The mind-body problem is the problem of determining the relationship between the human body and the human mind. Philosophical positions on this question are generally predicated on either a reduction of one to the other, or a belief in the discrete coexistence of both. ==Philosophical perspectives== If the mind is not seen as a "mysterious" substance, and it is assumed there are only ''mental events'' and that "the mind" is no more than a series of mental events, then it is possible to inquire about the relation between mind and body in terms of the relation between mental events and physical events. One can ask: are mental events ''completely different'' from physical events, so that you can't explain what mental events are in terms of physical events; or are mental events somehow explainable as being identical with certain physical events? For example, when John feels a pain, a mental event is occurring; is that pain identical to something that is physically occurring in John's brain, such as the firing of some special group of neurons? The mind-body problem can be introduced more fully with the following example. Suppose John decides to walk across the room, whereupon he does in fact walk across the room. John's decision is a mental event and his walking across the room is a physical event. In addition, there is ''another'' physical event involved, namely, something occurs in John's brain that tells John's legs to start walking. This brain event is closely connected with John's decision; the brain event happens at about the same time, or right after, John decides to walk across the room. One might ask: how is it possible that a decision, a ''mental'' event, results in something ''physical'' happening in John's brain? If it is claimed that the mental and the physical are completely different, then how can one have any ''causality '' impact on the other? How can a mere mental event, a decision, actually cause neurons in one's brain to start firing? A different philosophical view describes the situation thus: John's decision is ''itself'' a physical event. When John decides to take a walk across the room, a group of neurons fire in his brain. He is not aware of those neurons; but the firing of those neurons is itself just the same as his decision. There isn't any more to the decision than that physical event. In this view there's no trouble thinking about how a mental event can have a physical effect; mental events are themselves physical. Ultimately, everything is physical. To many it may sound strange to say that a mental process is no more than a special kind of physical process. Many believe the mind is more spiritual, ethereal, and is simply not the sort of thing that can be physical. Still, there are other reasons for rejecting this reduction of the mental to the physical. In the past, some philosophers have believed instead that the reduction goes the other way, that the body should be explained in terms of mental events. In this way, the physical is reduced to the mental. In this view, when John walks across the room, really that was only happening in John's mind and perhaps also in each of our minds individually at the same time. There is, in this view, nothing more to John's walking across the room than our having the thought, or the perception, that it happens. This view would also solve the problem of how the mental can affect the physical. Since physical events are themselves nothing more than a special kind of mental event, then of course there is no trouble about how a decision, which is obviously a mental event, can result in our bodies moving, which is also a mental event, although less obviously so. The three above-described views about the relationship between the mental and the physical have names: * ''Dualism (philosophy of mind)'' is the view that mental events and physical events are totally different kinds of events. * ''Materialism'', or ''physicalism'', is the view that mental events are nothing more than a special kind of physical event. * ''Phenomenalism'', or ''subjective idealism'', is the view that physical events are nothing more than a special kind of mental event. Materialism and Phenomenalism are two opposite forms of monism since they both assume that only a kind of substance (respectively, matter or mind) exists. The mind-body problem, to put it as generically and broadly as possible, is this question: "What is the basic relationship between the mental and the physical?" For the sake of simplicity, we can state the problem in terms of mental and physical events. It could just as well be put in terms of processes, or of consciousness. So the problem restated is: "What is the basic relationship between mental events and physical events?" There are, then, three basic views: mental and physical events are totally different, and cannot be reduced to each other (dualism); mental events are to be reduced to physical events (materialism); and physical events are to be reduced to mental events (phenomenalism). To put it in terms of what exists "ultimately", we could say that according to dualism, both ''mental and physical'' events exist ultimately; according to materialism, only ''physical'' events exist ultimately; and according to phenomenalism, only ''mental'' events exist ultimately. Materialism and phenomenalism are both varieties of monism, and of monism