. * [http://www.newuniversity.org/print.php?id=1032 Efficiency in Polling] Article by Courtney Baird. * [http://electionmethods.org/ electionmethods.org] by Russ Paielli * [http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Main_Page Electowiki] A wiki that focuses on voting theory, which covers some topics not found in wikipedia. Also contains older versions of some wikipedia voting articles. * [http://electorama.com/em Election methods list]: A mailing list containing technical discussions about election methods * [http://theorem.ca/~mvcorks/code/voting_methods.html Evaluating Voting Methods] Article by Matt Corks * [http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/HistTopics/Voting.html The history of voting] * [http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~slinko/Research/IC6.pdf How Large a Coalitional Should Be to Manipulate an Election?] (Portable Document Format) Article by Arkadii Slinko. * [https://www.discover.com/issues/nov-00/features/featbestman/ May the Best Man Lose] article on Approval voting and Borda Count by Dana Mackenzie. *[http://www.hss.caltech.edu/Events/SCW/Papers/erdeo.pdf Minimal Monotonic Extensions of Scoring Rules] Article by Orhan Erdem and M. Remzi Sanver. (Portable Document Format) * [http://www.mcs.vuw.ac.nz/~ncj/comp303/schulze.pdf A New Monotonic and Clone-Independent Single-Winner Election Method] (Portable Document Format) by Markus Schulze ([http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/submissions/csharman-10_0409201706-143.pdf mirror1], [http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/demexp-dev/2003-09/pdflQW7IlpAfC.pdf mirror2]) * [http://www.eco.fundp.ac.be/cahiers/filepdf/c223.pdf On the Likelihood of Condorcet's Profiles] (Portable Document Format) Article by V. Merlin, M. Tataru, and F. Valognes. * [http://www.hss.caltech.edu/Events/SCW/Papers/merlv.pdf On the impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes] (Portable Document Format) Article by Vincent Merlin and Fabrice Valognes. * [http://dmoz.org/Society/Politics/Campaigns_and_Elections/Voting_Systems/ ODP category on voting systems] *[http://personal.lse.ac.uk/DOWDING/Files/Manipulaiton_web_04_05.pdf In Praise of Manipulation] (Portable Document Format) Article by Martin van Hees and Keith Dowding. * [http://www.braindoll.net/vote Preferential Voting FAQ] (see glossary at the end) * [http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/Perot.pdf President Perot or fundamentals of voting theory illustrated with the 1992 election] (Portable Document Format) Article by Alexander Tabarrok. * [http://stv.sourceforge.net/ pSTV -- Software for computing a variety of voting systems including IRV, STV, and Condorcet] *[http://www.math.auckland.ac.nz/~slinko/Research/rules3.pdf A Statistical Investigation of Social Choice Rules] Article by Arkadii Slinko and Wayland Leung. (Portable Document Format) * [http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/sing.html Single winner page] by Mike Ossipoff * [http://www.maa.org/editorial/knot/LiberalArts.html Student's Social Choice] A column by Alex Bogomolny using java applets to illustrate various concepts of choice. * [http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~conitzer/tweakIJCAI03.pdf Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard] (Portable Document Format) An article by Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm. * [http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/diss/node4.html Vote Aggregation Methods] An article by Lorrie Cranor evaluating voting methods. *[http://www.pubchoicesoc.org/papers2005/Moser.pdf Voting by Adaptive Agents in Multi-candidate Elections] Article by Scott Moser.(Portable Document Format) * [http://webspeedreader.com/articles/voting.htm Voting, Elections, Democracy, Republicanism, and the Electoral College] by William C. Spaulding * [http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm Voting methods: tutorial and essays] by James Green-Armytage Voting systems
Voting system
A WikiProject is being developed at Wikipedia:WikiProject Voting Systems for further work on this and other voting system related pages. ==coverage== I know I've been scattering pages all over the place here, but here's my idea. :Voting system will be used to discuss the dry, mathematical aspects, :election to discuss specifically human elections, probably their history, geography, etc. Each system page will discuss the mathematical aspects of that particular system, as well as examples of it's use (real-world and hypothetical). I'm not sure how much of a :Proportional representation to recreate on [Voting system]. --DanKeshet :More about methods, I think that ''someone who knows'' should perhaps add notes about the adducted reasons for every system, in order to describe why it is respectively supposed that each system would be a better instrument to represent electors rather than the other ones (thus expanding what is now in the considerations list). At least a concise list of alleged ''pro'' and ''contra'', so that we don't stop at a technical point. :I.e.: I confusely remember Kelsen's notes about proportional system, where he describes why he thinks this should ensure the better popular representation and respect of minorities etc., while others instead criticise this because... Others propose let's say a "majority prize" stressing this should ensure a more effectively productive parliamentar or governmental life, while oppositors believe that... and so on. :I know that this would risk to become and endless tale, and also that (due to single parties' positions on the matter) it would always keep us on the border of a non-NPOV, but a bit of detail (scientifically reported) would render a more complete idea. :Could this eventually belong to a separate page? ==context== ''Voting systems are usually discussed in the context of electoral reform or grassroots democracy, or as an alternative to consensus decision making, but the tradeoffs in choosing a voting system are so complex that there is no easy summary of how these various debates interact with system characteristics.'' Removed because the first sentence is not necessarily true; there are many environments in which voting systems are discussed; the second part is discussed already, and better, in the paragraphs below. pde((?)). ==coalitions== As it stands, we have this text regarding coalitions: ''These parties may in turn be aligned with other parties, to form coalitions, which can play roles beyond those played by the party.'' But I'm wondering, are coalitions ever actually a formal part of the ''voting system'', and not just political or parliamentary entitites which