In the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects, properties, events (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events. Ultimately, only mental objects, properties, events, exist. In particular, we may reduce talk of physical bodies to talk of ''bundles of sense-data''. The philosopher who is most famous for advocating ''both'' the bundle theory of objects, ''and'' phenomenalism, is the 18th century Irish philosopher, George Berkeley. Berkeley's version is more commonly called "subjective idealism". Philosophers who hear the sceptic's challenge – "There's no reason to think an external world exists" – reply, "Well, no, I guess there isn't any reason to think that an external world exists. All there is, is sense-data. Physical objects are bundles of sense-data. When I hold up my hand, and I see it, I'm not seeing something external to my mind; I'm seeing a series, a whole bundle, of hand sense-data, and ''there is no hand'' apart from those hand sense-data. That's what my hand is – a bundle of sense-data." Such philosophers get around scepticism not by replying to the sceptic and proving the existence of an external world, but instead by saying that there is no external world. One objection to phenomenalism, uses a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose the phenomenalist is correct. This argument intends to disprove that assumption. Let's assume that, for me, the physical world is all just a construction out of my sense-data. Now suppose you and I are talking about philosophy. On the face of it, there's my body, and my mind associated with it, and there's your mind, with your body associated with it. But we are assuming that phenomenalism is true. That means that when I see ''your body'', I'm not seeing an irreducibly physical body; I am seeing a bundle of sense-data in my own mind. Let's suppose I hear you saying all sorts of intelligent things, which I want to take as evidence of the existence of your mind, of what you are thinking. All those intelligent things you say are, after all, ''sense-data in my own mind''. So I have no reason to think that either your body, or your mind exist. The phenomenalist has no reason to believe that any other minds, besides his own, exist. Why should the phenomenalist be surprised when we say that? After all, phenomenalism denies that an external world exists. Just remember what "external world" means according to the phenomenalist: it means the world ''outside his own mind''. But that means that all other bodies ''and other minds'' are part of the external world. The phenomenalist seemingly must come to a counterintuitive conclusion. The argument in brief: # If phenomenalism is true, then nothing that is thought to be in the external world exists. # But other minds besides my own are thought to be in the external world (since the external world is anything outside my own mind). # Therefore, other minds do not exist. The phenomenalist ends up a solipsism, taking the view that one's mind is the only thing that exists – that one is entirely alone in a universe that exists completely in one's own mind. Berkeley got around this by employing God and his revelation through the Bible. However, phenomenalism was also adopted by Schopenhauer, who was atheist (or, arguably, a pantheist, since his Will has some divine properties, such as omnipotence, and is responsible for the existence of the representation). Schopenhauer argued that there was also the flip side of one's perception ["representation" as he called it] which is found through intuitive knowledge. He identified this flip side of perception as being will and he claimed that one could see the same inner-nature in other people [as well as other animals and all beings] ''only'' after one has acknowledged the will in oneself. The above argument invites critique from another direction by assuming that we have firsthand sensory knowledge of our own minds. If we reject that assumption then our own minds and the minds of others are on the same ontological footing, since we can confirm the existence of neither through sense-data, strictly speaking. A straightforward charge of solipsism then becomes difficult. Another classic problem is that if there is a book on the table before you and you turn around, you do not know whether it is there or not; this seems to offend common sense. Berkeley solves it by saying that God is everywhere, and Schopenhauer by saying that the will dwells in all our perceptions. A simpler response might be to ask, what would you think if you turned back around, only to see that the book was gone? Would you assume it has been stolen or destroyed by someone else? And if you assumed as much, would your lack of knowledge regarding the book's continued existence count as evidence for or against phenomenalism? Despite the inclination to reject solipsism out of hand, its argument is made in such a way that it is that it is not falsifiable and therefore cannot be disproven; at least not by means of modern science, philosophy included. By extension the above argument does not disprove phenomenalism in any way, even if we do accept that phenomenalism is solipsistic. A lack of falsifiability would render phenomenalism unscientific, however, so one could potentially reject it on that basis instead. Philosophy of mind Philosophy by tradition