there is one further variety, namely neutral monism. ==What science has to say== Most neuroscience believe in the identity of mind and brain, a position that may be considered related to materialism and physicalism, though there is a subtle difference; namely, that postulating an identity between mind and brain (or more specifically, particular types of neuronal interactions) does not necessarily imply that mental events are 'nothing more' than physical events, but rather is more akin to saying that physical events and mental events are different aspects of a more fundamental mental-physical substratum which can be perceived as both mental and physical, depending on perspective. Since most neuroscientists believe in the identity of mind and brain, it may not be surprising to hear that the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) has become something of a Holy Grail in the neuroscientific community. A major shift in the neurosciences occurred in the 1990s: the topic of consciousness and its relation to brain function has become a respectable topic that many neuroscientists take seriously. Prior to the 1990s, few neuroscientists spoke of consciousness, and even fewer would be bold enough to try to approach the topic scientifically. Consciousness was not considered to be a topic that was amenable to the methods of science. The tide change in the neuroscientific community of the 1990s is largely due to outspoken scientists such as Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine Francis Crick, and philosophers such as David Chalmers. While neuroscience has not yet solved the mind-brain problem in terms of coming up with an NCC, to many in the field, the next decade looks promising. Future research may soon reveal how far science can go in addressing and solving the question of the mind-brain problem. == See also == * consciousness * Daniel Dennett * dualism (philosophy of mind) * functionalism (philosophy of mind) * materialism * monism: discusses, among other things, two positions that should probably make it to this page: functionalism and eliminativism * Odic force * Thomas Nagel * panpsychism * physicalism * pluralism (philosophy of mind) * qualia * solipsism * supervenience ==External links== * [http://www.foothill.net/~jerryi/INTRODUCTION_PDF_PAGELINK.html The Mind-Brain Problem] - an introduction for beginners (article in pdf format). * [http://sci-con.org/ Sci-Con.org] - Science and Consciousness Review, a site maintained by such notables as Bernard Baars, among others. * [http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/ David Chalmer's Homepage] - a large collection of essays from one of the leading philosophers in the consciousness field. * [http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/~ddennett.htm Daniel C. Dennett's homepage at Tufts University] Philosophy of mind
I think an article on this subject should mention Decartes and his "Cogito ego sum" idea, as in "I think, therefore I am". I think it's relevant to the mind-body issue and shouldnt be left out. --User:ArcticFrog 14:06, 6 Jun 2004 (UTC)ArcticFrog === Should the article be ordered historically? === The discussion is introduced in terms of the "human body and its mind". However, the mind-body problem has been discussed throughout antiquity in slightly different terms by metaphysicians (in the philosophical rather than 'supernatural' sense), viz. as a question of the fundamental nature of reality : is reality composed of mind(s) or matter? The article's presentation begins from the relatively recent perspective of the philosophy of mind by focusing on the nature of human consciousness and things like neurons. However, this article goes on to generalize the discussion ("What is the basic relationship between the mental and the physical?") I suppose this critique is mainly one of structure and order. I am inclined to a more historically ordered presentation, although this may not be the best way to describe the topic in contemporary terms. This re-structuring would entail a major edit. User:68.7.60.40 07:32, 17 Mar 2004 (UTC) : Personally, I think it's better to start with the more recent theory, then delve back into (or refer to) the past as necessary. Clear sectioning and a degree of modularity would allow the reader to follow the piece in the order they prefer. User:MrJones 03:34, 9 Apr 2004 (UTC) :BTW, who has suggested that the world is composed of mind? I don't think anyone has ever seriously suggested that. User:MrJones 17:49, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC) ::George Berkeley's Subjective idealism seems to be precisely this view. --User:Mporch 11:17, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC) === William James and the Mind-Body Problem === William James makes a very important point in one of his books on the subject - but I cannot remember which one. Can anyone point me to it? Also, has anyone else made similar points? Anyway, the point he made was this: Opponents of dualism ask, "How exactly does the mind substance interact with the physical substance?" William James replies, "How exactly does one physical substance interact with another physical substance?" The answer, according to James, as I understand him, is "It just does". If a physical substance can act on another physical substance, why can't a mental substance act on a physical substance? If