make agreements on candidates and/or lists to submit to a voting system (in which case, they're a bit off-topic)? --User:Pde 04:17 8 Jul 2003 (UTC) : In the Australian(?) system, you can fill in a set of preferences, or you can alternatively just check the "Green" checkbox and have the Green party fill in your preferences for you. In such a system coalitions have a considerable impact. : Also, some voting systems encourage or discourage coalition government (eg proportional representation tends to create coalitions, first past the post tends to create a two party systeam). So there are links that way too. User:MyRedDice :Yes, I meant those words exactly as you understood them. See, for example, http://www.kypros.org/Elections/electoral.html In that system, you can vote for single-party lists or multiple-party coalitions, and there are different election thresholds for single-party lists and for coalitions, and even for coalitions based on their size. Cyprus is not unique in this regard. User:DanKeshet 14:50 8 Jul 2003 (UTC) ---- A grumble about a change that I'm not bold enough to undo myself: disapproval voting is a valid voting topic but is not a "system" in the same sense as the others listed here. -- User:pm67nz == want to add a section for how the absentee ballot is handled in various states == Hi, I'm new to the wiki as an author and I would like to contribute a section on the votes are actually sorted and tabulated in various states. Specificly, I wanted to add a section on how absentee ballots are handled and then tabulate which states allow for absentee ballots. The current Voting System page doesn't allow for this very well without an addition to the table of contents. My thought on this is to add a voting methods section under the aspects of voting systems and have 3 sections: :Voting methods ::Absentee voting: ::Internet Voting: ::DRE voting: ::Paper ballot: Then I will want to expand on the sub headings and get others who are well versed to do the same. Thoughts? --User:Ceremona 19:56, 28 Feb 2004 (UTC) ---- == classification scheme == I do not understand your changes to the classification scheme, Tom: *In what sense is the borda count an "approval" scheme. *All single-winner systems by definition are "majoritarian" (as opposed to proportional). *The bloc vote is not semi-proportional, it is majoritarian. Please explain these changes. User:DanKeshet 18:42, May 7, 2004 (UTC) ---- Dan, Proportional Representation says Electoral systems that do not result in proportional representation are known as majoritarian systems. The term "majoritarian" would seem to me to only apply to multiwinner elections. Maybe this means majoritarian systems pass this test: "If a majority of voters agree-to-agree before the election, they can guarantee to control all the winners." If so, I accept that this would be true for all reasonable single-vote and approval-vote methods. Still I think differentiating multiple vote methods is important. Imagine running an election poll by two methods: Plurality and Method X. If a single candidate gains a sincere majority in Plurality, that candidate should win any reasonable election method. Unfortunately that candidate is not guaranteed to win with an Approval or Borda count because that majority is not necesarily aware of its power and they may "overvote" and cause their favorite to lose. At least Bucklin can pass this test since it only allows each voter one vote in the first round. Borda is an "approval" method because it is not a "One person, one vote" method. Once voters offer more than one vote, there's no definition of majority winner. The only question I have about Borda, is "Can voters truncate their preferences?" The answer doesn't change that it is an approval ballot. It only changes how much Borda looks like simple approval. Looking at simple approval voting: If I approve of candidates in the order of A,B,C, and dislike D and E, I might approval vote [ABC] counted as: (A=1, B=1, C=1, D=0, E=0); Or approval vote [AB] is counted as (A=1, B=1, C=0, D=0, E=0); Or approval vote [A] counted as (A=1, B=0, C=0, D=0, E=0) In comparison in the same Borda election, allowing up to 5 rankings, I might rank vote [ABC], counted as: (A=5, B=4, C=3, D=0, E=0); Or rank vote [AB], counted as (A=5, B=4, C=0, D=0, E=0); Or rank vote as [A] counted as (A=5, B=0, C=0, D=0, E=0). So you can see Borda looks very much like Approval - the number of votes offered increases as more candidates are "approved". As to the multiwinner elections, I apologize. I was in error. The method "Bloc Voting" is apparently identical to the method I call "Plurality-at-large" which I added. I should remove Plurality-at-large and add it as another name for Bloc Voting. User:Tomruen 02:07, 8 May 2004 (UTC) :Regarding bloc voting, thanks for moving that to majoritarian. If anything, it's super-majoritarian because it can produce results even more lopsided than SMDP can. :Regarding single-winner methods: I can understand the distinction you're making, although I think there are better ways to categorize them. More importantly than the quality, though: is this something you have seen in other literature or are these categories idiosyncratic? If it's an accepted system (like majoritarian/semi-proportional/proportional is for multi-winner systems), then let's do it. But if it's just a new system that you made up, I think it's better not to impose our own system of categorizing on these systems. User:DanKeshet 02:40, May 8, 2004 (UTC) ---- Hi Dan, Sorry, I apparently didn't have a watch on this talk page. I'm not sure what super-majoritarian would be. Bloc-voting allows a devoted 51% to win all the seats. Maybe you mean that you don't even need 51% to get all the seats since there's no majority requirement for winners. I don't know what SMDP is. About the single-winner method groupings, admittingly the categories I offered may not be any sort of consensus position. I have read about some methods being considered "Approval methods" as methods that offer more than one vote at a time, although some may argue that Condorcet is an approval method as well, while I keep it separate. Whatever classification is used, I really do believe it is useful to separate methods that can be judged "single vote" versus "multiple vote". Single vote methods (Plurality, runoff, IRV, STV, Cumulative Voting) are all methods used in political elections. I don't know any multivote, single-winner election method used in politics. All proportional represenatation systems are (or should be) single-vote methods - every voter gets equal votes to influence the results. Anyway, I'll do some more research in some books and online