[[Image: van Minderhout, Battle of Lowestoft.jpg|thumb|400px|''The Battle of Lowestoft, 13 June 1665, showing HMS Royal Charles (1655) and the Dutch ship Eendracht'' by Hendrik van Minderhout, painted c. 1665.]] The Battle of Lowestoft, 13 June 1665 was a naval battle of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. It remains the worst naval defeat in Dutch history. A fleet of more than a hundred ships of the United Provinces commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam attacked an Kingdom of England fleet of equal size commanded by James II of England forty miles east of the port of Lowestoft in Suffolk, England. The Dutch were desperate to prevent a second English blockade of their ports, after the first was broken off by the English for lack of supplies. The leading Dutch politician, Johan de Witt, ordered Van Wassenaer to attack the English aggressively during a period of stable eastern winds which would have given the Dutch the weather gage. Van Wassenaer however, feeling that his fleet was still too inferior in training and fire power to really challenge the British in full battle, postponed the fight till the wind turned in order to seek a minor confrontation in a defensive leeward position from which he could disengage quickly and return without openly disobeying orders. His attitude would cost him a quarter of his fleet and his life. On 11 June Van Wassenaer sighted the British fleet of 109 ships, 4,542 cannon and 22,055 men; it consisted of three squadrons. James himself commanded the van, the squadron of the red flag; Prince Rupert commanded the centre, the squadron of the white flag and Edward Montagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich commanded the rearguard, the squadron of the blue flag. The Dutch fleet of 103 ships, 4,869 cannon en 21,613 men had no less than seven squadrons: the first (from the Admiralty of Amsterdam) commanded by Van Wassenaer himself on ''Dutch ship Eendracht''; the second commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Johan Evertsen on ''Hof van Zeeland''; the third (from the Admiralty of the Maas) commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Egbert Bartholomeusz Kortenaer on ''Groot Hollandia''; the fourth (the Frisian fleet) commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Auke Stellingwerf on ''Sevenwolden''; the fifth (from the Admiralty of the Northern Quarter) commanded by Vice-Admiral Cornelis Tromp on ''Liefde''; the sixth (the Zealandic fleet) commanded by Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Oude on ''Vlissingen'' and the seventh commanded by Vice-Admiral Volckert Schram on ''Wapen van Nassau''. The reason for the large number of squadrons was that the smaller admiralties insisted on having their own squadron; the Admiralties of Amsterdam and the Maas (i.e. Rotterdam) then split their fleets to make squadrons of equal size to those of the smaller fleets. Both national fleets could only be so large by employing armed merchants: the British used 24 of these; the Dutch twelve, some of them enormous East India Company (VOC) warships, specially brought over from the Indies. The Dutch also had activated 18 laid up warships from the previous war. On 11 June there was a calm and no battle could take place. On 12 June the wind again started to blow — and from the east, giving Van Wassenaer the weather gage. However, he simply didn't attack, despite clear orders to do so under these conditions. Next morning the wind had turned to the west and now he approached the enemy fleet. ==The Battle== It's difficult to give a coherent account of the battle. There is a wealth of sources but these have never been properly studied. The British found the behavior of ''Opdam'' (as they called him) puzzling and ascribed all kinds of intentions to him that he in reality never had. After the defeat the surviving Dutch flag officers to exonerate themselves pretended the fleet had followed the original written orders, blaming misfortune and cowardice among the merchant captains for the disaster. In the early morning of the 13th the Dutch fleet was positioned to the southeast of the British fleet. Most British historians have assumed Van Wassenaer made a sudden dash to the west, trying to regain the weather gage, and the British beat him to it. If so, the wind must have been blowing from the southwest — otherwise there was no gain in this manoeuvre — but this makes it difficult to explain how the British fleet, sailing to the south, could be swifter than the Dutch. An alternative interpretation, more in accordance with the Dutch sources, would be that the wind