I can find where James discusses this, I will have to reread that argument. User: Michael Voytinsky * I don't have copy on me at the moment, but I'd say that the most likely source is his Principles of Psychology, most likely the sections on "The Automaton Theory" and "Mind-stuff". Again, I'm going from memory here. If you have the two-volume set, the most interesting material is in the first volume, I think. The wiki article on the PoP has a link to the etext. User:Adam Conover — User:Adam Conover User talk:Adam Conover 16:53, Apr 9, 2004 (UTC) * It's probably worth mentioning that the idea, "It just does" is a classic example of the type of philosophy advocated by pragmatism --User:Mporch 21:00, 8 Jun 2004 (UTC) == An outline of Larry Sanger's article == This has a few additions (by other editors and myself) beyond what Larry wrote, of course. Please wikify this and make changes and suggestions as to how it should be structured. I do quite like the flow of it. I hope we can regain that in newer versions. User:MrJones 03:34, 9 Apr 2004 (UTC) *Definition and outline of problem ** Who does this concern? *** Philosophers of mind *** Theologians ** The relationship of body and mind ** Are mind and matter different? If so, how? ** Mental "substance" and physical "substance" ** Another view: Mental events rather than mental "substance" *** Mental "events" and physical events **** Relationships **** Differences **** The causation of Brain function (Larry's assertion seems a bit bogus to me; manifestation of an event in the brain doesn't preclude it being non-physical or even not purely the operation of neurons). * Objections to non-physicality of the mind ** Decisions and actions *** How can the mental affect the physical if it is not physical? *** The mind is exclusively physical (the physicalist view) * Objections to the assertion that mind is physical. ** Spirituality ** ''Other objections'' (please add to this list) *** Hard problem of consciousness ** The apparent determinism of physical systems conflicting with free will ** Non-computability of mental processes *** ''Aside'' Quantum mind -- Non-computable, yet physicalist, mind. * An older view: mind creates the world ** The physical is a consequence of the mental ** People who have held this view (Is there anyone? I've never encountered it User:MrJones 19:35, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)) *** Western Idealism **** Platonism **** George Berkeley's Subjective idealism **** German Idealism **** British Idealism *** Eastern philosophy ** Are there any objections to this? (I guess not if no-one believed it). User:MrJones) * Alternative formulations (aside) ** Processes ** Consciousness * Other ways of expressing the problem ** By what they can be reduced to *** mental and physical events are totally different, and cannot be reduced to each other (which is dualism); *** mental events are to be reduced to physical events (which is materialism) *** physical events are to be reduced to mental events (which is phenomenalism). ** By what exists "ultimately" *** according to dualism, both mental and physical events exist ultimately *** according to materialism, only physical events exist ultimately; *** according to phenomenalism, only mental events exist ultimately. * Monism ** Materialism and physicalism ** phenomenalism ** neutral monism. ** '' also '' ** functionalism (analogy with behaviourism) ** eliminativism ** supervienience * Dualism (?) *Philosophers who have discussed this problem, and their views ** '' Recently '' *** Karl Popper interactionism *** Patricia Churchland physicalism *** Paul Churchland physicalism *** John Searle physicalism *** Daniel Dennett physicalism *** Douglas Hofstadter physicalism *** Jaegwon Kim physicalism *** George Lakoff physicalism *** David Chalmers anti-physicalist, something like property dualism or neutral monism, AFAIK *** Colin McGinn mysterianism (we cannot know) ** Worlds I, II and III. *** John Eccles ** '' Historically '' *** Descartes substance dualism *** Spinoza neutral monism *** George Berkeley subjective idealism *** Nicolas Malebranche occasionalism dualism (theistic) *** Gottfried Leibniz pre-established harmony dualism (theistic) *** Thomas Hobbes materialism * Summary of definition ** "The relationship between mental and physical" ** The three traditional positions *** Dualism is the view that mental events and physical events are totally different kinds of events. *** Materialism, or physicalism, is the view that mental events are nothing more than a special kind of physical event. *** Phenomenalism, or subjective idealism, is the view that physical events are nothing more than a special kind of mental event. :MrJones, this is amazing work. Great job. With this, we should be able to go through each point and write a new version that replaces Larry's Text. It looks like we might have three of us to work on this project -- I'll start this weekend. User:Adam Conover — User:Adam Conover User talk:Adam Conover 03:42, Apr 10, 2004 (UTC) (P.S.: I moved this thread to the bottom of the page for readability's sake. Hope you don't mind.) No worries. There're a fair few more topics to add, like supervenience physicalism, and the topics near the bottom need working into the main structure. I'm not sure the time's right to start writing, but you might like to have a go anyway