This reduction fails to account for the so called "subjective idealism" of Berkeley. - He was by no means a solipsist, to Berkeley only the spirit existed. All things in the external world are indeed mere sense-data, but they do not only inhere in one's mind. Berkeley's philosophy is deeply spiritual - to him the things which we observe to be in the external world exist only so much as they are contained in God's mind. Rather then leading to solipsism, Barkley leads us to a kind of Spiritual Matrix. --- Whoever wrote the above comment, its unnecessary. Interpretations of any idealism or solipsism or subjectivism can be argued without contradiction--this is why Wittgenstein described philosophy moving between solipsism, idealism, and realism--and that all are true. They can all be collapsed into each other. An idealist doesn't believe there is nothing we consider "external", just that it isn't a "real" externality. There are many ways to interpret this--that nothing "exists" without perception (Berkeley argued that to be is to be percieved), the externality isn't "real" (David Hume), or that all we see as "matter" is really mind or spirit (i don't think Hegel would say this, but at least he said "matter is false"). Also, the statement made in this article, that implies that phenomenalism can't talk about other minds existing, is clearly wrong--you could say that they exist, but just as your mind doesn't have a "place" relative to internality or externality neither do they. The problem Wittgenstein found was just that any interpretation of reality, whether idealistic, solipsistic, or realistic, are metaphysical and thus nonsensical. User:Brianshapiro == NPOV? == This article seems to be attacking the problem from a rather anti-phenomenalist POV. Does anyone agree? Also, are there people who could be cited who use the reductio ad absurdum described here? My knowledge of this field is limited so I don't want to butt in too much, but as it stands, the article fails to take into account several things -- such as the fact that I, for one, don't have any actual *sensory* experience that proves that my own mind exists -- apart from the sensory experience I have of my hands and feet and my own interesting thoughts as I write them down. My knowledge of my own mind (I think?) comes from a set of qualia, not a set of concrete sensory perceptions. Hence if the only things that exist are bundles of sensory information, then my mind is just as likely or unlikely to exist as other peoples'. I'm not sure what to call that conclusion, but I don't think it's solipsism. User:Solemnavalanche 09:58, 22 Nov 2004 (UTC) == Two things == To me it also seems to be written in a anti-phenomenalism point of view. Also, it fails to consider the Zen Buddhist point of view, that is very interesting and relevant to the discussion about reality, and especially in the case of what is real and what is in and out of one's mind. Conventional Buddhist lore can easily refute some of the author's arguments against this philosofical view.
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Words begining with Phenomenalism:
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Phenomenalism
In the philosophy of perception, phenomenalism is the view that physical objects, properties, events (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events. Ultimately, only mental objects, properties, events, exist. In particular, we may reduce talk of physical bodies to talk of ''bundles of sense-data''. The philosopher who is most famous for advocating ''both'' the bundle theory of objects, ''and'' phenomenalism, is the 18th century Irish philosopher, George Berkeley. Berkeley's version is more commonly called "subjective idealism". Philosophers who hear the sceptic's challenge – "There's no reason to think an external world exists" – reply, "Well, no, I guess there isn't any reason to think that an external world exists. All there is, is sense-data. Physical objects are bundles of sense-data. When I hold up my hand, and I see it, I'm not seeing something external to my mind; I'm seeing a series, a whole bundle, of hand sense-data, and ''there is no hand'' apart from those hand sense-data. That's what my hand is – a bundle of sense-data." Such philosophers get around scepticism not by replying to the sceptic and proving the existence of an external world, but instead by saying that there is no external world. One objection to phenomenalism, uses a reductio ad absurdum. Suppose the phenomenalist is correct. This argument intends to disprove that assumption. Let's assume that, for me, the physical world is all just a construction out of my sense-data. Now suppose you and I are talking about philosophy. On the face of it, there's my body, and my mind associated with it, and there's your mind, with your body associated with it. But we are assuming that phenomenalism is true. That means that when I see ''your body'', I'm not seeing an irreducibly physical body; I am seeing a bundle of sense-data in my own mind. Let's suppose I hear you saying all sorts of intelligent things, which I want to take as evidence of the existence of your mind, of what you are thinking. All those intelligent things you say are, after all, ''sense-data in my own mind''. So I have no reason to think that either your body, or your mind exist. The phenomenalist has no reason to believe that any other minds, besides his own, exist. Why should the phenomenalist be surprised when we say that? After all, phenomenalism denies that an external world exists. Just remember what "external world" means according to the phenomenalist: it means the world ''outside his own mind''. But that means that all other bodies ''and other minds'' are part of the external world. The phenomenalist seemingly must come to a counterintuitive conclusion. The argument in brief: # If phenomenalism is true, then nothing that is thought to be in the external world exists. # But other minds besides my