was blowing from the northwest and Van Wassenaer tried to engage the British from a defensive leeward position, his favorite tactic. Indeed both fleets passed in opposite tack and then turned. During the turn ''HMS Great Charity'' became isolated and was boarded and captured by captain Jan de Haen, the later admiral, who immediately returned with his prize to the Netherlands, an obviously unsound practice that would be forbidden after this battle. After this there was a second pass. Though the British had some trouble controlling these manoeuvres, the Dutch now completely failed to maintain a line of battle. In theory their being in a leeward position would have given their guns a superior range, allowing them to destroy from a safe distance the rigging of the British ships with chain shot. In reality the several squadrons began to block each other's line of sight, older ships got behind, company ships — never trained in these tactics — behaved as if no other vessels were present and this disorder caused a part of the British line to shift over some heavier Dutch ships who only just managed to escape to their main force. Later they would claim they had intentionally tried to directly attack the enemy in accordace with general orders. Some other ships happened to be in an optimal range for the British to concentrate their fire and took heavy damage. The young life of the commander of the Frisian fleet, Lieutenant-Admiral Auke Stellingwerf, was ended when he was shot in two. Veteran Lieutenant-Admiral Kortenaer, probably the most competent Dutch commander present, was fatally wounded in the hip by a cannonball. Van Wassenaer now suspended the squadron command structure, hoping by placing all ships directly under his own guidance to bring some coherence to the Dutch force. This only added to the confusion however. Again both fleets turned. And now something strange happened that has proven very difficult to explain. After the manoeuvre the British rear should obviously have been to the north of the centre. All sources agree however that it resulted in a reversed order of the British fleet in that the rearguard was now to the ''south'' of the centre. The traditional British solution to this riddle has been that their fleet tacked synchronously, i.e. each individual ship turned simultaneously to reverse fleet order, instead of turning one behind the other. If true that would have been a truly unique accomplishment for that age. Dutch sources suggest a different explanation: while executing the third turn the Dutch fleet lost all coherence because the wind suddenly turned to the southwest. It then slammed into the British van and centre. The British rear, avoiding the mass of confused ships, sailed behind the Dutch fleet to the south. A flotilla from the van then closed the trap completely, blocking the intended return to the Dutch coast. This scenario explains why all manoeuvring stopped and why some British flotillas clearly report trying to sail to the west, which would be inexplicable if they hadn't been to the ''east'' of the Dutch fleet. If indeed surrounded the Dutch would have been in a hopeless position. The British main force to the west of them would have had the weather gage precluding boarding as a viable tactic. The British rear, firing from a leeward position, could have damaged the Dutch with impunity. Around noon the British rear divided the Dutch fleet (if the traditional British scenario is true now for the first time a part only of the Dutch fleet was surrounded). Apart from these positional problems the Dutch had a structural disadvantage: on average their guns were much lighter. Especially the eight largest British vessels were almost unsinkable themselves but could wreck the smallest Dutch ships with a single broadside. The larger Dutch vessels therefore tried to protect the little ones. The Dutch flagship ''Eendracht'' duelling the ''Royal Charles'' — James was nearly killed by a Dutch chain-ball decapitating several of his courtiers, the head of one of them striking him down — exploded, killing Van Obdam. Kortenaer was second in command; though fatally wounded he hadn't died yet and the other Admirals were unaware of his condition. For hours the Dutch fleet was therefore without effective command. By evening the Dutch were routed, but Vice-Admiral Cornelis Tromp and Lieutenant-Admiral Johan Evertsen, both having taken over command (showing the utter confusion on the Dutch side), made possible an escape and covered the flight, thus preventing complete catastrophe, though 16 more ships were lost. The British lost only one ship, the captured ''Great