for practice. I don't know how you work in that respect :-) I am going to do some reading and return to this in a week's time. I will monitor the page as I can in the mean time. User:MrJones 18:03, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC) OK, this is going to take me a couple more weeks at least. Very interesting to investigate. User:MrJones 13:36, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC) Just throwing in a few things into the discusssion. These topics should probably be integrated into the overall discussion - or at least related to the other various sub-topics: Occasionalism - Pre-established harmony - panpsychism. Wikipedia is also missing an article on Property Dualism, which also deserves mention on this page in the Dualism section. One thing I find interesting is how terribly similar Property Dualism and Neutral Monism seem to be - they both are contrary to Physicalism/Materialism and phenomenalism/Subjective idealism. The distinction between Property Dualism and Neutral Monism can be arrived at by making the property/substance distinction from classic metaphysics (I actually think taht the whole monism/dualism debate can be viewed from a property/substance perpspective). Another thing of interest I've seen a 4-point-dial diagram where these various views arranged (see http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/prop.html). --User:Mporch 12:00, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC) I'm going to throw another idea into the mix here. What about associating the views of epistemology with perspectives on the mind/body problem? For example, metaphysical materialism has traditionally been associated with epitemological empericism. Just a thought. --User:Mporch 12:23, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC) *Just adding Popper's views on the subject (please correct this if this is wrong). *Popper argued that philosophical doctrines like materialism and determinism have NO scientific basis in classical physics. Materialism has been undermined by every advancement in physics, from Newton. *Popper, whose knowledge of the sciences is remarkable, still advocated "common sense" interactionism (dualism), where body and mind interact. Popper also thought the question "what is mind?" is a futile one. ===Final sentence=== Perhaps I'm misunderstanding here, but the sentence: "Future research may soon reveal the limitations of science in addressing and solving the question of the mind-brain problem." hardly seems NPOV to me. Is there any reason why it needs to be put on the end of the article?
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Mind-body problem
The mind-body problem is the problem of determining the relationship between the human body and the human mind. Philosophical positions on this question are generally predicated on either a reduction of one to the other, or a belief in the discrete coexistence of both. ==Philosophical perspectives== If the mind is not seen as a "mysterious" substance, and it is assumed there are only ''mental events'' and that "the mind" is no more than a series of mental events, then it is possible to inquire about the relation between mind and body in terms of the relation between mental events and physical events. One can ask: are mental events ''completely different'' from physical events, so that you can't explain what mental events are in terms of physical events; or are mental events somehow explainable as being identical with certain physical events? For example, when John feels a pain, a mental event is occurring; is that pain identical to something that is physically occurring in John's brain, such as the firing of some special group of neurons? The mind-body problem can be introduced more fully with the following example. Suppose John decides to walk across the room, whereupon he does in fact walk across the room. John's decision is a mental event and his walking across the room is a physical event. In addition, there is ''another'' physical event involved, namely, something occurs in John's brain that tells John's legs to start walking. This brain event is closely connected with John's decision; the brain event happens at about the same time, or right after, John decides to walk across the room. One might ask: how is it possible that a decision, a ''mental'' event, results in something ''physical'' happening in John's brain? If it is claimed that the mental and the physical are completely different, then how can one have any ''causality '' impact on the other? How can a mere mental event, a decision, actually cause neurons in one's brain to start firing? A different philosophical view describes the situation thus: John's decision is ''itself'' a physical event. When John decides to take a walk across the room, a group of neurons fire in his brain. He is not aware of those neurons; but the firing of those neurons is itself just the same as his decision. There isn't any more to the decision than that physical event. In this view there's no trouble thinking about how a mental event can have a physical effect; mental events are themselves physical. Ultimately, everything is physical. To many it may sound strange to say that a mental process is no more than a special kind of physical process. Many believe the mind is more spiritual, ethereal, and is simply not the sort of thing