
George P. Lakoff (Pronounced: "lay-koff") is a professor of linguistics (in particular, cognitive linguistics) at the University of California, Berkeley where he has taught since 1972. Although some of his research involves questions traditionally pursued by linguists, such as the conditions under which a certain linguistic construction is grammatically viable, he is most famous for his ideas about the centrality of conceptual metaphor to human thinking and society. He is particularly famous for his concept of the "embodied philosophy". In recent years he has applied his work to the realm of politics, and founded a Progressivism think tank, the [http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org Rockridge Institute]. == The reappraisal of metaphor == Lakoff's original thesis on conceptual metaphor was expressed in his book with Mark Johnson (professor) entitled ''Metaphors We Live By'' in 1980. Metaphor has been seen within the Western scientific tradition as purely a linguistic construction. The essential thrust of Lakoff's work has been the argument that metaphors are primarily a conceptual construction, and indeed are central to the development of thought. He says "''Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.''" Non-metaphorical thought is for Lakoff only possible when we talk about purely physical reality. For Lakoff the greater the level of abstraction the more layers of metaphor are required to express it. People do not notice these metaphors for various reasons. One reason is that some metaphors become 'dead' and we no longer recognise their origin. Another reason is that we just don't ''see'' what is ''going on''. For instance, in intellectual debate the underlying metaphor is usually that argument is war: *He ''won'' the argument *Your claims are ''indefensible'' *He ''shot down'' all my arguments *His criticisms were ''right on target'' *If you use that ''strategy'', he'll ''wipe you out'' For Lakoff, the development of thought has been the process of developing better metaphors. The application of one domain of knowledge to another domain of knowledge offers new perceptions and understandings. Lakoff's theory has major consequences if correct. It points to the complete re-evaluation of the entire Western philosophical and scientific traditions. It has applications throughtout all academic disciplines and indeed within all society. Lakoff has sought to explore the full consequences of this view in his later works. == About the embodied mind == When Lakoff claims the mind is "embodied", he is arguing that almost all of human cognition, up through the most abstract reasoning, depends on and makes use of such concrete and "low-level" facilities as the sensorimotor system and the emotions. Therefore embodiment is a rejection not only of dualism vis-a-vis mind and matter, but also of claims that human reason can be basically understood without reference to the underlying "implementation details". Lakoff is, with Rafael E. Núñez, the primary proponent of the embodied mind thesis. Lakoff offers three complementary but distinct sorts of arguments in favor of embodiment. First, using evidence from neuroscience and neural network simulations, he argues that certain concepts, such as color and spatial relation concepts (e.g. "red" or "over"), can be almost entirely understood through the examination of how processes of perception or motor control work. Second, based on cognitive linguistics' analysis of figurative language, he argues that the reasoning we use for such abstract topics as warfare, economics, or morality is somehow rooted in the reasoning we use for such mundane topics as spatial relationships. (See conceptual metaphor.) Finally, based on research in cognitive psychology and some investigations in the philosophy of language, he argues that very few of the categories used by humans are actually of the black and white type amenable to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On the contrary, most categories are supposed to be much more complicated and messy, just like our bodies. "We are neural beings," Lakoff states, "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything - only what our embodied brains permit." A criticism of Lakoff would be that he writes as if he has discovered something unique with the concept of the embodied mind. However, a number of thinkers have considered the mind to be 'embodied', and his argument would be stronger if he referenced their ideas. Physicist David Bohm made a similar argument for embodiment in ''Thought As A System''. John Grinder and Richard Bandler articulated this view in Neuro-linguistic programming. Similar ideas can also be found in the work of Julian Jaynes. == Controversial extensions to the embodied mind thesis == Many scientists share the belief that there are problems with falsifiability and foundation ontology purporting to describe "what exists", to a sufficient degree of rigor to establish a reasonable method of empirical validation. But Lakoff seems to discard both claims entirely: In particular, he asserts, in an idiosyncratic claim extending those published in "The Embodied Mind", that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias - that mathematics itself is subjective to the human species and its cultures: thus "any question of math's being inherent in physical reality is moot, since there is no way to know whether or not it is." == Lakoff on mathematics == Lakoff argues that the best way to understand what mathematics and philosophy ideas are really about is to consider them in light of the structure of the embodied mind. Therefore, the philosophy of mathematics ought to look to the