and see what I can find. I suppose it might just be useful to point out (elsewhere) which methods are used in various locations, or if they are just theoretical. --User:Tomruen 19:34, 17 May 2004 (UTC) :Hi Tom, :RE: bloc voting: SMDP is Single Member District Plurality (first-past-the-post, but emphasizing the system-wide aspect of it). While first-past-the-post is majoritarian in a single district, often because of the variation in districts, it has some aspect of proportionality (e.g. there are 2 districts where D's are in the majority and 1 where R's are in the majority). In bloc voting, all 3 districts become one large district, where D's are in the majority and win all three seats. That is what I meant by super-majoritarian. :RE: the distinction you make about "approval methods": I have never heard it before. Also, when you say that in "single-vote methods" (another term I've never heard before), every voter gets equal votes to influence the results, this is also true in what you're calling "approval" methods. All voters are equal in all of these methods. User:DanKeshet 21:18, May 17, 2004 (UTC) ::Hi Dan, :: Terminology is always a problem. When I say "single vote method", I mean the same as saying "One person, one vote" - any system that allows every voter one vote for one choice, (or more generally allows a full vote split among a set of candidates). Plurality obviously follows that logic. Runoffs and IRV also follow it since every voter has one vote each round. :: Methods like "Approval", "Borda", and "Bucklin", do not follow the "one person, one vote" ideal. Approval allows multiple full votes. Borda forces multiple votes (unless truncation is allowed). Bucklin applies multiple votes if the first preference votes don't identify a majority candidate. In these methods, if you add the total votes applied, it will exceed the number of voters. :: You might even define an "Approval method" as a method where two or more "majority winners" may exist, although the definition depends on how you normalize the count. You can normalize the count by dividing by the maximum votes one person can offer to a single candidate, then a majority support is fairly defined as half as many votes as voters. :: In "single vote" methods it is possible to identify a majority winner as a singular candidate being supported by more than 50% of the voters. In multivote methods it is possible more than one candidate will exceed more than 50% of the vote (because the total votes exceeds the number of voters). :: In Borda, for example, you might say "Everyone gets equal votes", rank 1,2,3 and apply 3,2,1 points, and so everyone offers 6 points. This can be normalized (by dividing by 3) to 1, 2/3, 1/3 point vote for each ranking, so every can be said to be allowed up to 2 total votes, but no more than 1 vote for any one candidate. But the system disallows putting a full allowable vote on one candidate. If I only have one favorite, I must "bullet vote" (offer 1 ranking, 1 vote). Some people get up to 2 votes while I'm limited to 1 vote. :: Similar in Bucklin, if I only have one favorite, and I don't rank deeper than one, and there's no first rank majority winner, other voters can get a second vote to influence the winner, while I am disallowed from putting a second vote on my first favorite. :: "Single vote" methods allow runoffs because candidates that are weak because they are not popular. Approval methods (methods allowing more votes than winners) can't use runoffs fairly because they encourage tactical voting - strong candidate supporters can bluff support for weak competition to force elimination of actually stronger competition, and then back down their support later when the competion is weakened. It's very possible for a single-vote runoff winner to lose in an approval-vote runoff. :: Similarly for PR in multiwinner elections, if you use a multivote method, there's no good definition of a proportional quota in election. Cumulative voting (CV) and STV both are "one vote" methods because all voters can offer a full vote on one candidate. CV is a single-vote method because you can offer your full vote on one choice so 3-votes is actually normalized to 3-(1/3) votes per person. STV is more clearly a one vote method since it is "one vote" that is automatically fractionally split among multiple choices. :: I'm not discounting "approval methods" as unconditionally inferior, but I think the distinction is clear and important to realize as fundamentally different properties. :: Every single-seat voting system used in politics to my knowledge is a one vote system. Basically plurality or runoff or IRV. Bucklin and ranked ballots was tried in Minnesota city of Duluth in the early 20th century and rejected by the courts for not being a "one person, one vote" system. :: See http://www.fairvotemn.org/resources/publications/Municipal%20Voting%20System%20Reform%20article.pdf ::--User:Tomruen 00:05, 18 May 2004 (UTC) ---- == classification scheme - take 2 == :''regroup method list based on category (single vote, multiple vote, and pairiwise votes),'' I think this new classification scheme is nonstandard and adds more confusion and bias. Calling a runoff election a "single vote" method is odd. After all, in case of a tie you need a runoff for many other kinds of election. Saying that approval voting is not ''one person one vote'' is POV, given the common association of that phrase with ''basic fairness in democracy''. In any given election, most people cast lots more than one vote, but for different candidates in different races, but we don't deprecate that practice. I think the root meaning of the phrase is that person A doesn't get to have their votes given more weight than person A (as was the case in the original constitution with respect to slaves). Talking about ''used exclusively in political elections'' would need a lot more evidence to back it up, I think. Suggesting that single vote schemes don't involve ''tactical voting'' but multiple vote ones do is clearly incorrect, given the major tactical connundrum that minor party supporters face in the current US system. :Interesting idea, and sorry I missed this discussion until the article changed. But I suggest going back to the previous revision. User:Nealmcb 21:39, 2004 Jun 4 (UTC) :: I can and will defend my change as aiding in differentiating methods and reduced confusion. These are fundamental differences. Runoffs are "one person, one vote" because a second vote is allowed only after the original vote is invalidated. :: On my claim for "used exclusively in political election", the word exclusive risks being an overstatement, but I know of no exceptions. Of