that can be physical. Still, there are other reasons for rejecting this reduction of the mental to the physical. In the past, some philosophers have believed instead that the reduction goes the other way, that the body should be explained in terms of mental events. In this way, the physical is reduced to the mental. In this view, when John walks across the room, really that was only happening in John's mind and perhaps also in each of our minds individually at the same time. There is, in this view, nothing more to John's walking across the room than our having the thought, or the perception, that it happens. This view would also solve the problem of how the mental can affect the physical. Since physical events are themselves nothing more than a special kind of mental event, then of course there is no trouble about how a decision, which is obviously a mental event, can result in our bodies moving, which is also a mental event, although less obviously so. The three above-described views about the relationship between the mental and the physical have names: * ''Dualism (philosophy of mind)'' is the view that mental events and physical events are totally different kinds of events. * ''Materialism'', or ''physicalism'', is the view that mental events are nothing more than a special kind of physical event. * ''Phenomenalism'', or ''subjective idealism'', is the view that physical events are nothing more than a special kind of mental event. Materialism and Phenomenalism are two opposite forms of monism since they both assume that only a kind of substance (respectively, matter or mind) exists. The mind-body problem, to put it as generically and broadly as possible, is this question: "What is the basic relationship between the mental and the physical?" For the sake of simplicity, we can state the problem in terms of mental and physical events. It could just as well be put in terms of processes, or of consciousness. So the problem restated is: "What is the basic relationship between mental events and physical events?" There are, then, three basic views: mental and physical events are totally different, and cannot be reduced to each other (dualism); mental events are to be reduced to physical events (materialism); and physical events are to be reduced to mental events (phenomenalism). To put it in terms of what exists "ultimately", we could say that according to dualism, both ''mental and physical'' events exist ultimately; according to materialism, only ''physical'' events exist ultimately; and according to phenomenalism, only ''mental'' events exist ultimately. Materialism and phenomenalism are both varieties of monism, and of monism there is one further variety, namely neutral monism. ==What science has to say== Most neuroscience believe in the identity of mind and brain, a position that may be considered related to materialism and physicalism, though there is a subtle difference; namely, that postulating an identity between mind and brain (or more specifically, particular types of neuronal interactions) does not necessarily imply that mental events are 'nothing more' than physical events, but rather is more akin to saying that physical events and mental events are different aspects of a more fundamental mental-physical substratum which can be perceived as both mental and physical, depending on perspective. Since most neuroscientists believe in the identity of mind and brain, it may not be surprising to hear that the search for the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) has become something of a Holy Grail in the neuroscientific community. A major shift in the neurosciences occurred in the 1990s: the topic of consciousness and its relation to brain function has become a respectable topic that many neuroscientists take seriously. Prior to the 1990s, few neuroscientists spoke of consciousness, and even fewer would be bold enough to try to approach the topic scientifically. Consciousness was not considered to be a topic that was amenable to the methods of science. The tide change in the neuroscientific community of the 1990s is largely due to outspoken scientists such as Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine Francis Crick, and philosophers such as David Chalmers. While neuroscience has not yet solved the mind-brain problem in terms of coming up with an NCC, to many in the field, the next decade looks promising. Future research may soon reveal how far science can go in addressing and solving the question of the mind-brain problem. == See also == * consciousness * Daniel Dennett * dualism (philosophy of mind) * functionalism (philosophy of mind) * materialism * monism: discusses, among other things, two positions that should probably make it to this page: functionalism and eliminativism * Odic force * Thomas Nagel * panpsychism * physicalism * pluralism (philosophy of mind) * qualia * solipsism * supervenience ==External links== * [http://www.foothill.net/~jerryi/INTRODUCTION_PDF_PAGELINK.html The Mind-Brain Problem] - an introduction for beginners (article in pdf format). * [http://sci-con.org/ Sci-Con.org] - Science and Consciousness Review, a site maintained by such notables as Bernard Baars, among others. * [http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/ David Chalmer's Homepage] - a large collection of essays from one of the leading philosophers in the consciousness field. * [http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/~ddennett.htm Daniel C. Dennett's homepage at Tufts University] Philosophy of mind