current scientific consensus understanding of the human body as a foundation ontology - abandoning self-referential attempts to ground the operational components of mathematics in anything other than "meat". This has generated some controversy. It is as yet unclear whether philosophers not so mathematically inclined are terribly interested in or bothered by Lakoff. An example of a controversial Lakovian idea in this vein is that, when considering the significance of mathematics, we should remain agnostic about whether math is some how wrapped up with the very nature of the universe. Early in 2001 Lakoff told the American Association for the Advancement of Science, ''"Mathematics may or may not be out there in the world, but there's no way that we scientifically could possibly tell."'' This claim bothers a number of people, some because they think there really is a way we could "tell", others, presumably, because it implies that mathematics involves a good deal less certainty than one might expect. The falsifiability of this claim is itself a central question in the cognitive science of mathematics, a field which attempts to establish a foundation ontology based on the human cognitive and scientific process. == Political significance and involvement == Lakoff's "application of cognitive linguistics to politics, literature, philosophy and mathematics" has led him into territory normally considered basic to political science. Lakoff has publicly expressed both ideas about the conceptual structures that he views as central to understanding the political process, and some of his particular political views. He almost always discusses the latter in terms of the former. ''Moral Politics'' gives book-length consideration to the conceptual metaphors that Lakoff sees as present in the minds of American "liberals" and "conservatives". The book is a blend of cognitive science and political analysis. Lakoff makes an attempt to keep his personal views confined to one particular section near the book's close. Lakoff argues that the differences in opinions between progressives and conservatives follow from the fact that they subscribe to different metaphors about the relationship of the state to its citizens. Both, he claims, see governance through metaphors of the family. The conservative model has a family structured around a strong, dominant "father" (government), and assumes that the "children" (citizens) need to be disciplined to be made into responsible "adults" (financially and morally responsible beings). However, the "children" are "adults", and so the "father" should not interfere with their lives: the government should stay out of the business of those in society who have proved their responsibility. In contrast, Lakoff argues that progressives support a model of the family based on "nurturant values", where both "mothers" and "fathers" work to keep the essentially good "children" away from "corrupting influences" (pollution, social injustice, poverty, etc.). Lakoff says that most people have a blend of both metaphors applied at different times, and that political speech works primarily by invoking these metaphors and urging the subscription of one over the other. Lakoff further argues that one of the reasons progressives have had difficulty since the 1980s is that they have not been as aware of their own guiding metaphors, and have too often accepted conservative terminology framed in a way to promote the "stern father" metaphor. Lakoff insists that progressives must cease using terms like "partial birth abortion" and "tax relief" because they are manufactured specifically to allow the possibilities of only certain types of opinions. "Tax relief," for example, implies explicitly that taxes are an unpleasant thing, something someone would want "relief" from. To use the terms of another metaphoric worldview, Lakoff insists, is to unconsciously support it. Progressives must support linguistic think tanks in the same way that conservatives do if they are going to succeed in appealing to those in the country who share their metaphors. Lakoff has distributed some much briefer political analyses via the Internet. One article distributed this way is "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf", in which Lakoff argues that the particular conceptual metaphors used by the first George H. W. Bush administration to justify American involvement in the Gulf ended up either obscuring reality, or putting a handy conservative spin on the facts. Presumably it is contributions such as this that have helped endear Lakoff to some political activists with little interest in theories of the mind. In recent years, Lakoff has become involved with a progressive think tank, the [http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org Rockridge Institute], an involvement which follows in part from his recommendations in ''Moral Politics''. Among his activities with the Institute, which concentrates in part on helping liberal candidates and politicians with re-framing political metaphors, Lakoff has given numerous public lectures and written accounts of his message from ''Moral Politics.'' His latest political work, ''Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate'', self-labeled as "the Essential Guide for Progressives," was published in September 2004 and features a foreword by former United States Democratic Party presidential candidate Howard Dean. == Comparison to other thinkers/schools == * Noam Chomsky * Francisco Varela * The idea of an "empirically responsible philosophy" * Natural language processing also articulates in its own way the concept of the embodied mind. * Frank Luntz-Republican pollster/wordsmith == Published books == * George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. ''Metaphors We Live By.'' University of Chicago Press, 1980. * George Lakoff and Mark Turner. ''More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor'' University of Chicago Press, 1989. * George Lakoff. ''Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind'' University of Chicago Press, 1987. * George Lakoff. ''Moral Politics.'' University of Chicago Press, 1996. (''Moral Politics'' has been published with two different subtitles. See the article about it for more information.) * George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. ''Philosophy In The Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought.'' Basic Books, 1999. * George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez. ''Where Mathematics Comes From.'' Basic Books, 2000. * George Lakoff. ''[http://www.chelseagreen.com/2004/items/elephant Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate.]'' Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004. == See also == * Cognitive linguistics * metaphor * conceptual metaphor * Metonymy * Cognitive science of mathematics * Embodied philosophy * embodiment * Language and thought * Framing (communication theory) * Code word (figure of speech) == External links == *[http://www.linguistics.berkeley.edu/lingdept/Current/people/facpages/lakoffg.html University of California, Berkeley department of Linguistics page on George Lakoff] *[http://www.georgelakoff.com/ George Lakoff's blog] *[http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/bios/lakoff.html Edge bio of Lakoff] *[http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html "Metaphor and War" (1991)] *[http://www.alternet.org/story/15414 "Metaphor and War, Again" (2003)] *[http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/ Rockridge Institute] Linguists American linguists
''This is the most recent discussion. For very old news, see Talk:George Lakoff/Archive.'' ---- This article seems to have been written from someone with a rather odd take on Lakoff. I'm removing a number of passeges that do more harm than good, in addition to doing some reorganizing and rephrasing. A coherent explanation of Lakoff's actual ideas is needed, but I decided I couldn't attempt that before doing some housecleaning. Here are some things removed: : [Lakoff is a] cognitive scientist well known for his unorthodox views of the scientific process, and its supposed central position in the culture of developed countries as an assumed neutral point of view. Removed. Well known to whom? Although Lakoff may be a relativist in certain senses, I don't think Lakoff is an avid critic of the scientific process; without that process, his work is basically meaningless. And what does this have to do with developed vs non-developed countries? :He is, with Rafael E. Núñez, the primary proponent of the embodied mind thesis: ::"We are neural beings," Lakoff states, "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything - only what our embodied brains permit." Removed. First, I don't think Núñez and Lakoff are alone in advocating an "embodied mind thesis". Second, that quote is ok, but it would be much better if it said what book it was from. Finally, I'm not sure this is worth presenting in such a brief, sound-bite form. :Lakoff seems to discard falsifiability and some basic tenets of particle physics entirely. In particular, he asserts, in an idiosyncratic claim extending those published in "The Embodied Mind", that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias This is incoherent. Falsifiability of what? Also, don't mention "particle physics" without explaining the connection; I feel this has been inserted only to add credibility to a weak argument. :"any question of math's being inherent in physical reality is moot, since there is no way to know whether or not it is." Fine, but redundant. :Despite his attempts at some degree of scientific neutrality, his work shows (and to some extent even admits) the influence of his liberal (in his own sense) view of the world, and tends to be more palatable to those on the American political left. Oops. I wrote that. It was only referring to ''Moral Politics'', and should have been moved to its article. :Some members of the anti-globalization movement have been heavily influenced by Lakoff's work, perhaps as much as by that of fellow linguist Noam Chomsky. Who? I don't see any obvious connections between Lakoff and the anti-globalization folks. Also, I'm curious: assuming there actually are such people inspired by Lakoff, do they actually have a clue what he is talking about? :Lakoff and Chomsky's respective views of linguistics are almost as different as can be. I wrote that. I'd say it's true, but it doesn't fit with the current organization of the article, and it's kind of useless if it isn't fleshed out further. --User:Ryguasu 23:10 Nov 22, 2002 (UTC) Yup, still fighting against the mess that 24 created. Amazing how much damage can be done by a single individual. User:AxelBoldt 04:00 Nov 25, 2002 (UTC) ---- Changed the "Trivia" section which made Robin Lakoff sound trivial. --User:Dante Alighieri I don't have any opinions about Robin Lakoff; I just thought it was kind of silly to be talking about husbands and wives of ''any'' sort in the introductory paragraph. Sorry. By the way, are you sure Robin and George are married? The dedication from my ''Where Mathematics Comes From'' says his wife is named Kathleen Frumkin. --User:Ryguasu 09:54 Nov 25, 2002 (UTC) Well slap me silly... I guess I've been wrong all these years. :( Must be a coincidence then. I'm removing the link about Robin Lakoff