course if you get down to city or other lower elections, anything may be possible in some corners. (Admitting I don't know anywhere that "random ballot" is used.) :: According to the book "The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design", 1/97, under "The World of Electoral systems", the single winner methods used by country are: ***FPTP - USA, Canada, UK, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia ... (30+ other countries) ***Alternative Vote (IRV) - Australia ***Two Round - France, Cuba, (~20 other countries) :: I think it is deceptive to put "Used" and "Theoretical" methods in the same list as if they were all regarded equally in practice. :: If it is judged better for this page to simply list methods, then an alternative location for this information might be a a "Election System History" page that classifies all methods used for practical large scale elections (political or otherwise) in various places and times, and give some background to their local rise (and/or fall). For example, I know Bucklin was used in Minnesota city of Duluth in the past until it was judged as breaking the "one person, one vote" ideal. :: Some people may wish to redefine "one person, one vote" to include Approval voting as "one person, one vote PER CANDIDATE", but the standard meaning is "One person, one vote PER ELECTED SEAT". It is the definition that allows a singular majority winner to be identified. It is also the definition that allows all Proportional Representation systems to function for multiple winners. :: I accept the classification may not be liked by some interested in giving all theoretical election methods equal footing. :: I accept my originally labeling "multiple vote methods" as "approval methods" was nonstandard, but the fundamental difference between allowing an individual voter to support one candidate at a time versus supporting multiple candidates is not debatable. It is irresponsible to not make this clear distinction. :: I said "Multiple vote methods give voters more flexibility where tactical voting is less of a concern." This is standard understanding. The more flexible voting is, the more important tactical voting is. This is well accepted even by the advocates of Borda and Approval. Approval itself is a tactical degeneration of Cardinal Ratings. :: I will be respectful, but I won't retreat and support completely without more discussion. I would hope that others can improve this change if it needs work. :: --User:Tomruen 23:22, Jun 4, 2004 (UTC) :::Hi Tom, I agree this section is very confusing. Part of my motivation for lumping stuff in here was to have one place for all the terminology that gets discussed; I think it might make a lot of sense for *this* page to discuss categorizations, with a few popular examples. For example, I can think of at least three orthogonal ways to categorize systems: **** What the result is (e.g., single-winner, multiple-winner, proportional) ***** How balloting is done (e..g., single vote, cardinal rating, ranking) ***** How it is counted (e.g., pairwise, runoff, etc.) :::I think if we can be clear(er) about how we categorizing things, the other discussions might be easier. Then, we have a whole 'other page which is an exhaustive list of systems (perhaps labeled according to categorizations other than the top-level one) along with a note of where (if ever) they're used. That is, keep this page abstract, and put concrete info in that one. Its not perfect, but hopefully it will help us move forward. User:Drernie 01:49, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) :::: Hi Ernie, Thanks for your thoughts. :::: Certainly "single winner" versus "multiple winner" is the top-level categorical separation and this has already been done (even if there is possible overlap.) :::: I considered separating by "How balloting is done", but that didn't seem as important since each method can have different types of ballots. Runoff and Instant Runoff use different ballots but same results. Condorcet could have rank ballots OR pairwise ballots, but same results. :::: "How it is counted" is clear to me as second most fundamental next to "how many winners". :::: If my regroupings can be improved or wording made with more neutrality, I very much welcome input. I don't want to be unnecessarily controversial, or cause senseless revision/reverting wars, now or over time. I hope there can be some agreement better than an alphabetized listing, even if that's also valuable somewhere. Thanks again! :::: --User:Tomruen 02:15, Jun 5, 2004 (UTC) ::: I'm in favour of classification by ballot type. What matters is not the debatable "fundamentalness" of a clasification scheme but its usefulness, particularly to encyclopedia readers. Ballot types are easily and quickly understood. There is also less room for controversy. Tom's classification is very controversial (see gathering storm on electoral methods mailing list). Personaly I disagree both with his interpretation of what ' the "one person, one vote" ideal' means and that the main advantage of 'multiple vote' methods is to 'give voters more flexibility where tactical voting is less of a concern'. The third category, is, by its own admission a messy one, since particular variants of it can fall into either of the first two categories. None of these problems arise with a ballot type based classification. :::Dealing with the objections above: :::: ''I considered separating by "How balloting is done", but that didn't seem as important since each method can have different types of ballots.'' ::: For every method there is a simplest possible ballot, that is the only one that matters. :::: ''Runoff and Instant Runoff use different ballots but same results.'' ::: Eh? See French presidential election, 2002. :::: ''Condorcet could have rank ballots OR pairwise ballots, but same results.'' ::: I don't belive "pairwise ballot" is a well defined term. Note above point about simplest ballot - Condorcet is a ranked ballot method. ::: User:Pm67nz 06:32, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == classification scheme - take 3 == : I offer a replacement groupings based first on "ballot type" and second on "counting type". Hopefully this is less controverial. These distinction are clear. :The subclass "counting type" is less defendable, especially as listed as "one count" and "multiple counts", but single count methods are worthy to point out since they are simpler and helpful voting strategies will be more transparent in a single round. : --User:Tomruen 08:54, Jun 5, 2004 (UTC) : Someone with only an IP address changed the first catagory to Up/Down so that approval can be moved there. I think