Mind-body problem
I think an article on this subject should mention Decartes and his "Cogito ego sum" idea, as in "I think, therefore I am". I think it's relevant to the mind-body issue and shouldnt be left out. --User:ArcticFrog 14:06, 6 Jun 2004 (UTC)ArcticFrog === Should the article be ordered historically? === The discussion is introduced in terms of the "human body and its mind". However, the mind-body problem has been discussed throughout antiquity in slightly different terms by metaphysicians (in the philosophical rather than 'supernatural' sense), viz. as a question of the fundamental nature of reality : is reality composed of mind(s) or matter? The article's presentation begins from the relatively recent perspective of the philosophy of mind by focusing on the nature of human consciousness and things like neurons. However, this article goes on to generalize the discussion ("What is the basic relationship between the mental and the physical?") I suppose this critique is mainly one of structure and order. I am inclined to a more historically ordered presentation, although this may not be the best way to describe the topic in contemporary terms. This re-structuring would entail a major edit. User:68.7.60.40 07:32, 17 Mar 2004 (UTC) : Personally, I think it's better to start with the more recent theory, then delve back into (or refer to) the past as necessary. Clear sectioning and a degree of modularity would allow the reader to follow the piece in the order they prefer. User:MrJones 03:34, 9 Apr 2004 (UTC) :BTW, who has suggested that the world is composed of mind? I don't think anyone has ever seriously suggested that. User:MrJones 17:49, 15 Apr 2004 (UTC) ::George Berkeley's Subjective idealism seems to be precisely this view. --User:Mporch 11:17, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC) === William James and the Mind-Body Problem === William James makes a very important point in one of his books on the subject - but I cannot remember which one. Can anyone point me to it? Also, has anyone else made similar points? Anyway, the point he made was this: Opponents of dualism ask, "How exactly does the mind substance interact with the physical substance?" William James replies, "How exactly does one physical substance interact with another physical substance?" The answer, according to James, as I understand him, is "It just does". If a physical substance can act on another physical substance, why can't a mental substance act on a physical substance? If I can find where James discusses this, I will have to reread that argument. User: Michael Voytinsky * I don't have copy on me at the moment, but I'd say that the most likely source is his Principles of Psychology, most likely the sections on "The Automaton Theory" and "Mind-stuff". Again, I'm going from memory here. If you have the two-volume set, the most interesting material is in the first volume, I think. The wiki article on the PoP has a link to the etext. User:Adam Conover — User:Adam Conover User talk:Adam Conover 16:53, Apr 9, 2004 (UTC) * It's probably worth mentioning that the idea, "It just does" is a classic example of the type of philosophy advocated by pragmatism --User:Mporch 21:00, 8 Jun 2004 (UTC) == An outline of Larry Sanger's article == This has a few additions (by other editors and myself) beyond what Larry wrote, of course. Please wikify this and make changes and suggestions as to how it should be structured. I do quite like the flow of it. I hope we can regain that in newer versions. User:MrJones 03:34, 9 Apr 2004 (UTC) *Definition and outline of problem ** Who does this concern? *** Philosophers of mind *** Theologians ** The relationship of body and mind ** Are mind and matter different? If so, how? ** Mental "substance" and physical "substance" ** Another view: Mental events rather than mental "substance" *** Mental "events" and physical events **** Relationships **** Differences **** The causation of Brain function (Larry's assertion seems a bit bogus to me; manifestation of an event in the brain doesn't preclude it being non-physical or even not purely the operation of neurons). * Objections to non-physicality of the mind ** Decisions and actions *** How can the mental affect the physical if it is not physical? *** The mind is exclusively physical (the physicalist view) * Objections to the assertion that mind is physical. ** Spirituality ** ''Other objections'' (please add to this list) *** Hard problem of consciousness ** The apparent determinism of physical systems conflicting with free will ** Non-computability of mental processes *** ''Aside'' Quantum mind -- Non-computable, yet physicalist, mind. * An older view: mind creates the world ** The physical is a consequence of the mental ** People who have held this view (Is there anyone? I've never encountered it User:MrJones 19:35, 16 Apr 2004 (UTC)) *** Western Idealism **** Platonism **** George Berkeley's Subjective idealism **** German Idealism **** British Idealism *** Eastern philosophy ** Are there any objections to this? (I guess not if no-one believed it). User:MrJones) * Alternative formulations (aside) ** Processes ** Consciousness * Other ways of expressing the problem ** By what