from the George Lakoff page. And don't worry, I didn't think you were intentionally trivializing it, I just thought it was a less than ideal choice of words. :) --User:Dante Alighieri Perhaps other people have made the same mistake; the situation certainly sounds plausible. In that case, it might make sense to put back the "trivia" section, and include the fact about who he ''isn't'' married to. =) Or maybe that is getting a bit too far afield for an encyclopedia.... --User:Ryguasu 10:01 Nov 25, 2002 (UTC) I agree, that's a bit far afield... I must say, though, that I feel ESPECIALLY stupid seeing as how I attended UC Berkeley and took several courses in the Linguistics department. Sigh. --User:Dante Alighieri ---- I'm trying to assess how idiosyncratic an understanding of Lakoff and Johnson's first book feminist Julie Nelson has. It's a little hard for me to check, since I don't have the book. The passage in question is: :That is, to the metaphorical connections outlined by Lakoff and Johnson of up-in-center-control-rational we can add "superior" and "masculine," and to the connections of "down-out-periphery-submission-emotional we can add "inferior" and "feminine". This seems to suggest that, somewhere in their book, Lakoff and Johnson argue for one monolithic concept called "up-in-center-control-rational", and another monolithic concept called "down-out-periphery-submission-emotional", which seems not entirely plausible given my understanding of these guys. Certainly they talk about up vs. down and how this connects metaphorically to other domains (e.g. more vs. less, better vs. worse). But do they discuss these more monolithic concepts as well? --User:Ryguasu 23:40 Jan 22, 2003 (UTC) =="Lakoff would strongly reject a number of formulations of the Strong AI position"== There is a difference between saying that * 1) the human mind is produced by physical brain processes and saying that * 2) a human-like mind could be implemented in computer hardware. Saying #1 does not automatically rule out #2. Some people may have suggested that it might be possible to understand human-like minds as a general phenomenon by making AI with human-like mental abilities, but it is not clear to me that even this claim need be rejected by someone who is a mind-brain monist. Does anyone have a source that illustrates rejection of a version of strong AI by Lakoff? User:JWSchmidt 04:20, 3 Apr 2004 (UTC) == Rejecting a number of formulations of Strong AI position? ==
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George Lakoff
George P. Lakoff (Pronounced: "lay-koff") is a professor of linguistics (in particular, cognitive linguistics) at the University of California, Berkeley where he has taught since 1972. Although some of his research involves questions traditionally pursued by linguists, such as the conditions under which a certain linguistic construction is grammatically viable, he is most famous for his ideas about the centrality of conceptual metaphor to human thinking and society. He is particularly famous for his concept of the "embodied philosophy". In recent years he has applied his work to the realm of politics, and founded a Progressivism think tank, the [http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org Rockridge Institute]. == The reappraisal of metaphor == Lakoff's original thesis on conceptual metaphor was expressed in his book with Mark Johnson (professor) entitled ''Metaphors We Live By'' in 1980. Metaphor has been seen within the Western scientific tradition as purely a linguistic construction. The essential thrust of Lakoff's work has been the argument that metaphors are primarily a conceptual construction, and indeed are central to the development of thought. He says "''Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.''" Non-metaphorical thought is for Lakoff only possible when we talk about purely physical reality. For Lakoff the greater the level of abstraction the more layers of metaphor are required to express it. People do not notice these metaphors for various reasons. One reason is that some metaphors become 'dead' and we no longer recognise their origin. Another reason is that we just don't ''see'' what is ''going on''. For instance, in intellectual debate the underlying metaphor is usually that argument is war: *He ''won'' the argument *Your claims are ''indefensible'' *He ''shot down'' all my arguments *His criticisms were ''right on target'' *If you use that ''strategy'', he'll ''wipe you out'' For Lakoff, the development of thought has been the process of developing better metaphors. The application of one domain of knowledge to another domain of knowledge offers new perceptions and understandings. Lakoff's theory has major consequences if correct. It points to the complete re-evaluation of the entire Western philosophical and scientific traditions. It has applications throughtout all academic disciplines and indeed within all society. Lakoff has sought to explore the full consequences of this view in his later works. == About the embodied mind == When Lakoff claims the mind is "embodied", he is arguing that almost all of human cognition, up through the most abstract reasoning, depends on and makes use of such concrete and "low-level" facilities as the sensorimotor system and the emotions. Therefore embodiment is a rejection not only of dualism vis-a-vis mind and matter, but also of claims that human reason can be basically understood without reference to the underlying "implementation details". Lakoff is, with Rafael E. Núñez, the primary proponent of the embodied mind thesis. Lakoff offers three complementary but distinct sorts of arguments in favor of embodiment. First, using