approval is a cardinal method, limited values 0,1. : They also added a "ties" subcategory which I think is not clear. For example, they put Bucklin under "ties allowed" which is not true for any definition I've seen. Bucklin doesn't allow a voter two votes in the first round. That blocks the ability of Bucklin to idenify a singular a majority winner in the first round! : I leave it up to others to consider these changes, but I disagree. --User:Tomruen 00:15, Jun 6, 2004 (UTC) == orphaned article: Simple Majority Voting == There's an orphaned article, Simple Majority Voting. Someone might want to rescue the material there, or delete it. :I'll add it back for now under Plurality, until someone tells me the difference. User:Drernie 22:43, 3 Jun 2004 (UTC) ::I would rather see it deleted User:Pm67nz 06:04, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == Single Winner Variations SECTION == Does anyone understand this section? Where the heck is this stuff used? I don't think this belongs on a "list" page like Voting_Systems unless it has a link. --User:Tomruen 05:44, Jun 5, 2004 (UTC) :Single Winner Variations ::Automatic Equal Ranking Line Option (AERLO) :::A voter may mark a line in his/her ranking, meaning that if no one above that line wins, then that voter wants to promote to 1st place all of him/her above-line candidates and have a recount. (In pairwise-count methods the promotion only takes place if, additionally, there's a circular tie containing above-line and below-line candidates). ::Automatic Truncation Line Option (ATLO) :::A voter may mark a line in him/her ranking, meaning that if no one above the line wins, then that voter wants to drop from him/her ranking all of him/her below-line candidates and have a recount. (In pairwise-count methods the dropping only takes place if, additionally, there's a circular tie containing above-line and below-line candidates). : Agreed, these are AFAIK recent inventions known only to readers of the electoral methods mailing list, and do not (yet!) belong in a general purpose encyclopedia, well certainly not on a core/intro/list page like this one. User:Pm67nz 06:35, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == theory vs. practice/history == In one of the comments above, Tom suggested that we have a separate page to give an overview of voting systems as they have been used in practice and in history. I think this would make a good subsection of this page. For example: "Around the world, the most popular voting systems are .... and ...., which is especially popular in ...." User:DanKeshet 19:41, 5 Jun 2004 (UTC) == capital letters == Dear User:Michael Hardy, you wrote: "Would the authors of articles on voting methods please stop worshipping capital letters with such incredibly fanatical intensity. It makes it hard to get links right." I consider your recent changes to be vandalism. If you are really so upset about capital letters, then it is sufficient to replace e.g. "Schulze method" by "Schulze method". But the way you replaced capital letters destroyed the links completely. -- User:MarkusSchulze 5 Jan 2005 == "... is not guaranteed..." == Henrygb: why did you feel that was POV? I thought it was tautological, based on the preceding paragraph. --User:Baylink 04:48, 25 Feb 2005 (UTC) == Cleaning up == This article is ''way too long''. You cannot give an uninformed person a complete understanding of all kinds of voting systems in one article, but it seems that lots of people have been trying, and adding their own favorite obscure aspects of voting systems. I've taken out a few things that clearly didn't belong in the article (the line-option stuff that was already discussed here; a duplicate section on criteria signed by Mike Ossipoff; a section on alternate names for Condorcet stuck in the middle of a bulleted list of methods). The section on criteria, and the table, should be merged into Voting method criteria. There should be a paragraph pointing there, noting that criteria are an important way to rationally compare voting methods when everything else devolves into political ideologies. I followed the election-methods list for a while. I appreciate the large volume of contributions those people are making, but some of them should keep in mind that things that are hot topics on that list may nevertheless be too obscure for Wikipedia. User:Rspeer 19:47, Mar 28, 2005 (UTC) == Remove University of Texas tutorial == I followed the link to the University of Texas tutorial, and found it to be misinformative, and generally lower-quality than existing tutorials in the external links section. Specifically, it called IRV and Approval "positional methods", but the generally accepted definition of a positional method is one where positions on a ballot correspond directly to points. IRV is at least ranked, which is a term that is confusable with "positional", but I have no idea what inspired them to put Approval there. Fahrenheit451, I hope you can understand that I'm not reverting your edit out of spite. I would have removed that link if anyone had posted it and I had followed it. That said, it is because your edits to Borda count have made me suspicious that I followed the link. If any other external links on this page are equally misinformative, or if they are biased or have other flaws, I would advocate removing them too. I simply haven't looked at them all. User:Rspeer 17:38, Apr 8, 2005 (UTC) That's fine on removing that tutorial. Your other criteria for link removal is interesting in that it is contrary to what you are advocating for the electowiki link: "if they are biased or have other flaws.." That is quite broad and would include many, perhaps most links on wikipedia. Perhaps you are operating on a double standard. --User:Fahrenheit451 02:10, 31 May 2005 (UTC) == New table == I've made a new table of voting system criteria. Some changes I made are: * Make the table in Wiki-style, instead of HTML * Spell out the method names instead of using incomprehensible abbreviations * To accomodate that, split the criteria into two tables (ones that don't assume strategic manipulation and ones that do, though I acknowledge the line is a bit fuzzy) * Sort the methods in alphabetical order to remove the pro-CSSD bias * Remove Majority Choice Approval altogether (I believe that MCA is original research) * Add Ranked Pairs, which has a Wikipedia article and seems to be on an equal level of notablity with CSSD * Add majority criterion and consistency criterion (which needs an article) * Add Independence of irrelevant alternatives, including local independence * Add independence of clone candidates. Possible values for the column are "Yes", "No (teaming)", "No (vote-splitting)", and "No (crowding)". Teaming trumps crowding. * Collapse "generalized" or "weak" criteria into the main criterion - they rarely make a difference When I had to add cells to the table, I looked up the information on [http://condorcet.org/emr condorcet.org] or Electowiki. I apologize if I made a mistake in any of the cells. Also, if someone can fill in the "unknown" information for Ranked Pairs, it would be quite helpful. User:Rspeer 03:28, Apr 12, 2005 (UTC) Thank you to the anon at 62.246.