Charity''. Eight Dutch ships were sunk by the British; six of these were burnt in two separate incidents when they got entangled while fleeing and set ablaze with a fire ship: this happened with the ''Tergoes'' entangling with the company ship ''Maarseveen'' and the merchant ''Swanenburg''; and also to the ''Koevorden'', ''Stad Utrecht'' and ''Prinse Maurits''. The company ship ''Oranje'' exploded while trying to block ''HMS Charles'', when she was attacked by ''HMS Royal Oak'', ''HMS Essex'' and ''HMS Royal Katherine''. Nine more were captured: the ''Hilversum'', ''Delft'', ''Zeelandia'', ''Wapen van Edam'' and ''Jonge Prins''; the VOC-ship ''Nagelboom'' and the merchants ''Carolus Quintus'', ''Mars'' and ''Geldersche Ruyter''. The ''Tromp'' was captured but escaped. Eight older ships had to be written off, as the costs of repair would have exceeded their value. Notable English captains present at the battle included Captain of the Fleet William Penn (admiral) in the HMS Royal Charles and George Ayscue. It has always been a mystery why the British fleet didn't at least try to pursue the Dutch. Several anecdotes are told to explain this. According to one Penn remarked to James that he was looking foreward to the heavy fighting the next day — after all the Dutch were at their best when cornered. James, having narrowly escaped death already, then would have lost his nerve completely. Another legend has it that James' wife ordered Henry Brouncker to keep her husband safe; he obeyed by giving flagcaptain Harman the false order to stop the ''Charles'' in the night. The outcome of the battle was partially caused by an inequality in fire-power, but the Dutch had already embarked on an ambitious expansion programme, building many heavier ships. The English failed to take advantage of their victory. They never managed an effective blockade of the Dutch coast and couldn't prevent the VOC-fleet from returning from the Indies. The fleets, now much more equal in quality, met again at the Four Days Battle in June 1666. Battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars Naval battles History of Suffolk 1665
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Words begining with Battle_of_Lowestoft:
Battle_of_Lowestoft
Battle of Lowestoft
[[Image: van Minderhout, Battle of Lowestoft.jpg|thumb|400px|''The Battle of Lowestoft, 13 June 1665, showing HMS Royal Charles (1655) and the Dutch ship Eendracht'' by Hendrik van Minderhout, painted c. 1665.]] The Battle of Lowestoft, 13 June 1665 was a naval battle of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. It remains the worst naval defeat in Dutch history. A fleet of more than a hundred ships of the United Provinces commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Jacob van Wassenaer Obdam attacked an Kingdom of England fleet of equal size commanded by James II of England forty miles east of the port of Lowestoft in Suffolk, England. The Dutch were desperate to prevent a second English blockade of their ports, after the first was broken off by the English for lack of supplies. The leading Dutch politician, Johan de Witt, ordered Van Wassenaer to attack the English aggressively during a period of stable eastern winds which would have given the Dutch the weather gage. Van Wassenaer however, feeling that his fleet was still too inferior in training and fire power to really challenge the British in full battle, postponed the fight till the wind turned in order to seek a minor confrontation in a defensive leeward position from which he could disengage quickly and return without openly disobeying orders. His attitude would cost him a quarter of his fleet and his life. On 11 June Van Wassenaer sighted the British fleet of 109 ships, 4,542 cannon and 22,055 men; it consisted of three squadrons. James himself commanded the van, the squadron of the red flag; Prince Rupert commanded the centre, the squadron of the white flag and Edward Montagu, 1st Earl of Sandwich commanded the rearguard, the squadron of the blue flag. The Dutch fleet of 103 ships, 4,869 cannon en 21,613 men had no less than seven squadrons: the first (from the Admiralty of Amsterdam) commanded by Van Wassenaer himself on ''Dutch ship Eendracht''; the second commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Johan Evertsen on ''Hof van Zeeland''; the third (from the Admiralty of the Maas) commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Egbert Bartholomeusz Kortenaer on ''Groot Hollandia''; the fourth (the Frisian fleet) commanded by Lieutenant-Admiral Auke Stellingwerf on ''Sevenwolden''; the fifth (from the Admiralty of the Northern