they can be reduced to *** mental and physical events are totally different, and cannot be reduced to each other (which is dualism); *** mental events are to be reduced to physical events (which is materialism) *** physical events are to be reduced to mental events (which is phenomenalism). ** By what exists "ultimately" *** according to dualism, both mental and physical events exist ultimately *** according to materialism, only physical events exist ultimately; *** according to phenomenalism, only mental events exist ultimately. * Monism ** Materialism and physicalism ** phenomenalism ** neutral monism. ** '' also '' ** functionalism (analogy with behaviourism) ** eliminativism ** supervienience * Dualism (?) *Philosophers who have discussed this problem, and their views ** '' Recently '' *** Karl Popper interactionism *** Patricia Churchland physicalism *** Paul Churchland physicalism *** John Searle physicalism *** Daniel Dennett physicalism *** Douglas Hofstadter physicalism *** Jaegwon Kim physicalism *** George Lakoff physicalism *** David Chalmers anti-physicalist, something like property dualism or neutral monism, AFAIK *** Colin McGinn mysterianism (we cannot know) ** Worlds I, II and III. *** John Eccles ** '' Historically '' *** Descartes substance dualism *** Spinoza neutral monism *** George Berkeley subjective idealism *** Nicolas Malebranche occasionalism dualism (theistic) *** Gottfried Leibniz pre-established harmony dualism (theistic) *** Thomas Hobbes materialism * Summary of definition ** "The relationship between mental and physical" ** The three traditional positions *** Dualism is the view that mental events and physical events are totally different kinds of events. *** Materialism, or physicalism, is the view that mental events are nothing more than a special kind of physical event. *** Phenomenalism, or subjective idealism, is the view that physical events are nothing more than a special kind of mental event. :MrJones, this is amazing work. Great job. With this, we should be able to go through each point and write a new version that replaces Larry's Text. It looks like we might have three of us to work on this project -- I'll start this weekend. User:Adam Conover — User:Adam Conover User talk:Adam Conover 03:42, Apr 10, 2004 (UTC) (P.S.: I moved this thread to the bottom of the page for readability's sake. Hope you don't mind.) No worries. There're a fair few more topics to add, like supervenience physicalism, and the topics near the bottom need working into the main structure. I'm not sure the time's right to start writing, but you might like to have a go anyway for practice. I don't know how you work in that respect :-) I am going to do some reading and return to this in a week's time. I will monitor the page as I can in the mean time. User:MrJones 18:03, 11 Apr 2004 (UTC) OK, this is going to take me a couple more weeks at least. Very interesting to investigate. User:MrJones 13:36, 19 Apr 2004 (UTC) Just throwing in a few things into the discusssion. These topics should probably be integrated into the overall discussion - or at least related to the other various sub-topics: Occasionalism - Pre-established harmony - panpsychism. Wikipedia is also missing an article on Property Dualism, which also deserves mention on this page in the Dualism section. One thing I find interesting is how terribly similar Property Dualism and Neutral Monism seem to be - they both are contrary to Physicalism/Materialism and phenomenalism/Subjective idealism. The distinction between Property Dualism and Neutral Monism can be arrived at by making the property/substance distinction from classic metaphysics (I actually think taht the whole monism/dualism debate can be viewed from a property/substance perpspective). Another thing of interest I've seen a 4-point-dial diagram where these various views arranged (see http://www.phil.gu.se/posters/prop.html). --User:Mporch 12:00, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC) I'm going to throw another idea into the mix here. What about associating the views of epistemology with perspectives on the mind/body problem? For example, metaphysical materialism has traditionally been associated with epitemological empericism. Just a thought. --User:Mporch 12:23, 30 Apr 2004 (UTC) *Just adding Popper's views on the subject (please correct this if this is wrong). *Popper argued that philosophical doctrines like materialism and determinism have NO scientific basis in classical physics. Materialism has been undermined by every advancement in physics, from Newton. *Popper, whose knowledge of the sciences is remarkable, still advocated "common sense" interactionism (dualism), where body and mind interact. Popper also thought the question "what is mind?" is a futile one. ===Final sentence=== Perhaps I'm misunderstanding here, but the sentence: "Future research may soon reveal the limitations of science in addressing and solving the question of the mind-brain problem." hardly seems NPOV to me. Is there any reason why it needs to be put on the end of the article?
See other meanings of words starting from letter:
M
MA | MB | MC | MD | ME | MF | MG | MH | MI | MJ | MK | ML | MN | MO | MP | MR | MS | MT | MU | MW | MX | MY | MZ |Words begining with Mind-body_problem:
Mind-body_problem
Mind-body_problem
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