* - your changes do seem to be correct. I hastily reverted them (having my guard put up by seeing anonymous changes with no edit log), then realized that I had screwed up originally and the anon was right. User:Rspeer 14:08, Apr 12, 2005 (UTC) == Table == I don't want to edit myself but suggest the table and criteria are a little confusing in that the criteria are generally expressed in a negative formulation, but the table appears to be positive about that negative, if you see what I mean. May I humbly and tentatively suggest re-wording the criteria to a positive sense, if only as 'avoids the problem of ...'. --Chuck (2005-05-12) You don't need to be so humble - I was just blatantly inconsistent in writing those criteria. Is it better now? User:Rspeer 23:08, May 10, 2005 (UTC) Yes, a lot clearer. -- Chuck (2005-05-13) ==electowiki link== F451: If you go to this page http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Special:Allpages you will find various articles that exist on electowiki but do not exist on wikipedia. Certainly there is a lot of duplication, but the extra material makes it worth an external link. User:Hermitage It's another secondary resource, but in this case, mostly an older, obsolete version of the wikipedia articles that have since been edited to much higher quality. Let's cultivate a high standard of scholarship, James. Anything that is there and valid should be copied over to wikipedia and edited here. There is a worthwhile project for whoever wishes to do it.--User:Fahrenheit451 00:58, 30 May 2005 (UTC) * I disagree. Electowiki serves a purpose, because ongoing research in election methods can go there, while it can't go on Wikipedia until it's more established. We should link to it. Your complaint seems to be that, on the topics where it overlaps with Wikipedia, it hasn't been obsessively edited to keep in sync with Wikipedia. That doesn't mean it's worthless: that means it has fewer editors, plus merging content from one GFDL resource to another can be confusing and difficult. User:Rspeer 21:33, May 30, 2005 (UTC) You are falsely alleging that I require "obsessive editing to keep in sync with wikipedia" and I think electowiki is worthless. Please present some examples of innovative, ongoing research on electowiki. Otherwise, there is no reason to link to it.--User:Fahrenheit451 02:01, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Why were you unable to check out the site yourself (as I requested) before you deleted the link? User:Hermitage Because I am not a student on summer break like you are and have lots of time on my hands. I have a career and other responsibilities. You are perfectly capable of presenting a case of the inclusion of a dubious link.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) I've said before that if you don't have the time to read a source, you don't have the time to remove that source as an external link. User:Hermitage I wonder if your comment is elitist. Sure comes across that way. I looked over some, but not all, of the articles, and found nothing of any value. Perhaps a voting methods research article should be created and electowiki would be an appropriate link. I will continue to remove the electowiki link for the reasons I have stated.--User:Fahrenheit451 19:32, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) It would have been very simple to go to the link I posted above and notice that there are several articles there that are not in the wikipedia. Wrong. I have no idea what is different between the two. I did ask for examples.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Okay, well, now you know. User:Hermitage However, I have taken some more of my own time to copy the names of some of the articles below. Some of these may be in wikipedia, but I believe that the majority of them are not. Which ones are and which are not?--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) As far as I know, none of the articles below are in wikipedia, but I can't say that for sure. User:Hermitage As for your comments about "high standards of scholarship": 1. It smells of elitism. User:Hermitage Wrong again. That is exercising responsibility for the standards of wikipedia content.Evidently you don't know what the word elitism means.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) If you assume that only people whose articles are published in journals have something useful to say, that's elitism. I'm sure that your actual views aren't this extreme, but they seem to tend in this direction, i.e. your insistence that external links should be published and peer reviewed. User:Hermitage Wrong again. The publication and peer-review process gives a particular professional community the opportunity to comment on a scholar's work. It is an imperfect, but valuable process.--User:Fahrenheit451 19:32, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) Who are you to decide what the standard of scholarship should be, and whether a given site meets those standards? User:Hermitage Because I am a wikipedia editor.--User:Fahrenheit451 13:43, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Right, well, we're all wikipedia editors here, so that's not really saying much. My point is that you don't have a right to decide these things unilaterally. If your standards of scholarship are not embraced by a broad consensus of wikipedia editors, then you don't have a right to impose them on any given page. User:Hermitage 21:55, 31 May 2005 (UTC) Wrong again, James. I have a right to edit in accordance with wikipedia policy and I exercise those rights fully.