Quarter) commanded by Vice-Admiral Cornelis Tromp on ''Liefde''; the sixth (the Zealandic fleet) commanded by Vice-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen de Oude on ''Vlissingen'' and the seventh commanded by Vice-Admiral Volckert Schram on ''Wapen van Nassau''. The reason for the large number of squadrons was that the smaller admiralties insisted on having their own squadron; the Admiralties of Amsterdam and the Maas (i.e. Rotterdam) then split their fleets to make squadrons of equal size to those of the smaller fleets. Both national fleets could only be so large by employing armed merchants: the British used 24 of these; the Dutch twelve, some of them enormous East India Company (VOC) warships, specially brought over from the Indies. The Dutch also had activated 18 laid up warships from the previous war. On 11 June there was a calm and no battle could take place. On 12 June the wind again started to blow — and from the east, giving Van Wassenaer the weather gage. However, he simply didn't attack, despite clear orders to do so under these conditions. Next morning the wind had turned to the west and now he approached the enemy fleet. ==The Battle== It's difficult to give a coherent account of the battle. There is a wealth of sources but these have never been properly studied. The British found the behavior of ''Opdam'' (as they called him) puzzling and ascribed all kinds of intentions to him that he in reality never had. After the defeat the surviving Dutch flag officers to exonerate themselves pretended the fleet had followed the original written orders, blaming misfortune and cowardice among the merchant captains for the disaster. In the early morning of the 13th the Dutch fleet was positioned to the southeast of the British fleet. Most British historians have assumed Van Wassenaer made a sudden dash to the west, trying to regain the weather gage, and the British beat him to it. If so, the wind must have been blowing from the southwest — otherwise there was no gain in this manoeuvre — but this makes it difficult to explain how the British fleet, sailing to the south, could be swifter than the Dutch. An alternative interpretation, more in accordance with the Dutch sources, would be that the wind was blowing from the northwest and Van Wassenaer tried to engage the British from a defensive leeward position, his favorite tactic. Indeed both fleets passed in opposite tack and then turned. During the turn ''HMS Great Charity'' became isolated and was boarded and captured by captain Jan de Haen, the later admiral, who immediately returned with his prize to the Netherlands, an obviously unsound practice that would be forbidden after this battle. After this there was a second pass. Though the British had some trouble controlling these manoeuvres, the Dutch now completely failed to maintain a line of battle. In theory their being in a leeward position would have given their guns a superior range, allowing them to destroy from a safe distance the rigging of the British ships with chain shot. In reality the several squadrons began to block each other's line of sight, older ships got behind, company ships — never trained in these tactics — behaved as if no other vessels were present and this disorder caused a part of the British line to shift over some heavier Dutch ships who only just managed to escape to their main force. Later they would claim they had intentionally tried to directly attack the enemy in accordace with general orders. Some other ships happened to be in an optimal range for the British to concentrate their fire and took heavy damage. The young life of the commander of the Frisian fleet, Lieutenant-Admiral Auke Stellingwerf, was ended when he was shot in two. Veteran Lieutenant-Admiral Kortenaer, probably the most competent Dutch commander present, was fatally wounded in the hip by a cannonball. Van Wassenaer now suspended the squadron command structure, hoping by placing all ships directly under his own guidance to bring some coherence to the Dutch force. This only added to the confusion however. Again both fleets turned. And now something strange happened that has proven very difficult to explain. After the manoeuvre the British rear should obviously have been to the north of the centre. All sources agree however that it resulted in a reversed order of the British fleet in that the rearguard was now to the ''south'' of the centre. The traditional British solution to this riddle has been that their fleet tacked synchronously, i.e. each individual ship turned simultaneously to reverse fleet order, instead of turning one behind the other. If