own are thought to be in the external world (since the external world is anything outside my own mind). # Therefore, other minds do not exist. The phenomenalist ends up a solipsism, taking the view that one's mind is the only thing that exists – that one is entirely alone in a universe that exists completely in one's own mind. Berkeley got around this by employing God and his revelation through the Bible. However, phenomenalism was also adopted by Schopenhauer, who was atheist (or, arguably, a pantheist, since his Will has some divine properties, such as omnipotence, and is responsible for the existence of the representation). Schopenhauer argued that there was also the flip side of one's perception ["representation" as he called it] which is found through intuitive knowledge. He identified this flip side of perception as being will and he claimed that one could see the same inner-nature in other people [as well as other animals and all beings] ''only'' after one has acknowledged the will in oneself. The above argument invites critique from another direction by assuming that we have firsthand sensory knowledge of our own minds. If we reject that assumption then our own minds and the minds of others are on the same ontological footing, since we can confirm the existence of neither through sense-data, strictly speaking. A straightforward charge of solipsism then becomes difficult. Another classic problem is that if there is a book on the table before you and you turn around, you do not know whether it is there or not; this seems to offend common sense. Berkeley solves it by saying that God is everywhere, and Schopenhauer by saying that the will dwells in all our perceptions. A simpler response might be to ask, what would you think if you turned back around, only to see that the book was gone? Would you assume it has been stolen or destroyed by someone else? And if you assumed as much, would your lack of knowledge regarding the book's continued existence count as evidence for or against phenomenalism? Despite the inclination to reject solipsism out of hand, its argument is made in such a way that it is that it is not falsifiable and therefore cannot be disproven; at least not by means of modern science, philosophy included. By extension the above argument does not disprove phenomenalism in any way, even if we do accept that phenomenalism is solipsistic. A lack of falsifiability would render phenomenalism unscientific, however, so one could potentially reject it on that basis instead. Philosophy of mind Philosophy by tradition
Phenomenalism
This reduction fails to account for the so called "subjective idealism" of Berkeley. - He was by no means a solipsist, to Berkeley only the spirit existed. All things in the external world are indeed mere sense-data, but they do not only inhere in one's mind. Berkeley's philosophy is deeply spiritual - to him the things which we observe to be in the external world exist only so much as they are contained in God's mind. Rather then leading to solipsism, Barkley leads us to a kind of Spiritual Matrix. --- Whoever wrote the above comment, its unnecessary. Interpretations of any idealism or solipsism or subjectivism can be argued without contradiction--this is why Wittgenstein described philosophy moving between solipsism, idealism, and realism--and that all are true. They can all be collapsed into each other. An idealist doesn't believe there is nothing we consider "external", just that it isn't a "real" externality. There are many ways to interpret this--that nothing "exists" without perception (Berkeley argued that to be is to be percieved), the externality isn't "real" (David Hume), or that all we see as "matter" is really mind or spirit (i don't think Hegel would say this, but at least he said "matter is false"). Also, the statement made in this article, that implies that phenomenalism can't talk about other minds existing, is clearly wrong--you could say that they exist, but just as your mind doesn't have a "place" relative to internality or externality neither do they. The problem Wittgenstein found was just that any interpretation of reality, whether idealistic, solipsistic, or realistic, are metaphysical and thus nonsensical. User:Brianshapiro == NPOV? == This article seems to be attacking the problem from a rather anti-phenomenalist POV. Does anyone agree? Also, are there people who could be cited who use the reductio ad absurdum described here? My knowledge of this field is limited so I don't want to butt in too much, but as it stands, the article fails to take into account several things -- such as the fact that I, for one, don't have any actual *sensory* experience that proves that my own mind exists -- apart from the sensory experience I have of my hands and feet and my own interesting thoughts as I write them down. My knowledge of my own mind (I think?) comes from a set of qualia, not a set of concrete sensory perceptions. Hence if the only things that exist are bundles of sensory information, then my mind is just as likely or unlikely to exist as other peoples'. I'm not sure what to call that conclusion, but I don't think it's solipsism. User:Solemnavalanche 09:58, 22 Nov 2004 (UTC) == Two things == To me it also seems to be written in a anti-phenomenalism point of view. Also, it fails to consider the Zen Buddhist point of view, that is very interesting and relevant to the discussion about reality, and especially in the case of what is real and what is in and out of one's mind. Conventional Buddhist lore can easily refute some of the author's arguments against this philosofical view.
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