--User:Fahrenheit451 19:32, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) That's it? That's your whole reply? You asked for examples of original research unique to electowiki, and I gave you 24 examples. Yes, electowiki duplicates out of date wikipedia articles, but it also has original work which makes it easily as worthwhile as some of the other pages linked to this page. My guess is that you're deleting the link for some sort of emotional reason, e.g. to avoid losing face. Anyway, your reply seems to contradict the spirit of wikipedia. ("Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution.") I haven't read up on the dispute resolution procedures yet, but for now I'm going to hope that someone else besides me adds the electowiki link, so that F451 sees that I'm not the only one who thinks that it has merit. User:Hermitage 23:07, 1 Jun 2005 (UTC) Descending Acquiescing Coalitions Direct Democracy via Proxy Voting Imagine Democratic Fair Choice Later-no-harm criterion Marginal Ranked Approval Voting Neutrality of Spoiled Ballots Pairwise-Elimination SCRIRVE Approval Sorted Margins CDTT Cardinal pairwise DSC Descending Acquiescing Coalitions MMPO Median Ratings Pairwise Sorted Approval Pairwise Sorted Dyadic Ballots Ranked Approval Voting River Sprucing up Uncovered set Definite Majority Choice Descending Solid Coalitions Vote For and Against User:Hermitage 12:15, 31 May 2005 (UTC) == Challenge to validity of Independence of Clones criteria == I challenge the validity of the Independence of Clones criteria: I have not found any mathematical definition of a clone, nor have I found a way to objectively determine what a clone is and isn't. I can say that clones are a special case of a correlated pair, but that still is not a precise definition. I would like to promote a discussion on this topic.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:29, 6 Jun 2005 (UTC) * Independence of clones is a commonly-used way of formalizing the effects strategic nomination. Clones are defined precisely on the strategic nomination page. Deleting a column from a table is a very poor way of "promoting discussion". What was your reason for doing this? User:Rspeer 04:51, Jun 7, 2005 (UTC) There is nothing precise about that definition, furthermore, show me some actual clones.--User:Fahrenheit451 20:00, 7 Jun 2005 (UTC) Independence of clones is mathematically well-defined. See T.N. Tideman (1987): Independence of Clones as a Criterion for Voting Rules. Social Choice and Welfare, 4: 185-206 I am aware of that reference and cited it in a past edit.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) You are correct in saying that perfect clone sets are unlikely to occur in public elections. However, the criterion is still useful for analytical purposes. Also, methods failing clone independence are more likely to respond irregularly to the addition or subtraction of candidates who are close to being clones of other candidates. There is no evidence that any clones have ever existed. When you say useful for analytical purposes, you are giving your opinion, which with I disagree, but you are also implying icc is nothing more than a theoretical construct. I say it is not well-defined because it does not identify observable phenomena, and it does not lead to the prediction of phenomena yet unobserved. I would go so far to assert that the independence of clones criteria is Junk Science.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Independence of clones is a criterion that many students of voting theory find to be significant. Exactly which students are you refering to?--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Thus, I see no reason to delete it. If you find the criterion unimportant, that's fine, but there is no need to impose that judgement on all wikipedia readers new to the topic. I have no interest in deleting the article, just removing the references to it in relations to various voting methods. I can invent a criteria, call it the independence of the tooth fairy criterion, and edit the various voting method articles to state which ones comply or don't comply with itfc. Even if some editors "find it useful" it is absurd to use it if the tooth fairy can never be observed or proven to exist.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Remember, Wikipedia works on the basis of consensus. If there is wide agreement that ICC is at least worth considering as a voting systems criterion (which there is), then it should be defined on wikipedia, and it should be listed among the criteria passed and failed by the various tally methods. If all wikipedia editors made a point of deleting criteria that they didn't find useful, there would be few to zero criteria left in the encyclopedia. Please don't be so contentious in your editing. Wikipedia also requires content to be verifiable, and these "clones" are not. It is irrelevant if 100 wiki editors proclaim the tooth fairy to exist when the existence of even one can never be verified or proven.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) With regard to ICC, you seem to be largely editing before discussing, rather than the other way around. If you are having trouble understanding why people find merit in the ICC, I suggest that you discuss more before editing. In addition to discussing on wikipedia, I invite you to discuss these issues on the electorama mailing list. Go ahead and make an anti-ICC argument there, and see what kind of replies you get. That should be more productive and less antagonistic than the current pattern of "edit wars" here on wikipedia.User:Hermitage 04:54, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) I did browse the postings to that list. To me, most of it is noise rather than signal. The opinions on that list do not interest me, rather I am interested in verifiable facts. Tideman's "clones" are Not verifiable.--User:Fahrenheit451 15:27, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Voting method criteria are not facts, they are mathematical definitions. Clone is not a criteria, but is presumed to exist in Tideman's definition. If clone candidates do not exist, then discussing them is tantamount to discussing fiction.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:56, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) If you do not understand what a mathematical definition is, you do not have the necessary background to write about criteria. You are in no position to evaluate my mathematical aptitude. Just to clue you in, I pulled straight A's in calculus in high school and only attended class to take the tests. I also passed the final exam for first year college chemistry with calculus prior to my high school senior year and took organic chemistry and lab while still a high school senior. Have a good day, Rob.