evidence from neuroscience and neural network simulations, he argues that certain concepts, such as color and spatial relation concepts (e.g. "red" or "over"), can be almost entirely understood through the examination of how processes of perception or motor control work. Second, based on cognitive linguistics' analysis of figurative language, he argues that the reasoning we use for such abstract topics as warfare, economics, or morality is somehow rooted in the reasoning we use for such mundane topics as spatial relationships. (See conceptual metaphor.) Finally, based on research in cognitive psychology and some investigations in the philosophy of language, he argues that very few of the categories used by humans are actually of the black and white type amenable to analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. On the contrary, most categories are supposed to be much more complicated and messy, just like our bodies. "We are neural beings," Lakoff states, "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything - only what our embodied brains permit." A criticism of Lakoff would be that he writes as if he has discovered something unique with the concept of the embodied mind. However, a number of thinkers have considered the mind to be 'embodied', and his argument would be stronger if he referenced their ideas. Physicist David Bohm made a similar argument for embodiment in ''Thought As A System''. John Grinder and Richard Bandler articulated this view in Neuro-linguistic programming. Similar ideas can also be found in the work of Julian Jaynes. == Controversial extensions to the embodied mind thesis == Many scientists share the belief that there are problems with falsifiability and foundation ontology purporting to describe "what exists", to a sufficient degree of rigor to establish a reasonable method of empirical validation. But Lakoff seems to discard both claims entirely: In particular, he asserts, in an idiosyncratic claim extending those published in "The Embodied Mind", that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias - that mathematics itself is subjective to the human species and its cultures: thus "any question of math's being inherent in physical reality is moot, since there is no way to know whether or not it is." == Lakoff on mathematics == Lakoff argues that the best way to understand what mathematics and philosophy ideas are really about is to consider them in light of the structure of the embodied mind. Therefore, the philosophy of mathematics ought to look to the current scientific consensus understanding of the human body as a foundation ontology - abandoning self-referential attempts to ground the operational components of mathematics in anything other than "meat". This has generated some controversy. It is as yet unclear whether philosophers not so mathematically inclined are terribly interested in or bothered by Lakoff. An example of a controversial Lakovian idea in this vein is that, when considering the significance of mathematics, we should remain agnostic about whether math is some how wrapped up with the very nature of the universe. Early in 2001 Lakoff told the American Association for the Advancement of Science, ''"Mathematics may or may not be out there in the world, but there's no way that we scientifically could possibly tell."'' This claim bothers a number of people, some because they think there really is a way we could "tell", others, presumably, because it implies that mathematics involves a good deal less certainty than one might expect. The falsifiability of this claim is itself a central question in the cognitive science of mathematics, a field which attempts to establish a foundation ontology based on the human cognitive and scientific process. == Political significance and involvement == Lakoff's "application of cognitive linguistics to politics, literature, philosophy and mathematics" has led him into territory normally considered basic to political science. Lakoff has publicly expressed both ideas about the conceptual structures that he views as central to understanding the political process, and some of his particular political views. He almost always discusses the latter in terms of the former. ''Moral Politics'' gives book-length consideration to the conceptual metaphors that Lakoff sees as present in the minds of American "liberals" and "conservatives". The book is a blend of cognitive science and political analysis. Lakoff makes an attempt to keep his personal views confined to one particular section near the book's close. Lakoff argues that the differences in opinions between progressives and conservatives follow from the fact that they subscribe to different metaphors about the relationship of the state to its citizens. Both, he claims, see governance through metaphors of the family. The conservative model has a family structured around a strong, dominant "father" (government), and assumes that the "children" (citizens) need to be disciplined to be made into responsible "adults" (financially and morally responsible beings). However, the "children" are "adults", and so the "father" should not interfere with their lives: the government should stay out of the business of those in society who have proved their responsibility. In contrast, Lakoff argues that progressives support a model of the family based on "nurturant values", where both "mothers" and "fathers" work to keep the essentially good "children" away from "corrupting influences" (pollution, social injustice, poverty, etc.). Lakoff says that most people have a blend of both metaphors applied at different times, and that political speech works primarily by invoking these