true that would have been a truly unique accomplishment for that age. Dutch sources suggest a different explanation: while executing the third turn the Dutch fleet lost all coherence because the wind suddenly turned to the southwest. It then slammed into the British van and centre. The British rear, avoiding the mass of confused ships, sailed behind the Dutch fleet to the south. A flotilla from the van then closed the trap completely, blocking the intended return to the Dutch coast. This scenario explains why all manoeuvring stopped and why some British flotillas clearly report trying to sail to the west, which would be inexplicable if they hadn't been to the ''east'' of the Dutch fleet. If indeed surrounded the Dutch would have been in a hopeless position. The British main force to the west of them would have had the weather gage precluding boarding as a viable tactic. The British rear, firing from a leeward position, could have damaged the Dutch with impunity. Around noon the British rear divided the Dutch fleet (if the traditional British scenario is true now for the first time a part only of the Dutch fleet was surrounded). Apart from these positional problems the Dutch had a structural disadvantage: on average their guns were much lighter. Especially the eight largest British vessels were almost unsinkable themselves but could wreck the smallest Dutch ships with a single broadside. The larger Dutch vessels therefore tried to protect the little ones. The Dutch flagship ''Eendracht'' duelling the ''Royal Charles'' — James was nearly killed by a Dutch chain-ball decapitating several of his courtiers, the head of one of them striking him down — exploded, killing Van Obdam. Kortenaer was second in command; though fatally wounded he hadn't died yet and the other Admirals were unaware of his condition. For hours the Dutch fleet was therefore without effective command. By evening the Dutch were routed, but Vice-Admiral Cornelis Tromp and Lieutenant-Admiral Johan Evertsen, both having taken over command (showing the utter confusion on the Dutch side), made possible an escape and covered the flight, thus preventing complete catastrophe, though 16 more ships were lost. The British lost only one ship, the captured ''Great Charity''. Eight Dutch ships were sunk by the British; six of these were burnt in two separate incidents when they got entangled while fleeing and set ablaze with a fire ship: this happened with the ''Tergoes'' entangling with the company ship ''Maarseveen'' and the merchant ''Swanenburg''; and also to the ''Koevorden'', ''Stad Utrecht'' and ''Prinse Maurits''. The company ship ''Oranje'' exploded while trying to block ''HMS Charles'', when she was attacked by ''HMS Royal Oak'', ''HMS Essex'' and ''HMS Royal Katherine''. Nine more were captured: the ''Hilversum'', ''Delft'', ''Zeelandia'', ''Wapen van Edam'' and ''Jonge Prins''; the VOC-ship ''Nagelboom'' and the merchants ''Carolus Quintus'', ''Mars'' and ''Geldersche Ruyter''. The ''Tromp'' was captured but escaped. Eight older ships had to be written off, as the costs of repair would have exceeded their value. Notable English captains present at the battle included Captain of the Fleet William Penn (admiral) in the HMS Royal Charles and George Ayscue. It has always been a mystery why the British fleet didn't at least try to pursue the Dutch. Several anecdotes are told to explain this. According to one Penn remarked to James that he was looking foreward to the heavy fighting the next day — after all the Dutch were at their best when cornered. James, having narrowly escaped death already, then would have lost his nerve completely. Another legend has it that James' wife ordered Henry Brouncker to keep her husband safe; he obeyed by giving flagcaptain Harman the false order to stop the ''Charles'' in the night. The outcome of the battle was partially caused by an inequality in fire-power, but the Dutch had already embarked on an ambitious expansion programme, building many heavier ships. The English failed to take advantage of their victory. They never managed an effective blockade of the Dutch coast and couldn't prevent the VOC-fleet from returning from the Indies. The fleets, now much more equal in quality, met again at the Four Days Battle in June 1666. Battles of the Anglo-Dutch Wars Naval battles History of Suffolk 1665
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BA | BC | BD | BE | BF | BG | BH | BI | BJ | BK | BL | BM | BN | BO | BP | BR | BS | BT | BU | BW | BX | BY | BZ |Words begining with Battle_of_Lowestoft:
Battle_of_Lowestoft
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