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:56, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) "Clones" are a part of this definition, not something whose "existence can be verified or proven". Here are other similar Wikipedia articles, about idealizations that "do not exist" but are still useful definitions: * Ideal gas * Absolute zero * Infinity User:Rspeer 16:27, Jun 8, 2005 (UTC) Yes, and they are totally different bodies of data than clones. Those are not people, for one, and for two, absolutes are unobtainable in the physical universe. The three data you cited are absolutes. Clones are a theoretical construct for some imagined candidates who statistically correlate on ballots. The error in your thinking is that you are equating mathematical absolutes with the much larger superset of theoretical constructs. "Clones" are Not well-defined as they do not identify any observable entity. Hence, are of no practical use.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:56, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Well-defined is a mathematical concept, and clones certainly qualify as a well-defined object - there is no ambiguity in the definition as to whether something is a true clone or not. Whether or not they are likely to be commonly found in elections involving people is entirely secondary - just as no real-world temperature will ever be absolute zero, it is still a useful definition for analytical purposes. As was mentioned earlier, analysis on the effect of clones is frequently useful as analysis on the effect of near-clones as well. Clone analysis, for instance, can be used to study what the effect of putting the same candidate in two different places on the ballot would be. Clones are not a concept invented on Wikipedia either - they appear in the voting literature with some regularity. User:Scott Ritchie 19:46, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) Please cite where the ICC appears with regularity. Please substantiate your statement.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:40, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC) Am I right in that what you are saying is that clones are an interesting mathematical concept to you and some other folks, even though there is no evidence for their existence? I just do not agree that voting criteria should have no real world application. It is not number theory where such endeavors are legitimate. I have no objection to anyone playing with theories, but please do not mix that data in with data that does have real application with verifiably extant objects.--User:Fahrenheit451 00:30, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC) :There's no evidence of the existence of ideal gases either, however they are a very useful concept for studying real-world chemistry. To claim they have "no real world application" because empirical research shows them to be only very good approximations rather than a perfect model is...strange. True clones may not commonly exist in large public elections (just as true ties don't), however near ties and close elections certainly do, and theoretical analysis of their effects is certainly done - hence, it belongs in Wikipedia. User:Scott Ritchie 01:30, 10 Jun 2005 (UTC) Fine, so show me an article where a real candidate election was analyzed using ICC.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:43, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC) I mentioned this elsewhere (unfortunately this discussion spreads over several pages), but I'll repeat it here: The category we're dealing with is called "voting theory". Thus, it is not limited to observation of real elections. Hence the definition of clones can be useful here even though clones may never exist in large public elections. You ask which students of voting theory find the ICC to be interesting. There are far too many to list. Do a lit review. Do a google search. It's not our responsibility to spoon-feed this information to you. If you do the necessary research, you will find that ICC is a widely-discussed criteria, as far as voting criteria go, and therefore worthy of attention in wikipedia. If you don't have time to do the research, then you don't have time to delete ICC from wikipedia.User:Hermitage 23:15, 8 Jun 2005 (UTC) I wonder if Fahrenheit's talk about the Independence of Clones Criterion could have anything to do with his advocacy of a Talk:Borda_count ;)- Written by a anonymous coward with the i.p. address of 84.144.84.53 I wonder if Hermitage's talk about Independence of Clones Criterion has anything to do with his use of it in a derogatory article on the Borda count he has on his college webpage that he is not able to get published and peer-reviewed anywhere.--User:Fahrenheit451 18:36, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC) == NPOV notice == I can't tell when this page had anything POV on it recently, regardless of whether you think independence of clones is a good criterion. This page doesn't express any opinions about criteria, it just lists them. Can we remove the NPOV notice? User:Rspeer 02:44, Jun 10, 2005 (UTC) I think so. Perhaps the npov flag served to foster discussion about ICC, but I think discussion can continue without it. I don't think that the inclusion of a criterion like ICC is a sufficient reason to label a page as non-neutral. User:Hermitage 07:13, 11 Jun 2005 (UTC) == New mechanism for adding and removing methods/criteria == I'd like to propose a page where we discuss adding and removing methods or criteria from this page and its table. This is due to the large amount of editing that is involved in making such a change - it would be best to achieve consensus first. Please add /Included methods and criteria to your watchlist. I've started that page with a (perhaps surprising) proposal to add Majority Choice Approval as a method. User:Rspeer 05:15, Jun 13, 2005 (UTC) == Inconsistent use of voting method criteria == Today I edited several method articles to bring the criteria listed to consistency. One method satisfied the foo criteria, but in another article the foo criteria was not listed, but the boo criteria was. For example, I removed the Smith criterion from the Borda count article because most articles did not use it, and Hermitage reverts my edit. We need a consensus on which criteria is used to evaluate methods and stay consistent with that in editing.--User:Fahrenheit451 23:59, 14 Jun 2005 (UTC) :I agree that consistency in this area could be beneficial. I will follow Rspeer's lead and continue the discussion of which criteria to use on the /Included methods and criteria page. User:Hermitage 01:00, 16 Jun 2005 (UTC)
See other meanings of words starting from letter:
V
Words begining with Voting_system:
Voting_system
Voting_system
Voting_system/Included_methods_and_criteria
Voting_systems
Voting_systems
Voting_system_criteria
Voting_system_criteria
Voting_system_criterion
Voting_system_criterion
These materials are based on Wikipedia and licensed under the GNU FDL
YouTube.com videos better site than Turbo Tax 2007