metaphors and urging the subscription of one over the other. Lakoff further argues that one of the reasons progressives have had difficulty since the 1980s is that they have not been as aware of their own guiding metaphors, and have too often accepted conservative terminology framed in a way to promote the "stern father" metaphor. Lakoff insists that progressives must cease using terms like "partial birth abortion" and "tax relief" because they are manufactured specifically to allow the possibilities of only certain types of opinions. "Tax relief," for example, implies explicitly that taxes are an unpleasant thing, something someone would want "relief" from. To use the terms of another metaphoric worldview, Lakoff insists, is to unconsciously support it. Progressives must support linguistic think tanks in the same way that conservatives do if they are going to succeed in appealing to those in the country who share their metaphors. Lakoff has distributed some much briefer political analyses via the Internet. One article distributed this way is "Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify War in the Gulf", in which Lakoff argues that the particular conceptual metaphors used by the first George H. W. Bush administration to justify American involvement in the Gulf ended up either obscuring reality, or putting a handy conservative spin on the facts. Presumably it is contributions such as this that have helped endear Lakoff to some political activists with little interest in theories of the mind. In recent years, Lakoff has become involved with a progressive think tank, the [http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org Rockridge Institute], an involvement which follows in part from his recommendations in ''Moral Politics''. Among his activities with the Institute, which concentrates in part on helping liberal candidates and politicians with re-framing political metaphors, Lakoff has given numerous public lectures and written accounts of his message from ''Moral Politics.'' His latest political work, ''Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate'', self-labeled as "the Essential Guide for Progressives," was published in September 2004 and features a foreword by former United States Democratic Party presidential candidate Howard Dean. == Comparison to other thinkers/schools == * Noam Chomsky * Francisco Varela * The idea of an "empirically responsible philosophy" * Natural language processing also articulates in its own way the concept of the embodied mind. * Frank Luntz-Republican pollster/wordsmith == Published books == * George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. ''Metaphors We Live By.'' University of Chicago Press, 1980. * George Lakoff and Mark Turner. ''More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor'' University of Chicago Press, 1989. * George Lakoff. ''Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind'' University of Chicago Press, 1987. * George Lakoff. ''Moral Politics.'' University of Chicago Press, 1996. (''Moral Politics'' has been published with two different subtitles. See the article about it for more information.) * George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. ''Philosophy In The Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought.'' Basic Books, 1999. * George Lakoff and Rafael Núñez. ''Where Mathematics Comes From.'' Basic Books, 2000. * George Lakoff. ''[http://www.chelseagreen.com/2004/items/elephant Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate.]'' Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004. == See also == * Cognitive linguistics * metaphor * conceptual metaphor * Metonymy * Cognitive science of mathematics * Embodied philosophy * embodiment * Language and thought * Framing (communication theory) * Code word (figure of speech) == External links == *[http://www.linguistics.berkeley.edu/lingdept/Current/people/facpages/lakoffg.html University of California, Berkeley department of Linguistics page on George Lakoff] *[http://www.georgelakoff.com/ George Lakoff's blog] *[http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/bios/lakoff.html Edge bio of Lakoff] *[http://lists.village.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html "Metaphor and War" (1991)] *[http://www.alternet.org/story/15414 "Metaphor and War, Again" (2003)] *[http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/ Rockridge Institute] Linguists American linguists
George Lakoff
''This is the most recent discussion. For very old news, see Talk:George Lakoff/Archive.'' ---- This article seems to have been written from someone with a rather odd take on Lakoff. I'm removing a number of passeges that do more harm than good, in addition to doing some reorganizing and rephrasing. A coherent explanation of Lakoff's actual ideas is needed, but I decided I couldn't attempt that before doing some housecleaning. Here are some things removed: : [Lakoff is a] cognitive scientist well known for his unorthodox views of the scientific process, and its supposed central position in the culture of developed countries as an assumed neutral point of view. Removed. Well known to whom? Although Lakoff may be a relativist in certain senses, I don't think Lakoff is an avid critic of the scientific process; without that process, his work is basically meaningless. And what does this have to do with developed vs non-developed countries? :He is, with Rafael E. Núñez, the primary proponent of the embodied mind thesis: ::"We are neural beings," Lakoff states, "Our brains take their input from the rest of our bodies. What our bodies are like and how they function in the world thus structures the very concepts we can use to think. We cannot think just anything - only what our embodied brains permit." Removed. First, I don't think Núñez and Lakoff are alone in advocating an "embodied mind thesis". Second, that quote is ok, but it would be much better if it said what book it was from. Finally, I'm not sure this is worth presenting in such a brief, sound-bite form. :Lakoff seems to discard falsifiability and some basic tenets of particle physics entirely. In particular, he asserts, in an idiosyncratic claim extending those published in "The Embodied Mind", that falsifiability itself can never be established by any reasonable method that would not rely ultimately on a shared human bias This is incoherent. Falsifiability of what? Also, don't mention "particle physics" without explaining the connection; I feel this has been inserted only to add credibility to a weak argument. :"any question of math's being inherent in physical reality is moot, since there is no way to know whether or not it is." Fine, but redundant. :Despite his attempts at some degree of scientific neutrality, his work shows (and to some extent even admits) the influence of his liberal (in his own sense) view of the world, and tends to be more palatable to those on the American political left. Oops. I wrote that. It was only referring to ''Moral Politics'', and should have been moved to its article. :Some members of the anti-globalization movement have been heavily influenced by Lakoff's work, perhaps as much as by that of fellow linguist Noam Chomsky. Who? I don't see any obvious connections between Lakoff and the anti-globalization folks. Also, I'm curious: assuming there actually are such people inspired by Lakoff, do they actually have a clue what he is talking about? :Lakoff and Chomsky's respective views of linguistics are almost as different as can be. I wrote that. I'd say it's true, but it doesn't fit with the current organization of the article, and it's kind of useless if it isn't fleshed out further. --User:Ryguasu 23:10 Nov 22, 2002 (UTC) Yup, still fighting against the mess that 24 created. Amazing how much damage can be done by a single individual. User:AxelBoldt 04:00 Nov 25, 2002 (UTC) ---- Changed the "Trivia" section which made Robin Lakoff sound trivial. --User:Dante Alighieri I don't have any opinions about Robin Lakoff; I just thought it was kind of silly to be talking about husbands and wives of ''any'' sort in the introductory paragraph. Sorry. By the way, are you sure Robin and George are married? The dedication from my ''Where Mathematics Comes From'' says his wife is named Kathleen Frumkin. --User:Ryguasu 09:54 Nov 25, 2002 (UTC) Well slap me silly... I guess I've been wrong all these years. :( Must be a coincidence then. I'm removing the link about Robin Lakoff from the George Lakoff page. And don't worry, I didn't think you were intentionally trivializing it, I just thought it was a less than ideal choice of words. :) --User:Dante Alighieri Perhaps other people have made the same mistake; the situation certainly sounds plausible. In that case, it might make sense to put back the "trivia" section, and include the fact about who he ''isn't'' married to. =) Or maybe that is getting a bit too far afield for an encyclopedia.... --User:Ryguasu 10:01 Nov 25, 2002 (UTC) I agree, that's a bit far afield... I must say, though, that I feel ESPECIALLY stupid seeing as how I attended UC Berkeley and took several courses in the Linguistics department. Sigh. --User:Dante Alighieri ---- I'm trying to assess how idiosyncratic an understanding of Lakoff and Johnson's first book feminist Julie Nelson has. It's a little hard for me to check, since I don't have the book. The passage in question is: :That is, to the metaphorical connections outlined by Lakoff and Johnson of up-in-center-control-rational we can add "superior" and "masculine," and to the connections of "down-out-periphery-submission-emotional we can add "inferior" and "feminine". This seems to suggest that, somewhere in their book, Lakoff and Johnson argue for one monolithic concept called "up-in-center-control-rational", and another monolithic concept called "down-out-periphery-submission-emotional", which seems not entirely plausible given my understanding of these guys. Certainly they talk about up vs. down and how this connects metaphorically to other domains (e.g. more vs. less, better vs. worse). But do they discuss these more monolithic concepts as well? --User:Ryguasu 23:40 Jan 22, 2003 (UTC) =="Lakoff would strongly reject a number of formulations of the Strong AI position"== There is a difference between saying that * 1) the human mind is produced by physical brain processes and saying that * 2) a human-like mind could be implemented in computer hardware. Saying #1 does not automatically rule out #2. Some people may have suggested that it might be possible to understand human-like minds as a general phenomenon by making AI with human-like mental abilities, but it is not clear to me that even this claim need be rejected by someone who is a mind-brain monist. Does anyone have a source that illustrates rejection of a version of strong AI by Lakoff? User:JWSchmidt 04:20, 3 Apr 2004 (UTC) == Rejecting a number of formulations of Strong AI position? ==
...embodiment is a rejection not only of dualism vis-a-vis mind and matter, but also of claims that human reason can be basically understood without reference to the underlying "implementation details". (Thus Lakoff would strongly reject a number of formulations of the Strong AI position.)I think that parenthetical statement may be a non-sequitur. I don't know whether Lakoff does or does not reject these formulations, and I'm not arguing here about his views, but neither does the parenthetical statement. It is saying that a consequence of holding the embodied mind view would be to reject a number of the formulations of the strong AI position. While it's not clear exactly which formulations are meant, I do not believe that the emobided mind view should cause us in any way to reject the Strong AI position. Strong AI does not have to mean creating intelligence in exactly the same way that humans have it. And if it did have this as its goal, wouldn't the embodied mind argue against it? No, it wouldn't, for there is no reason why we couldn't also implement those "implementation details" as part of our computational model. :hi look, re: that - it is all a question of *what* you are "computing". Trivially, *everything in the universe* is computation or expressible in terms of computation (see e.g. Searle). The issue is whether a process is *best expressed* in terms of contemporary computation theory, or some other theory, for example one based on sets of non-linear differential equations (which in practice you would probably model with a digital computer, so as you could integrate them). In general, "embodied mind" folks, of whom there are a huge number now, overlap with the dynamicists in cogntive science. That is what the original poster had in mind I think. "Strong AI", well, you can argue about that if you like, but I think thats coming from a computer science perspective. The real argument is whether there are states in the brain that *represent* "things" in the world.The embodied mind/dynamicist folks would often hold that it does not work that way. :Most modern theorists reject the assertion that adult human linguistic or symbolic intelligence (as implied by the Church-Turing thesis), or playing chess, is what humans mean when they recognize each other as being concious, wise, or aware. Turing's Test also highlights these questions by suggesting that adult humans perhaps assume too much based on mere language - while paradoxically rejecting or ignoring the intelligence of great apes, who can master 2000-4000 word vocabularies. :It's the relationship between what mathematicians and scientists understand as "computed" versus what living creatures with bodies walking or swimming around with other bodies in ecologies would say had been successfully decided. Difference between "decided" and "computed" being bodily commitment - "intelligence" can't really exist outside some ecology enabling or requiring philosophy of action. Key distinction made by body philosophers back to Wittgenstein. Turing and Wittgenstein talked about this but in terms most people don't seem to understand as being "about this"... :Finally, AI that doesn't respect living creatures with bodies won't respect us either - it's not like we can patch in a moral code when we notice that it wants to slaughter us all as we are slaughtering apes... has to be part of the foundation ontology to recognize certain empathic common grounds... so this is an extension of the insect-makers' argument that you must solve the problems of getting around, finding food, getting along with others of your kind who find the same food in the same place (and maybe fight over it) before you can look at these absurdly abstract problems like chess or "go"... which are meaningless as tests of anything a living being would care about. :I think AI "progress" is disappointing because it sets up a false goal - honest assessments of intelligence would set the Great Apes up as benchmarks and assume that humans are the deluded ones making up criteria for their own prestige (as a species, or as researchers specializing in that criteria). ==Moral Politics== I think the "his book isn't unique" thesis is a bit strongly presented here and not terribly correct. Lakoff's analysis of language and framing goes a bit beyond what Orwell had in mind (and Orwell was not exactly the first person to argue that language determined quite a lot of thought, I am fairly sure) and is quite different from an Orwellian take in many respects (Orwell's position seems to be to have been that language ''can'' be used to frame things, Lakoff's is that language ''is always'' used to frame things). Jane Jacob's "guardian moral syndrome" and "commercial moral syndrome" looks only superficially like the sort of thing that Lakoff argues in ''Moral Politics'', which is about metaphor analysis. To say that Lakoff is just derivative/duplicative of these works is incorrect and POV at the very least -- you can of course read similarities into all sorts of works (Thomas Kuhn's idea of a paradigm, Foucault's idea of the episteme, etc. etc.) if you want to. Here is seems to serve the point of trying to criticize Lakoff in a not very NPOV way. If these are specific criticisms which have been put forth by prominent critics, then they should be attributed to those critics. Otherwise they should be deleted, if they are just the opinion of a Wikipedia editor. --User:Fastfission 01:28, 13 Apr 2005 (UTC) ==Pronunciation== I'm pretty sure his name is pronounced "Lay-koff". I say this as someone who has taken a class from him, know a number of his close friends, and once organized a talk by him. I've never heard anybody pronounce it otherwise. Any reason to suspect I'm wrong on this? (It would be somewhat mortifying if I was, since I've addressed him as such many times). --User:Fastfission 20:05, 3 Jun 2005 (UTC) :You're quite right. In International Phonetic Alphabet his name would be rendered . — User:Mark Dingemanse User Talk:Mark Dingemanse 11:48, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
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